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The transformation of our social lives and the 
increases in surveillance and technological
innovations have led us to believe that privacy is
in the midst of a very public death. But privacy is
not dying, nor can we let it do so. Privacy protects
a set of deeply significant values that no society can
do without; it is about the lines, boundaries and
relationships we draw between and among ourselves,
communities and institutions. Privacy appears
threatened because our perception of what it means
has radically changed.
This collection argues that we get the privacy 
culture we deserve. Our appetite for a connected 
society means we have yet to determine why we 
still care about privacy. These essays explore the 
underlying challenges and realities of privacy in an 
open society, and argue for a new settlement between 
the individual and society; the public and the state; 
the consumer and business. To achieve this, we need 
collective participation in negotiating the terms and 
conditions of twenty-first century privacy.
Charlie Edwards is Head of the Security Programme 
at Demos. Catherine Fieschi is Director of Demos.
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“An open society
depends on individuals
rediscovering the social
value of privacy...”
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9Foreword
Patrick O’Connell
The global technology and communication revolution of the last
two decades has created an unprecedented quantity and quality of
easily accessible information.
The data collected, categorised, analysed and accessed
through modern technology has created better, faster and cheaper
products and services in every part of the public and private 
sectors of democratic countries. Every citizen of these countries is
both required to share, and able to access, more personal data 
than ever before. It is unsurprising therefore that the increase in
personal data held in this way should be accompanied by an
upsurge of interest in issues relating to the security and privacy 
of this data from individuals, civil society and businesses 
like BT.
As a global leader in communications services, BT helps a
significant number of public and private sector customers to 
gather and use data in the most efficient, effective and secure way.
As a company, we are conscious of the responsibility that we have 
to ensure both security and privacy are protected. As individuals 
we are all contributors and consumers of information and so the
way in which institutions, businesses and governments use and
protect that information matters to each of us.
The Prime Minister, in his April 2007 speech to the 
University of Westminster, highlighted the importance of these
issues. Even before recent events involving security of data, he 
had called for a wider public debate about how data used in 
public and private realms could be subjected to oversight and
independent scrutiny. He also discussed the opportunity afforded
by technology to improve security of information and protect
individual liberty.
In the interests of furthering the public debate of these and
other related issues, we are pleased to support the work of Demos 
in collecting a number of engaging, challenging and thought-
provoking essays, which together address the theme ‘the social 
value of privacy’.
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The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of
BT, but they are all of great interest to us and we welcome this
report as a significant and timely contribution to the debate.
Dr Patrick O’Connell is Managing Director, BT Major Programmes.
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Introduction
Charlie Edwards and Catherine Fieschi
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in
society is an equally powerful desire.1
A society that doesn’t value and protect the privacy of the individual is one
without intimacy, honesty or trust.2
Privacy seems to be in the midst of a very public death. Recent 
work on privacy has tended to focus on its disappearance: with the
increase in surveillance and technological innovations, and the
transformation of our social lives. But privacy is neither dead nor
dying. Instead, as the essays in this collection suggest, it is our
perception of what constitutes privacy that is radically changing,
and with it our sense of what privacy means in today’s open society.
Privacy protects a set of deeply significant values that no
society can do without; it is about the lines, boundaries and
relationships we draw between and among ourselves, communities
and institutions. Rather than an empty ideal or state, attitudes to
privacy tell us much about those fundamental relationships; what
people think and expect of their neighbours, their fellow citizens
and their government.
We all value our private life but as individuals our
understanding of what constitutes privacy today is different from
past generations. Our definition of what constitutes privacy has
become increasingly stretched as we rely on each other more; lives
become increasingly connected through everyday activities and
virtually through a panoply of social networking sites. Already an
unprecedented volume of stimuli and interventions come at us 
daily – solicited and unsolicited – at speed and with breath-taking
ease.
Frequently conversations about privacy fail to consider
context and the impact privacy has on our core values such as
dignity, trust, honesty, intimacy and anonymity. The absence of 
this contextual anchor means such debates on privacy float
meaninglessly above our everyday lives. It is why we need to
consider the social value of privacy, which transcends our own
individual interpretation of what privacy means, the role it plays in
defining our social and political relationships, and the way in which
‘if one individual or a group of individuals waives privacy rights, the
level of privacy for all individuals decreases because the value of
privacy decreases’.3
This entails the exploration of a politics of privacy in which we
continually re-negotiate the relationship between privacy concerns
and other values in specific circumstances. We must accept that
individual claims to privacy impact on one another and may even be
in tension,4 and that privacy concerns may be of less importance in
some situations than in others.
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This collection focuses on the status of privacy in the UK today. 
The collection deliberately offers a wide arc of opinion, context and
commentary as privacy is ‘too often debated in terms of laws and
rights and technologies, when the interest of the issue is grounded
in what people feel about, want for and value in the experience of
private life and the personal projects, ties and commitments that it
represents’.5 As Catherine Fieschi points out in the opening essay,
privacy and the extent to which it is valued is intimately connected
to the extent to which people can influence the society and political
landscape around them. In Letters from America in 1951 Alastair
Cooke remarked on the cultural shocks of summer in New York,
where people would be dogged from public place to public place by
transistor radios carried by sports fans. The effect, he wrote, should
‘produce a shudder in you. If it doesn’t, then Britons are not what
they used to be, and their passion for privacy… is dead and gone.’6
From this traditional sense of privacy as freedom from
intervention into one’s personal space, we have reached a point
where our privacy has become a commodity to be exchanged for
goods or services. Personal information has become the currency of
the information age, distributed to corporations and governments
alike and bartered away by the majority of us with scarcely a second
thought as we accrue points on our Tesco club cards, rack up bills
on Amazon and run around town using our Oyster cards. With each
click and each swipe, we accept this continuous surveillance – tacitly
or explicitly – in exchange for the services that are increasingly
reliant on it.
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The use and manipulation of personal information constitutes
a global industry and as this commercial currency flows across
public and private spheres with ease, social, economic and political
boundaries appear to dissolve: information sourced in commercial
transactions or by government departments and agencies;
information about where and how we live, work, shop and drive;
information about our histories and preferences.
Understanding privacy today
But privacy is more than this; it cannot be about data or
information per se, nor even about transient cultural obsessions 
like reality TV. Privacy can be better understood as an elastic
concept that acts as a gateway to a cluster of values such as dignity,
trust, honesty, intimacy and anonymity.
And herein lies the problem. We lack the language to discuss
privacy holistically. We use outdated frames of reference that are no
longer adequate to discuss the contemporary landscape of privacy
concerns or re-frame complex issues about data protection and
vulnerability in other terms. To reduce cash-point theft, for
example, the Home Office announced an initiative to paint out
‘privacy spaces’ around ATM machines to increase our sense of
security: ‘Consisting of a marked out box on the pavement around
bank machines, the spaces are designed to give people privacy as
they use the machines.’7
Privacy is an elastic concept. We all share certain
understandings of it: a freedom to conduct our own personal lives
free from prying eyes; that certain types of information are not to 
be revealed outside limited circumstances; that the ‘Englishman’s
home is his castle’. Yet there is no monolithic definition of ‘privacy’
that holds firm across sectors and cultures.
For the most part, definitional wrangling occurs around a few
broad nodal points. When we guard our privacy we fear the loss of a
personal space in which to reflect and exercise autonomy, free from
scrutiny, pressure or risk, whether it is the ability to organise our
financial affairs, enjoy intimate relationships or participate in
political life. We fear that dignity and power have been wrested
from us to the extent that we are no longer in control of the access
others have to us.
Many have argued that a general concept or ‘right’ to privacy
is meaningless with ‘privacy’ often defined in terms of property 
(as exemplified by the instances in which celebrities go to the 
High Court over photographic rights) or liberty (when we 
protest governmental surveillance of our communications). This
instrumentalisation of the concept of privacy means that it may
better be thought of as the ‘gatekeeper’ to our core values.
In different cultures, different eras and different spheres of
life, expectations of privacy relate closely to relations of power,
concepts of dignity and social organisation. This elasticity reinforces
the need to consider privacy as a shared concept, not an individual
right, and one that evolves alongside the political, social and
economic worlds in which we operate.
In defence of public life
For most of us, however, it is the elastic nature of ‘privacy’ that 
helps conceal rather than reveal the tensions between our 
individual rights and our collective responsibilities. As such the
current debate on privacy has become polarised. In political, legal
and business language alike, complex problems are reduced to
recognisable conceptual frameworks that serve both to render the
issue ‘manageable’ and to structure and influence the outcome 
of debate. This kind of reductionism rarely fits our complex
societies without making serious omissions and is of little help in
seeking to navigate them. And worst of all, ‘privacy’ now essentially
denotes the data protection policy of a particular company or
organisation.
For example, it was argued in a 2005 paper of the UK
Presidency of the EU that ‘to turn our backs on proven biometric
technology, to ignore the use made of fingerprints, iris and digital
photos by both government and the private sector would be to
reject the twenty-first century’.8 In such a discursive representation,
only the obstructive Luddite, fighting the tides like King Canute, as
described by Tom Ilube, could object to these developments. We
need to go beyond the limitations of this bleak dichotomy and
accept that while biometric technologies at our borders may well 
be an important part of the future, they come with attendant costs
and benefits that we are yet to discover.
Just as importantly, attention is often so focused on the
possibilities of government abuse that the status of privacy in other
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spheres – from the NHS to popular culture – is overshadowed in
public discourse. We are regularly reminded that ‘there is no part of
people’s lives which is free from snooping. State intervention and
control expands every day.’9
Yet it is not only the state that is watching; we need a sense of
the bigger picture in all its complexity. Recently an online map of
central London, which includes aerial photography at four times 
the resolution of existing online maps, was launched. In the right
conditions, images at this resolution are enough to identify
individuals. The chief executive of the company was unapologetic.
In an interview Alastair Crawford said the company, 192.com, was
considering holding a competition. ‘We want to challenge people to
find out how much naughty stuff is happening. If you’re having an
affair in London, you’d better be careful!’10
While we may question whether such an initiative is at all
useful we must remember that technology is only a medium through
which the ideas and aspirations of individuals are developed.
Technology is not the ‘problem’ confronting our civil liberties, nor
will it define the future of privacy. However, society’s polarised views
on privacy work to foreclose the debate, to establish ideological
battlegrounds over civil liberties, security and the route to economic
success. We need to open the discussion up, to accept ambiguity
and conflicting social and political goals, and start arguing about
our values.
At present, privacy issues are considered separately by sector
and by sphere, in terms of information, communication, territory 
or the individual. Yet these divisions are becoming less salient in 
the twenty-first century. It is no longer possible to separate out 
these aspects as it once was. The fluidity between spheres of life 
and the extent to which areas are interlinked should therefore
caution us against viewing privacy debates in isolation, where each
is legislated for vertically, however limited our ability to regulate
comprehensively across such different sectors may be.
Privacy is about the lines we draw between ourselves and
others, one world and another. As such we should begin to think
about privacy in terms of ‘border crossings’, instances where ‘a
border of the person is crossed’, whether this is a physical or socio-
cultural barrier.11 This metaphor is particularly pertinent in the
context of globalisation as the world is rapidly being moulded into 
a shared social space by economic and technological forces which
results in diverse impacts between and on regions or sectoral forces
which were previously unconnected.12
The invisible transaction
The exchange of our privacy is increasingly an active transaction we
take part in every day. However, it is not one that we are always
cognisant of, let alone in a strong bargaining position for. Personal
information is attached to a market decision in most cases and is
increasingly hidden from view. In the most obvious scenario, we
enter our personal details in-store or online in order to purchase a
product we want, thus accepting the probability that our details will
be used to target us for similar transactions in future. We pay less
attention, however, to the ‘cookies’ that are placed on our hard
drives as we browse online, monitoring our activities.
We rarely make an objective decision about how much of our
privacy we are willing to trade for goods or services we receive in
return. Privacy is thus often reduced to a mere procedural question
in the commercial context – where it is up to us to pursue the details
and ‘opt out’ if such an option is offered. Today activities such as
driving, opening a bank account, even shopping, require a lot of
information, a lot of subsequent monitoring and, as things stand, a
substantial degree of acquiescence to the higher wisdom of the
necessary agency or corporation not to misuse it. As information is
used to tailor services ever more precisely, we increasingly have only
the choices we are offered.
While governments have always needed to tow a line between
privacy concerns and the demands of service provision, private
companies have traditionally tended to downplay the issue of
consumer privacy. They have often argued that the market or new
technologies will define the future of privacy. Recently, research
from Harvard and Carnegie Mellon has suggested that large
companies may not have much of an economic incentive to prevent
privacy breaches, while others have pointed out that privacy is ‘a
latent concern: the more people know about information risks, the
more concerned they become’.13
Managing a climate of fear
If concern over the status of privacy is becoming more high profile
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in the private sector, in the political sphere an intensified ‘ambition
to control and managerialise the future’14 has sought increasing
stores of personal information about its citizens. This occurs
simultaneously as a function of emotionalism and of rationalism in
public life, each working towards the ‘elimination’ of risk, whether
from terrorism and crime or from inefficiency and human error in
service delivery.
Perri 6 suggests that privacy can be understood as a claim 
for protection against a series of risks: to property, to liberty, to
reputation, to physical security.15 In the age of information, which
otherwise benefits us in so many ways, privacy can be seen not 
only as our protection against risks, but as itself increasingly at risk
as a result of our attempts to control against other hazards; for
example, the focus of many counterterrorism measures has been
physical territorial borders through the innovative use of biometric
technologies and registration schemes. It has been pointed out,
however, that the border-control mode of response to current
security threats does not really answer the problem posed by
terrorism.16 In the matter of security, therefore, we would do well to
remember the warnings of Dietrich Dorner that ‘failure does not
strike like a bolt from the blue; it develops gradually according to its
own logic’17 as understandings of both problems and solutions
acquire their own momentum.
At both the domestic and the international level there are
strong justifications for a degree of surveillance; even those in
favour of stronger safeguards for privacy expect to negotiate their
level of privacy against other needs in practice.18 But as Jeffrey
Rosen points out, many of the security measures we accept, or even
demand, in the name of security play primarily to emotional
responses and not to empirical analyses of the problem.
Some commentators go one step further suggesting that
security has too long been taken as its own vindication, a pursuit
that legitimises all measures. In fact, ‘absolute security is a chimera,
perpetually beyond reach’ and one can indeed have ‘too much
security’.19 That said, this rarely stops us pursuing technological
answers, whether it is the ‘naked machine’ at the airport as described
by Rosen or compulsory ID cards. If this is the case it becomes
important that the values attached to privacy are articulated. More
importantly, the burden of proof must remain on those who would
erode it. As Liberty warns: ‘We are moving away from a position
where information is not shared unless necessary, towards one where
it will be shared unless there is a reason not to.’20
What have you got to hide?
Unsurprisingly, given the loss of data by government departments,
agencies and some companies, there is a presumption of distrust in
the practice of information gathering by government, and growing
consternation that a reluctance to hand over personal data implies
that one has ‘something to hide’. Such a disposition is not only
unpleasant for the texture of society but corrodes the social
contract. As Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner, has
warned of ID cards, such systems of surveillance effect a very
significant sea change in the relationship between the state and
every individual in this country.21
We are reminded by Jonathan Bamford, for example, that
Britons are the most watched people in the world, with one closed
circuit television (CCTV) camera for every 14 people. Our collective
anger at such information often hides our individual support for
such measures. As David Lyon argues, surveillance has ‘two faces –
one that intrudes and impacts on privacy, and one that watches and,
potentially protects – but both may [be] visible simultaneously’.22
And despite the lack of conclusive evidence that CCTV prevents
crime, for example, it has been shown to have success at minimising
road accidents.23
As Joan Smith argued in the The Moral Universe, reticence
about disclosures relating to one’s private life ‘becomes
synonymous, to many journalists, with having something to hide’,24
an observation that has tended to be reflected in the political sphere
in recent years. Significantly, it is in the context of our right to
scrutinise public figures that privacy laws have often been most
tested. As Western culture has become increasingly fascinated with
celebrity, aided by the speed and technological sophistication of the
media and communications industries, the level of intrusion has
intensified far beyond unseemly gossip.25 High-profile court cases
such as those brought by Catherine Zeta Jones and Michael
Douglas or Naomi Campbell in recent years, as well as paparazzi
harassment such as that preceding the death of Princess Diana, have
ironically served as significant nodes of public debate for how we
think of privacy, consent and intrusion.
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As Zoe Williams argues one is more likely to discuss privacy in
terms of the right of celebrities to be free of excessive paparazzi
intrusion or harassment by the tabloids, than in terms of the data-
sharing practices that so regularly affect our own lives. In the media
industry, we also see the harsh tension between the market and
broader social values. Sometimes players self-regulate, as they have
at times with the younger royals. This was seen in the case of Kate
Middleton, girlfriend to Prince William but otherwise a fairly
normal young woman, who was subjected to continuous press
surveillance. The tabloids finally stepped back in response to threats
of legal action.
A final development relates to the private figure in the public
sphere, as the last decade has witnessed the phenomenal rise of
reality TV, particularly Big Brother. Unique among reality formats,
the programme strips away all privacy: contestants are filmed 24
hours a day – eating, sleeping, brushing their teeth, losing
psychological control and screaming and rowing with one another.
In this instance meaningful privacy relates less to information or
bodily access per se than to the more pervasive erosion of intimacy
in our ‘access all areas’ culture.
As Peter Bazalgette argues, the generation growing up as we
write has developed entirely different parameters for privacy from
those preceding it.26 Do we need to know if David Cameron, or
anyone else for that matter, took drugs at school? Bazalgette’s
answer is no: politicians are entitled to a past that is private and
remains private. Do we need to know if a prominent politician has
cheated on his wife or had an affair with a married woman? Only if
we suspect further corruption or abuse of his position is involved.
As scandals of recent years have shown, the lines are blurred
between the ‘conflict of interest’ story we may be entitled to, and the
personal, salacious minutiae that are often dug up. The tendency
towards function-creep is again in evidence as ‘necessity,
proportionality and consent’ pale in the face of the de facto
technological capability to circulate such stories. We have the
conversation after – and because – the private information is made
public, not in advance of the fact.
Conclusion
When asked, we tend not to want our personal information to be
used and manipulated without our consent, the chance to correct it
or to limit its accessibility; yet every day we make decisions and
choices that suggest we ultimately don’t care or know enough.
As this collection demonstrates, our collective ignorance
means we get the privacy culture we deserve. What seems clear is
that any settlement between the individual and society, the public
and the state, the consumer and business must be accommodating
enough to develop alongside new technologies, varied cultural
needs and emergent patterns of governance. What matters is our
active participation in negotiating the terms and conditions of
privacy.
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Essay summaries
Privacy’s public death?
The social value of privacy
Catherine Fieschi
The received conception of privacy under which we operate is
rooted in the language of rights, and perhaps more specifically in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The European
Convention on Human Rights and the UK’s corresponding 1998
Human Rights Act and other constitutional guarantees make it a
ubiquitous right in most advanced industrial democracies. While 
we know that the concept of privacy varies from one culture to
another, this variance raises some profound questions as to our
understanding of privacy, its elasticity and the way in which it 
might evolve in the future.
Whose privacy is it anyway?
Zoe Williams
Individuals have never had so much privacy. Daunted by the sur-
veillance possibilities of modern technology, we forget how many
surveillance possibilities our nearest and dearest used to have just by
opening their curtains. So we funnel essentially irrational anxieties
into a wider fear for our privacy from the prying eyes of the world,
and by a happy dovetailing, our celebrity ego ideals reflect those
anxieties right back at us, at greater volume. Our irrational anxieties
have no basis in reality at all.
Where everybody knows your name
Tom Ilube
A world rich in personal information brings with it risks. And this
world of information is a reality, a necessary part of globalised
business, international communication and interaction. The 
amount of personal information about us increases exponentially
every year. Instead of being fearful, we need to understand how 
to prosper in this world. Appreciating promotion, through the
technologies that spawn such a wealth of data, is as important as
privacy protection.
Drunken students, beauty queens and pole dancing
Peter Bazalgette
The bulk of users employ their MySpace and Facebook entries for
self-advertisement, social networking and the generally raw process
of growing up. They are the first generation that can tell you
precisely how many ‘friends’ they have. They are also the first
generation whose sexual adventures, drug taking, immature
opinions and personal photographs are shared electronically.
The public’s private lives
Being watched
Peter Bradwell and Niamh Gallagher
Shutting the door, drawing the curtains, disconnecting the phone,
deleting the files and stashing the diaries; the realm of the private is
at once comforting and essential. But the scent of the illicit or illegal
is never too far away. In the connections between ‘closeness’ and
affiliation there sit expectations about what we want, or are entitled,
to know of others, and vice versa. The way we talk about privacy
can tell us a lot about our social fabric, yet it is often seen as ‘merely’
a civil liberties problem, a predictable whine of the chattering classes
or paranoid libertarians. We should understand privacy as being
about control, context and choice. Across all three dimensions the
privacy challenge is changing.
A place of greater safety? Information sharing and confidentiality
Perri 6, Chris Bellamy and Charles Raab
Information sharing across public services is seen as key to
coordinating the efforts and support of government departments.
But this poses particular problems for privacy, often phrased in the
language of balance – between confidentiality and collaborative
working. But these decisions over risk are not about balance or
general rules; they involve judgement and choices about individual
cases and the risks attached to each. Guidance at the moment
concentrates on the risks of not sharing. But future government
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intervention needs to be based around training to develop the skills
and capacities for these judgements to be made, rather than more
guidance or legislation.
The case of electronic patient records: is the privacy debate a
smokescreen?
Marlene Winfield
If the majority of us are ‘privacy pragmatists’, then we need to
understand why the current phase of NHS reform, based around
electronic medical information and better sharing of it, is
happening, and what the benefits are. The NHS IT programme is
centred on changing the relationship between health service and
patient by putting the emphasis on patients’ informed choices, and
allowing them to have a greater voice in the health system. There 
are compelling and necessary benefits to connected health records,
from better-informed patients and staff, to better research into
medical and health trends. The opposition, in particular from
doctors, can be seen as a reaction against the empowering of
patients in this system with a greater voice, and better health
information.
How personal medical data can improve the public’s health
Robert Souhami
The opportunities for UK research to improve the health and lives
of the population are now exceptional. But just at this moment of
opportunity, changes in the laws concerning privacy, combined with
confused interpretation and regulation of these laws and a
conflicting and multilayered bureaucracy, have put such research at
risk. As citizens we know we have responsibilities as well as rights.
Regulating our private lives in an open society
Sleepwalking into a surveillance society
Jonathan Bamford
The thirst for more information about individuals seems
unquenchable but it would be unduly pessimistic to believe that
data protection and privacy laws are at best anachronistic, and at
worst completely useless. It is fair to say that data protection and
privacy regulation has struggled to keep pace with the technological,
economic and political changes that have driven the expansion in
the breadth and depth of personal details held about individuals.
Towards global privacy standards
Peter Fleischer
Information and data now flows easily and instantly around the
globe. But our data protection legislation does not match this
reality. Instead, there is either no protection, or, where it exists, 
it is not compatible enough with information protection regimes 
in other countries or regions. Because of the complex and
interconnected nature of the global information economy, we 
need to develop the patchwork of alternative approaches into a
coordinated drive to develop global privacy standards, consistent
with commercial realities, political needs and technological realities.
The naked machine: privacy and security in an age of terror
Jeffrey Rosen
When it comes to the protection of privacy, legal values tend to
reflect and follow social norms, rather than the other way around.
Perhaps those who hope to import a European understanding of
privacy into the US, and vice versa, should focus on changing social
understandings of privacy rather than on passing new laws. But can
social understandings of privacy easily be changed to accommodate
both honour and liberty? A society where citizens refuse to respect
their own privacy is not one where privacy will be long respected;
and the US experience suggests that citizens in an individualistic
market democracy may perceive too many market rewards for
exposure to respect their own privacy for long.
The culture of control
Simon Davies
The current interest in privacy stems from the broader concern over
loss of human autonomy. The number of people who are restrained
or disciplined by legal, administrative and judicial mechanisms each
year is a thousand per cent greater than 20 years ago. Legislation
regulating conduct in public has increased 15-fold in the same
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period. The requirement for ‘permission’ to initiate group activities
has soared. It can now be argued successfully that individual
freedom is no longer conditioned by what is expressly prohibited in
law, but instead is circumscribed by what the law expressly permits.
In this context privacy takes on a libertarian aspect and thus
becomes the standard bearer for the general issue of freedoms.
The architecture of privacy: space, power and human rights
Markus Miessen and International Festival
This chapter looks at privacy as a socio-spatial concept. Like the
boundaries between our home and the street, the space around us
comes to reflect the priorities of privacy: whom we choose to let in
to spaces and whom we choose to keep out. Through stipulations
about minimum overlooking distance and the often mandatory half
metre between pavement and front door, such considerations are in
fact at the heart of the UK planning system. The way spaces are
organised is not only a result of, but helps to shape, relationships
between people and groups, and influences how people understand
their identity, position vis-à-vis others, and culture of everyday life.
Regulating privacy
Gareth Crossman
In 2008 we are subject to levels of state and private sector intrusion
and surveillance unimaginable ten years ago. This is not necessarily
a bad thing. Surveillance techniques need to adapt to deal with
modern criminality while data sharing can make life more
convenient and improve access to public services. What has been
missing in government policy in recent years is a sense of
proportionality limiting privacy intrusion so that it is targeted and
appropriate. This overarching principle can be applied across the
range of privacy-relevant subjects. Citizens are dubious about the
extent to which their personal details and images will be accessible
through tools such as the National Identity Register, National DNA
Database and CCTV cameras. A government that is willing to listen
to the growing expressions of public concern about privacy
intrusion will provide a crucial opportunity for progressive change
and will help make privacy a meaningful concept once again.

PRIVACY’S PUBLIC DEATH?

1 The social value 
of privacy
Catherine Fieschi
31
The idea of human beings as social animals has deep philosophical
and emotional appeal, and following in Aristotle’s footsteps we
easily acquiesce to our unfailingly social nature. The Roussseaus
and Hobbes of this world may have periodically introduced a 
note of scepticism as to the inherently positive nature of social
relationships; recent research has tended to bear out the sociability
thesis for better or for worse. Whether this sociability gives rise 
to tribalism and sectarian instincts, or whether it is perceived as
enabling ‘the better angels of our nature’, it is understood as 
pivotal to our understanding of human motivation.1
Examining the concept of privacy is an additional lens
through which we can usefully examine the nature and ways of
sociability because it allows us to examine human beings as they
really are – neither entirely social, nor primarily individualistic,
neither needy busybodies nor not-so-noble savages, but rather as
beings who thrive and survive through exchange and whose needs
can be fulfilled only through a form of interdependence that entails
knowledge of each other and various forms of trust. Privacy allows
us to posit human beings as relational. The aim of this chapter is to
move beyond individualistic and spatial understandings of privacy
towards a more relational one – an understanding that moves
beyond the paradoxes of modern and postmodern life and
hopefully nuances a received wisdom deeply rooted in an
eighteenth-century view of human beings as having no choice but 
to be either estranged from society or riveted to one another. We
have already begun to use, if not properly to think about, privacy as
a commodity, but we have not yet begun to contemplate the needs
of the relationships that we trigger through this new conception 
of privacy, nor about the parameters of these relationships and the
choices to which they give rise and the adjustments that they 
require us to make in our very understanding of the concept of
privacy. If we can start to think of privacy as the regulatory
mechanism through which we can construct our relationships to
each other and to the state, then we can leave behind a very clunky
public/private division, just as we can move beyond banal and
misleading statements about global villages.
To do this I’ll outline a couple of paradoxes, examine one 
or two clichés, and delineate what we might call a ‘relational’
understanding of privacy as it relates to a world where community
and collective action – and therefore how we relate to one another –
hold the key to our wellbeing and survival. We know that
relationships are at the heart of politics. How can thinking about
privacy in new ways help us to structure these relationships in the
twenty-first century?
The private realm
Much of liberal political thought is structured around the
dichotomy between the public and the private – in fact, it is an
almost inescapable axiom of the liberal mindset and one which
many have rightly striven to define, protect and defend. But I 
would suggest that we need to re-think and re-phrase this axiom
slightly. In a world of dissolving spaces and boundaries and
increased information, the shape of each of these spheres is
changing irreversibly. What may matter more and more are the 
tools with which we negotiate these increasingly fluid barriers and
our evolving needs and aspirations rather than camping stubbornly
on a territory that is shifting beneath our feet.
What we have until now referred to as ‘the private realm’ may
well become more nebulous (parenting is coming under increasing
public scrutiny for educational and other purposes; family life is
regularly examined for its impact on lifestyle and behaviour; private
beliefs and convictions are ‘outed’ both in the name of recognition
as well as for the purposes of cohesion and security). In such a
climate, the ‘personal’ and the ‘intimate’ may well take on ever more
importance and we need new perspectives and instruments to
defend and understand their relevance.
As for the ‘public realm’, it is continuously reshaped by more
ephemeral but also unforeseen and powerful forces (linked to
obvious changes in IT, the Web 2.0 revolution and its consequences,
but also linked to population pressures, migration and capital
flows). In this situation, where the intimate and the anonymous, the
personal and the disembodied collide, the concept of privacy as a
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regulatory mechanism between new versions of the personal (and
not only the private) and the public may well be one of the many
tools we need to negotiate those new boundaries that emerge as
older ones dissolve.
Privacy and paradox
It has become commonplace to argue that one of the hallmarks of
late- or postmodernity is both the speed at which information
travels and the amount of information that is both held about us
and that we hold about others – all this against a background of
ever-increasing levels of alienation, isolation and depression. In
other words there are two paradoxes. The first is that information
and the flows of information which we once held to be the secret 
to connecting to each other and to securing shared goals, values 
and objectives, as well as an increased capacity to realise them (a
conception of progress linked to our capacity to know more about
each other and thereby work together better), seem to come at the
cost of deep disconnection and alienation in part undermining their
very aim.
The second paradox – not unrelated to the first – is that we
use and trade information every day (including personal informa-
tion, which can be slowly and increasingly collated and interpreted
across public and private boundaries) much as we would any other
currency or commodity in exchange for better and more tailored
services. Personalisation in public services, ease of movement and
increased convenience have in part come at the expense of received
notions of privacy. And as pointed out by analysts, many of these
transactions have become invisible, such is their degree of
embeddedness in technologies, practices and our daily lives. Yet,
while information is collected, processed, stored and distributed on
an unprecedented scale by both private and public organisations
(and by our own selves), the conditions under which most of us live
out our respective existences suggest that we share less and less with
those who are spatially closest to us. And, further, while we may
know our neighbours less, the information universe we inhabit
allows us to develop relationships across the ether with perfect (or
imperfect) strangers with whom we share concerns, lifestyles and
secrets. For example, Aron Ben Ze’ev makes a compelling argument
in his book Love Online2 about the extraordinary degree of intimacy
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achieved thanks to hitherto unknown levels of anonymity through
online relationships.
Why do these paradoxes matter? First, because they partly
explain our scrambling for the communal, the neighbourly: the turn
to a ‘politics of proximity’ in an attempt to return to a spatial scale
that might seem more in tune with both traditional interaction as
well as governmental capacity to govern and deliver goods at a time
of increasing differentiation of needs. This can, of course, yield both
the worst of tribal results (an increase in gang culture, rampant
nimbyism, and the aggressive hopelessness of communities ridden
with anti-social behaviour orders and the rampant paranoia of 
those who live next door) or create a much-needed palpable sense 
of place and belonging. But, no matter which, it highlights our deep
unease in the face of a dissolving sense of boundaries between the
personal and the public, the visible and the invisible, the familiar
and the new.
For the purposes at hand, two further reasons make these
paradoxes relevant to a discussion on privacy.
The first is that the reading of our human condition through
the lens of this paradox relegates us to the status of near-passive
victims – a situation in which we are no more than flotsam in a
churning sea of global forces. This scenario depicts us as utterly
unable to negotiate the complexity and sheer force of international
pressures – in the form of population diversity, capital flows,
information exchanges and all that is generally associated with
globalisation. I balk both at the characterisation of our condition
and at the overwhelmingly negative rendition of globalisation that 
it implies. We can do better than that on both counts – make more
of these deep transformations, seize the opportunities for
development, wellbeing, wealth creation and redistribution and
mobilise creatively enough to mitigate the negative effects of these
transformations and make the most of what they offer. But in order
to do this we must find new tools to negotiate new boundaries,
permeate new fields and understand evolving human reactions and
needs in the face of these.
The paradox matters in a second sense as well because it
tempts us into thinking of privacy as a possible escape from 
modern life to a primeval human state of self-sufficiency and self-
containment. Privacy here is a retreat into a pristine, individualised
space, but more importantly even, it is almost a fantasy of a 1950s,
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or even prewar, space, emblematic of a more traditional lifestyle 
and depicted as if it were in direct opposition to the world we live 
in – a time during which families sat down for dinner together,
neighbours knew and helped each other.
In this communal fantasy (modern, but not too modern)
‘bob-a-job’ communities had clear boundaries and obvious gate-
keepers. Never mind the fact that – where it existed – this fantasy
lasted no more than a handful of decades, politicians hark back to 
a time when communities had contours and when, once behind 
the closed door of the family home, people did as they saw fit, and
thankfully everyone (or so the fantasy goes, dismissing any notion
of power or lost voices) ‘saw fit’ in the same manner.
Behind the 1950s fantasy lurks the ghost of a made-up figure
of the individual – self-contained, emotionally restrained but also
more authentic, but above all decisive in embracing a certain place
in a world full of certainties.
These visions of privacy are less than helpful. This is privacy
‘on the back-foot’ – all about retreat and threat rather than a key
tool to help us navigate the new shape of the relationships in which
we find ourselves. How do we move on from this nostalgic concept
of privacy, to one that is fit for the twenty-first century? Traditional
interpretations don’t help.
Negotiating the received wisdom
Most of us operate with a conception of privacy rooted in the
language of rights, and perhaps more specifically in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, whose Article 12 specifically
enshrines the right to privacy as protection from arbitrary
interference. The European Convention on Human Rights as well
as the UK’s corresponding 1998 Human Rights Act and other
constitutional guarantees make it a ubiquitous right in most
advanced industrial democracies.
We also know that the concept of privacy varies from one
culture to another, but this variance raises some profound questions.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to
‘privacy’; the French, Italian, Spanish and German translations, to
name a few, refer to ‘private life’. Scandinavian translations on the
other hand use their word for ‘privacy’ (in Finnish for instance
‘yksityisyys’). But beyond the much-noted absence of a word for
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‘privacy’ in some languages (and anyone with, say, Italian relatives
will know that such an absence has very tangible repercussions in
day-to-day life), it is worth asking ourselves what this absence means.
Enshrining the concept of ‘privacy’ in the highest law means
enshrining a fundamental human need or human value – much as
one would refer to dignity or compassion for example. What we
value here is precisely that, a value. And in a sense what we
recognise and are committed to – beyond the value itself – is our
capacity to be emotionally attached to it collectively (in that we
undertake to defend it should it come under attack). Such
enshrining gives this value a social meaning and a political status.
What we value – and celebrate – is both our capacity to hold the
personal dear and publicly make that dearness a social good. The
concept of privacy is therefore in part defined by its capacity to 
link the personal to the social and public. For example we recognise
the fact that we all value the affection and commitments that hold 
a family together as a unit, and we publicly declare this unit’s
functioning to be a social good. By enshrining privacy in the law 
we give the personal a very public status.
When we use the language of ‘private life’ (rather than
‘privacy’) on the other hand, what we value is a space rather than a
value. It is a particular kind of space and the law recognises its
importance to all human beings, but it is outside us, no matter how
much value we want to ascribe to it. So what? I would argue that
the vying between these two understandings of privacy prevents us
from ascribing to it the value and role it deserves.
First, taking privacy as a space leads to some positive and
some negative results. On the up side, a space can be tended: such
an understanding places emphasis on the communal; it highlights
the value of the commons and a rich civic society structured around
notions of public space. On the down side, it can create strong,
near-impermeable boundaries between the public and the private
that often prove difficult to negotiate in political terms. More to the
point, with its emphasis on space rather than people it creates a
version of itself in which is difficult to maintain what Baumann calls
our ‘liquid’ state of modernity.3
On the other hand, taking privacy as an inherent human 
need has equally contrasting results. On the negative side it creates
the kind of individualism (some have even referred to a culture 
of narcissism) that is the hallmark of Anglo-Saxon democracies, 
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but more particularly of the US, and can lead to the kind of
commodification of privacy of the sort we delineated earlier:
something to be traded and exchanged at will. This means that it
can be both eaten away at through a process of constant re-
calibrating of the ladder of values, dangers and needs, or held up 
as non-negotiable trump-cards, a situation that leads us down the
blind alleys of non-negotiability: security vs freedom, privacy vs
security, etc.
More positively, however, privacy in this model can more
easily be adapted to the needs of societies whose borders have
become more fluid.
So both of these conceptions yield negative and positive
results, but I would argue that privacy, rather than being about 
how we protect our own turf or maintain our own backyard free of
strangers, could just as easily be seen as an instrument through
which we regulate relationships, in other words, how we relate to
others, to organisations and to institutions.
Towards a relational concept of privacy
Conceiving of privacy as ‘border crossings’ – that is instances where
‘a border of the person is crossed’, whether this is a physical or
socio-cultural barrier – is a step in the right direction. In this regard,
as Gary Marx has suggested,4 the empirical status of what was
known is altered, going from ‘private’ to ‘public’ to some degree. I
would argue, building on that, that a better way of understanding
what this relational approach might mean is to think of privacy in
this instance as a tool for transformation. In other words something
that allows us to move from one perception of someone to another
one. For example, from foreigner to neighbour, from stranger to
friend. Negotiating the different levels of privacy, pacing the
relationship and using the notion of privacy as regulator and, more
to the point, gauge of intimacy is one way of thinking about it.
The case for a relational approach is particularly appropriate
to an understanding of information sharing with the state. In this
case privacy needs to be a lens through which we systematically
assess and construct our relationship to the state and becomes 
the cornerstone of a dynamic and progressive citizenship project.
Because in order to be good citizens we need privacy as a space 
(to develop relationships, to forge our identities in the midst of
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different communities), but upstream from that we need privacy as
a way of constructing the primary public relationship we are in,
namely to other citizens and through that to the state.
Within the realm of this particular relationship with the state,
it is clear that the terms of the relationship are in perpetual flux.
How do we balance out the need for heightened security against the
equally important need for anonymity? The need for cohesion and
shared (basic) values against the right to express dearly held beliefs?
The traditional, liberal response is one that throws us right back
into the paradox outlined earlier. It isn’t that the distinction between
the public and the private isn’t of paramount importance, but rather
that our understanding of what makes up the private realm is
undergoing enormous change. By arguing that there is a clear line
between the public and the private, the rigorous toeing of which can
allow us to uphold the principle of least harm, thereby ensuring
allegiance to a minimal set of shared values and plenty of space for
the private expression of beliefs. The fact is that that stark
distinction between the two spheres is becoming inoperable – and
while it remains valuable, it needs to be updated and re-examined in
light of people’s evolving allegiances, patterns of belonging and
demands on the state (and vice versa). Privacy therefore is what will
allow us to build the kind of relationship we want with the state in
order to arrive at that balance. So privacy is not the result, but is the
instrument with which to achieve and negotiate a better citizenship
settlement.
What about the role of privacy with respect to the relationship
between citizens? In many ways this relationship, with citizens
whom we don’t know, is mediated by the institutions of the state. As
Claus Offe and colleagues suggest, shared institutions allow us to
make assumptions about others and to pretend that we know others
a little better than we actually do.5 It is in the relationship that we
each have with institutions that we can make a certain set of
assumptions about each other and maintain that necessary illusion –
that we share something with other citizens.
But, on another level, that relationship (between citizens) is
also mediated by what else we know about each other, by the ways
in which polls and statistics construct images of groups and of ‘the
other’. Our perceptions of others are fashioned by such information
and its presentation: the number of immigrants who came to the
UK and are planning to stay; the number of people entitled to UK
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citizenship who didn’t take it; the number of recent arrivals being
granted housing.
One of the key things that we may need to focus on in terms
of our future uses of privacy is that we need privacy in order to build
relationships. To create the kind of solidarity we need – the kind of
civil society we need – it is paramount that we both construct
institutions that foster cooperation as well as protect our capacity to
relate to one another on the terms we choose. In this respect it
means that cherishing the social means granting space for the
personal, both in terms of what we expect of the people we know, as
well as what we expect of more public figures.
This goes right to the heart of our notions of citizenship – it
means that we need to embed a notion of privacy in the way in we
choose to relate to others. Rather than use the concept of privacy as
a way of marking out borders, I suggest that we use it as a way of
asking questions about the kinds of relationships we want to build
with different institutions and organisations. Rather than talk only
in terms of our right to information and our right to privacy, and
then to retrench behind the walls that spatial conceptions of privacy
have allowed us to build (some of which for the better), let’s use the
opportunity to examine the terms on which we want to build some
of the key relationships in our lives – be it to institutions or to other
people. This is a subtle rather than a radical shift – it still leaves in
place a combination of the two conceptions of privacy and private
life that I outlined earlier, but it forces us to examine not the borders
we want to cross but the sunny uplands we want to reach and on
what terms.
Catherine Fieschi is the Director of Demos.
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2 Whose privacy is 
it anyway?
Zoe Williams
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When we discuss privacy, we mean one of three things: privacy vis-à-
vis the government; privacy within our families and social networks,
between us and the people we know; and finally, privacy in relation
to ‘the public’ – people who are distinct from us and our friends and
not known to us personally.
This latter group falls under the category of ‘cultural privacy’,
in the sense that it covers age-old tools of sub-legislative censure –
shame, vilification and exclusion. It is private in the sense that,
being sub-legislative, its catalysing event is almost always sex. You
don’t hear people talking about a breach of privacy when they’re
accused of fraud or corruption or indeed any misdeed that is fiscal
or political. They talk about clearing their name.
In terms of the government, in this non-totalitarian state, 
talk of privacy invariably comes down to principles. ‘I don’t want 
to be monitored.’ ‘Why not, if you’re not doing anything illegal?’
‘Because it’s the principle of the thing; I don’t want the structures in
place, should this become a totalitarian state; if I do nothing to
defend these freedoms, I don’t deserve these freedoms.’ I over-use
italics advisedly, here – most of this stuff is rhetorical.
This area really lends itself to great, persuasive theatrical
sweeps; it reminds us of the oratorical bells and whistles of the last
century, and we all feel a certain tingling in our toes listening to it,
but it’s not a going concern. A government that wants to invade its
citizens’ privacy can do so, no problem.
With or without ID cards, CCTV, the DNA database, a 
pliable civil service or a somnambulant populace, if there’s one
thing the last century taught us, where there’s a will, there’s a way.
The surveillance impulse, like that of warfare, drives technology; it
is not driven by it. So all the facilitating apparatus that is
supposedly unique to our times will never pose as great a threat to
our private lives as a government that’s interested in the first place.
And we know it.
We enjoy unprecedented privacy, and the way we fixate over
small incursions is indicative of the freedom of retreat we have come
to expect. For example, there was a brief scandal concerning Google
and the search strings, in which it was discovered that you could, as
a regular punter (albeit quite a computer-literate one) trace a
person’s Google searches, and in that way work out who they were,
and what they were up to.
The example given was a man who had looked up ‘vacancies
plumbing San Diego’, ‘wife cheating private detective’, ‘divorce
lawyer’, ‘revenge wife cheating’, ‘cheating bitch revenge’, ‘dating
San Diego’, ‘care home Florida’, ‘sell rotivator’; from this, an acutely
attentive neighbour or friend could pretty accurately identify this
cuckolded fellow and plot the trajectory of his betrayal and recovery.
In case that didn’t sound serious enough – a hypothetical
example was then given: ‘Baptist church Rochester New York’,
‘recipe cherry chocolate brownie’, ‘menopause symptoms’, ‘hot
flush herbal remedy’, ‘sex toys female’; here, it becomes rather more
problematic, since of course there’d be no forgetting who’d made the
cherry chocolate brownies in a relatively small church, and the
personal shame endured by the imaginary menopausal lady would
be enormous.
But set these possible breaches against the vast potential for
privacy that we now enjoy – the fact that you need never again be
spotted buying a vibrator because you can buy one on the internet;
the fact that you can seek advice on personal matters from internet
strangers, where once you’d have had to rely on people known to
you; the fact that you will never again be caught red-handed in a
phone box; the rolling out of credit availability so that you can
spend, undetected, as much as you want, and needn’t be rumbled
until and unless you bankrupt yourself.
Personal liberty, to pursue one’s ends in total privacy, can only
be absolute for those who have no meaningful social bonds. And
yet, all day-to-day technological advances, alongside making life
more convenient, also make it harder for us to monitor one another.
This is a natural enough progression, since the harder things
are, on a practical level, the more we need to cooperate, and the
more we will, by necessity, know about one another’s business. The
general trend, with consumer transactions getting easier and easier,
and neighbourly cooperation getting less and less necessary, is
towards anonymity. As is often the paradoxical way with our
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perception of risk, the harder it is to monitor one another, the more
anxious we get about the possibility that someone might want to.
So, for instance, last year there was a minor, Radio 4-scale
controversy about mobile-phone-tracking companies like
Verilocation, whose number had really exploded since the software
to track individual phones became available roughly five years ago.
It was an open invitation to stalkers, claimed the consumer
programme You and Yours, and it’s true that if you did want to stalk
someone this might be your first investment.
But never mind that these software programs only work with
consenting phones, and never mind that most of us, however much
we kid ourselves, have sufficiently predictable routines that the last
thing a stalker would need is satellite capability; the obvious point is
that, ten years ago, we could all locate one another geographically
without even thinking about it, by the simple precaution of using a
landline.
In every instance where we perceive our personal privacy to be
under threat, all we need to do is ask ourselves what it would have
been like a decade or two ago: almost invariably, the potential for
secrecy has increased and not diminished.
Cultural privacy should be even less of a concern, and yet in
the same way, occupies us irrationally. None of us holds any
particular interest for those who don’t know us. The sliding scale is
as follows: for the extremely famous, every aspect of their lives is
interesting to every possible observer; for the quite famous, it is
interesting to a lesser degree, until you get to the bottom half of the
alphabet, the M-list down, if you like, whereon personal details are
interesting only if they relate in some way to the thing this person is
famous for.
This being the case, our fear about our privacy in relation to
this amorphous mass of ‘public’ is totally unfounded, since it isn’t in
jeopardy. Nobody, for example, wants to know about what I drink
in a pub. There probably isn’t an activity I could do that would
interest the public that wasn’t illegal, in which case considerations of
privacy would have been trounced by those of the law. So, we claim
to put a high value on cultural privacy, because to do so is to
identify oneself with society’s most successful strata, and yet, the
only conceivable route any of us could take to ascend to that strata
is by abnegating privacy altogether – deliberately seeking fame,
which entails at least the promise of total self-exposure.
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The showbiz metaphor for this is the starlet who gets on to the
fame carousel by stripping, and then spends the rest of her career
tracking down and exterminating images of herself naked. This
tension, between pretending to value privacy much more highly
than in fact it warrants, and in reality being prepared to jettison it in
a heartbeat, for the higher purposes of fame, is most keenly felt and
obviously manifested in the so-called Big Brother generation, the
16–24-year-olds whose attention is the holy grail for all media.
In a YouGov poll early last year,1 a sample of 777 Big Brother
watchers (these were actually younger than the standard age
bracket, all under 20) were asked why they wanted to be famous,
and which particular famous people they emulated. The answers
were instructive: the vast majority were in it for the money and,
while there was very little consensus on celebrity role models,
nobody at all wanted to be Jade Goody and the largest single share
(11 per cent) said Richard Branson. Nobody wanted to be Callum
Best, or Abi Titmuss, or Tara Palmer Tomkinson.
Attention-seekers are universally derided, and yet we have
totally dropped the notion that money is a dirty word, totally
dropped the idea that pursuit of fame for the sake of cash is a
cynical business. Wealth was once considered an undignified end,
but it’s a lot more dignified than its alternative, the youth of today
point out, which is the indiscriminate pursuit of attention. And yet,
fame, certainly in its reality-TV form, carries no guarantees other
than attention, least of all wealth (some of them get rich, but they
are very much the minority).
Handbag economics
It is interesting, given that so many other social taboos have been
swept away – it is no longer de trop to be grasping, or selfish or
money-grabbing, or even gold-digging; it is acceptable to be girlish
or boyish, to refuse to grow up, to maintain the sartorial and
behavioural conventions of a person 20 years younger than you, to
idealise youth at the cost of rationality, to be vain, to reject
maturation. And yet attention-seeking – which has traditionally
been frowned on simply as a component of immaturity – is still
disparaged, while the immaturity itself is embraced. Why would
that be the case? Why should attention-seeking be singled out to
retain its taboo? Precisely because its opposite, privacy, is prized,
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even while so few of us are in a position where our privacy is
genuinely under threat, and of those whose is, most sought out that
threat in the first place.
Partly, this is just an extension of handbag economics, wherein
a ten-grand bag can look like a rat on a string, and will still be an
object of lust purely because it costs £10,000 – this idea occupied 
ad executives in the 1970s, but has passed out of notice simply
because it’s such a no-brainer that to remark on it is unnecessary: a
thing’s desirability is in inverse proportion to how affordable it is,
and furthermore, as an ironic gesture (I like to think), this thing is
often made less visibly desirable to ram home the message that it’s so
expensive, you’re going to want it anyway.
Celebrities are integral to this process of cranking up our
handbag urges, since aspiration is a pretty coarse impulse, and
doesn’t appeal in the abstract: we need to see someone embody a
lifestyle before we will aspire to it. Naturally, the one thing more
valuable than the thing that is incomprehensibly expensive is the
thing that is priceless. What do all celebrities always want? Privacy.
It is the only thing whose lack unites them and yet excludes us.
Everything else they can either easily afford or none of us can buy
and there’s already a Beatles song about how it can’t be bought.
Sex
All of which takes us back to sex. If we are not privileging cultural
privacy, and are simply aping celebrities, what are they doing? On
certain, rather rare, occasions, it’ll be about money, such as
Catherine Zeta Jones and Michael Douglas’s privacy, in their case
against Hello! Magazine. Their aim was to set themselves up as a 
legal precedent in the protection of other celebrities’ photo licensing
agreements (in doing so the Hello! photographs disturbed the
existence, and very lucrative, deal with OK! magazine).
A more obvious and representative case would be, say, David
Beckham calling for privacy in the text-tapping with Rebecca Loos,
when he actually meant ‘stop telling my wife these things’. This was
effectively a call for old-fashioned personal privacy within a family.
But there’s no honour in appealing to the public to keep your
secrets from your actual wife. You appeal instead to an impulse,
which (a) sounds as if it has a higher moral purpose and (b) seems
to you to be universal.
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During the thirteenth century, when the concept of
defamation first featured in English law, privacy did have a moral
dimension. The entire concept that one’s reputation could be
diminished in the eyes of right-thinking persons, and that anyone
would consider this a bad thing, relies on the concept of reputation,
and the existence of right-thinking persons. It relies on this Utopian
notion (Moore’s Utopia) that public shame is a useful and
meaningful tool of control, and therefore, that privacy ought not to
be invaded flippantly since, whether or not the misdemeanour was
real, the forces of public censure were powerful, and not to be taken
lightly, nor brandished disproportionately.
Nowadays, of course, such thinking is ludicrous – public
censure is no longer a powerful tool. There is no such thing as a
‘right-thinking majority’; there is pluralism; there is contrariness;
there is no such thing as absolute right; there is scant notion of
respectability. All this has been jettisoned by forces good and bad –
most of them, it has to be said, good; a lot of civil control, of
women, of the economically excluded, relied on disapproval to 
keep people quiet. On balance, I’d say we’re better off without it.
But the language of it remains attractive, since it lends dignity to
privacy appeals which would otherwise be a whiny, self-justifying,
‘don’t tell my wife! It weren’t me!’
The appeal for empathy, the notion that there’s a universal
urge for privacy which we all share, is another aspect of this bid for
dignity, and is even more false – celebrities and their defenders
always end with this: ‘Everyone needs some privacy.’ And we all nod
along, because in colluding with it we become a little bit more like
these golden gods, even while we are nothing like them, our needs
are totally different, and if we were offered greater privacy, we would
have no use for it, it would be like feeding grass to a mouse.
But just because it is ridden with sleight of hand and
disingenuousness doesn’t mean that debate around privacy has no
meaning or value – indeed, it’s probably the last arena in which we
discuss our views on sexual morality in a meaningful and honest
way. As such, it’s the last bastion of morality, really, since everything
else we have either abandoned or delegated to the legal system.
In conclusion, we’ve never had so much privacy in all the
most meaningful ways. Daunted by the surveillance possibilities of
modern technology, we forget how many surveillance possibilities
our nearest and dearest used to have just by opening their curtains.
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So we funnel essentially irrational anxieties into a wider fear for our
privacy from the prying eyes of the world, and by a happy dove-
tailing, our celebrity ego ideals reflect those anxieties right back at
us, at greater volume. It has no basis in reality at all. But I ought to
add the rider, here, that I never had any sense of privacy in the first
place, and will tell anybody anything.
Zoe Williams is a Guardian columnist.
Notes
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1 See www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/BRO050101012_1.pdf (accessed
18 Mar 2008).

3 Where everybody knows
your name
Tom Ilube
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The internet is great. It used to take me two to three weeks to gather everything 
I needed to steal an identity. Now I can get it done in two to three hours 
online.
This quote is from a fraudster, in a report commissioned by Garlik
and produced by the research criminologists 1871 Limited. We 
hear a lot about the dangers of personal information being made
available online, and we commissioned this report to try to gain
some insight into what is really going on.
Two important messages emerged from the research, which
illustrates the challenges that individual consumers face. With the
proliferation of data, fraudsters have become all too aware of how
easy it is to collate personal data online as it has become much easier
than intercepting mail or rooting around in bins for old documents.
This is great news for fraudsters as it is not even clear whether doing
this ‘personal information harvesting’ is actually an offence in the
UK.
The second message is that the ‘identify theft industry’ 
is becoming more organised. A federated, loosely coupled
organisational structure is emerging, with two ‘tiers’. There are
people who specialise in personal information harvesting, searching
online looking for likely targets, amassing their details and passing
them on to the second group. This second group are the identity
fraudsters, who use these packaged identities to fraudulently acquire
credit cards, loans, fake passports, driving licences, benefit claims –
and even to arrange sham marriages.
But while this all sounds very scary in theory, does it really
happen in practice? How easy is it to acquire enough information
about you to start to steal your identity?
The answers are yes, and ‘very easy’ – if you know where to
look. In contrast to the average consumer who will be fairly
ignorant of where their personal information is online, the average
identity fraudster knows exactly where to find you.
Recently Garlik was asked to conduct a short exercise. A TV
researcher selected a social networking user at random and pointed
me in her direction. The lady in question had a pretty typical
webpage – first name only, age, star sign, some general gossip and a
few photos. Nothing, in short, that was particularly revealing.
Within about an hour I had managed to collate enough about her
that, had I been a fraudster, I could have sold her details on as a
nice neat package ready for identity theft.
So, what had I done and what had I found? It is important to
stress that explaining what I did will not reveal anything that either
identity fraudsters or the authorities do not know already. The only
people without this understanding is the target – you. It can be
difficult to work out what warnings of ‘identity theft’ really mean,
and how it happens. Perhaps if there were a greater understanding
of what is possible, it would be easier to take steps to reduce the
probability of being a target.
The lady felt she had been careful on her social networking
page. No full name, no date of birth, no contact details. But this was
a minor inconvenience. I noticed that the social networking site in
question sometimes uses the user’s full name (‘firstname +
lastname’) in the website address (the URL) at the top of the
browser. So, she had been careful but the site itself had given me a
hook, a starting point.
I also knew her age and her star sign (because both were on
her page), so I knew what year and month she was born in. Off to
one of several genealogy websites that publish birth, marriage and
death records of everyone in the UK (whether you like it or not)
and after a few minutes of searching I had located her birth
certificate details. That gave me her mother’s maiden name too; very
useful for proving you are who you say you are when talking to the
high street banks and credit card companies who, despite the fact
that it’s publicly available online, still insist on using it as an
important security word.
Armed with her full name and age it’s over to the school
reunion websites. Ah, there she is. An entry she put on one of those
websites a couple of years ago and has neglected to remove even
though after the initial excitement of being reunited with old friends
she hasn’t actually used it since. There she lists all her schools. She
didn’t move far, I can see the area she was born and the schools she
went to on one of the online maps and they are all quite close.
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Brought up a Catholic, too, I see, judging by the schools. All useful
background context for the identity thief.
By looking at the electoral roll online it is also possible to get a
sense of where she lives and works. Because she hasn’t ticked the
confusingly worded ‘take me off the edited electoral roll’ box I am
soon able to find more details of her. Within a few hours
information about her career, old boyfriends, where she works now
and what she’s thinking about her future are all downloaded.
But the problem to the identity thief is that none of this is
tangible. Going into a high street store and trying to get a store card
in her name won’t work as they will ask for physical proof of
identity, perhaps a utility bill or similar, and possibly a photo to
prove it. I know her address so I could go round and trawl through
her rubbish looking for an old bill. But I don’t want to get my hands
too dirty and I might get caught. Besides, she’s probably got a
shredder and uses it diligently, confident in the belief that she is
thereby protected from identity theft.
However, have you ever looked at a utility bill? They tend to
be standard A4 bits of paper. By using any utility bill, I can scan it,
edit it with my details and within a short time I can create a near
perfect utility bill. Finally I can go to one of several ‘fake ID’ sites to
get a passable UK driving licence.
All that takes about an hour, and we have done several more
tests of this nature. We find that if you stop people randomly on the
street, collect their name, approximate age and star sign then on
average for three out of ten people you can go on to collate enough
information to take over their identity within an hour.
Moore’s law of personal information
This ability to intrude into an individual’s life using information
found solely online is unprecedented and is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Five years ago citizens did not face this situation. So
what has changed in this period? The first is the rise of Web 2.0.
Companies such as MySpace, Facebook, blogging sites, YouTube
and Friends Reunited began to emerge in 2002 after the ‘dotcom
crash’ of the preceding couple of years. This new wave differs from
the first-generation Web 1.0 companies (Amazon, eBay and Egg) by
being driven primarily by user-generated content. This means that
the bulk of the content that makes up a Web 2.0 website is
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contributed by its individual users rather than the company itself. It
might be pictures, an online diary, videos or just comments about a
hotel you stayed at. The common thread is that it is all about what
you say to the world.
Hundreds if not thousands of these sites, alongside perhaps
70 million ‘blogs’ (online diaries) have been created, relying on tens
of millions of users publishing a deluge of their content – from
pictures to videos.
The second point is the push towards e-government. The UK
government in particular is striving to use the web to make services
more accessible to citizens. One of the ways the government will do
this is to make public sources of information readily accessible by
making them available online. These range from millions of birth,
marriage and death records, company directors’ personal details,
house prices, electoral roll and address records. That extends to
planning applications, often with full plans of your house, plus your
signature and mobile phone number – online, in the name of e-
government. Recent analysis from Garlik estimates that in the
region of 600 million individual records of personal information
have been made publicly available online over the past few years in
an effort by the UK government to be more accessible.
You could argue that all this information is already ‘in the
public domain’, but there is a big difference between a piece of
personal information sitting in a document in the local town hall
and the same piece of information on the web available for
inspection across the globe from West Africa to Eastern Europe at
the click of a mouse.
With the fierce competition among Web 2.0 companies to
expand their user bases and advertising revenue, and the continued
drive towards e-government, this looks unlikely to slow down in the
near future.
The third factor is perhaps the most important and that is 
the way in which personal information can be joined up to provide
a level of insight into any individual that was not previously
possible.
As you will have observed from the earlier example of how to
collate a full picture of an individual online, it is the ability to tie
together personal information from multiple sources, from public
databases with user-generated and Web 2.0 content, that exposes us
in a way that did not previously exist. It’s all about understanding
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the relationships between the data. This is the world of ‘mash ups’,
where one source of data is overlaid (‘mashed up’) with another
source of data, to produce a new and interesting picture.
For example you can find out how much your local MP paid
for their house by taking a list of all the UK MPs’ home addresses
and mashing it up with house prices and an interactive map of the
UK. Sounds fun? How about if I do the same thing for you and all
your friends and relatives? Is that harmless fun too? After all, the
information is already ‘out there’, I am only combining it in new
ways, as are companies dedicated to doing just this sort of thing.
In physics there is a phenomenon known as a ‘phase
transition’. After a period of time of heating a solid block of ice it
will go through a transition and become a liquid. It’s still made of
the same particles but now it has different properties and needs to
be handled in different ways. The world of personal information is
undergoing its version of a ‘phase transition’. There is so much
personal information that has been made public on Web 1.0 and
Web 2.0 and all of it can be knitted together in unexpected ways. 
A new environment has been created, which is profoundly different
from what went before. And yet the current debate is often about
applying or strengthening the ‘old’ rules in this new environment,
without appreciating what has changed. In this new world of Web
2.0 we need to reconsider important notions such as privacy and
identity to ensure that our understanding of them, in this new
phase, still makes sense.
The King Canute strategy
We could address this new phase by adopting the King Canute
strategy. We could go down to the water’s edge as the tide of online
personal information sweeps towards us and declare loudly, ‘In the
name of Privacy, we command you to stop!’
This approach is doomed to fail. Instead we must approach
the challenge from a different perspective. We can assume that we
are entering a world in which in five years’ time there will be 10–20
times more personal information online about individuals than
there is today. I assume that information will be combined, ‘mashed
up’, in ways I can’t even imagine at the moment. That is the world I
expect to find myself in, whether I like it or not. It doesn’t worry me,
and it doesn’t scare me. It’s not better or worse than today’s world.
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It is just different – a different phase – and we need to be ready for
it and learn how to thrive in that new environment.
Much of the debate emphasises the negative aspects of Web
2.0 – invasions of privacy or identity theft – yet there are many
positive stories: rekindled relationships, opportunities seized and
lives changed due to this new world of personal information.
I recently found my sister, after 30 years, who was lost to us in
another country of over 20 million people. My search was founded
on, and was only possible because of, some random personal
information about me posted on a social networking site. As a
result, lives have been changed; my children have met new cousins,
my father has a daughter he thought he had lost forever and
grandchildren he never knew, and I have completed a link in the
chain of my life.
Staying private?
I don’t bother to ask how I retain my ‘privacy’ in this not too distant
digital world because I really do not know what ‘retain my privacy’
means. I do not seek ‘complete power’ or ‘absolute control’ over my
personal information because I live in a real world of negotiation
and navigation, not a world of black and white absolutes.
So the question I ask myself is this: how do I gain real power,
for myself and my family, over my personal information in this
digital world? In this new digital world, digital identity, the
collection of personal information about me, a person in the online
world, becomes as important as ‘real world’ identity. Who I am,
what shape I am, and how big I am in the digital world really
matters.
This is because others wanting to interact with me will make
decisions and assumptions based on my digital identity. This is
already starting to happen. When an executive is being recruited the
company employing him will almost certainly ‘Google’ him to get a
sense of what the world thinks of him. In social settings people
check each other out online as a matter of course. Companies
evaluate you continuously based on your digital profile. And as the
amount of information mushrooms and combines in different ways,
this will become standard and accepted practice.
So in many ways, however unfamiliar or uncomfortable a
concept it may be, promotion will be as important as protection in this
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emerging world of digital information. How do you want to be seen
by people who are looking at you?
As individuals we need help to understand this new world of
personal information and we need tools, techniques and powerful
levers to help us take advantage of it, to give us real power over our
personal information, and what it means for us. Just as companies
are emerging to extract and exploit personal information, so also
companies are emerging to help individuals use their personal
information to find that power.
Over the coming few years there will be large-scale initiatives
aimed at consumers, specifically designed to give them power over
their personal information. We are entering a different phase in the
evolving digital world of personal information, not better, not
worse, just profoundly different. The challenge for you as an
individual is not to try to hold back the tide in the name of privacy
but to learn how to swim safely, then jump right in and enjoy
yourself.
Tom Ilube is Chief Executive Officer at online identity experts Garlik.
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4 Drunken students,
beauty queens and 
pole dancing
Peter Bazalgette
57
When David Cameron’s brush with drugs at Eton was revealed 
last year he resolutely refused to comment. The leader of the
Conservative Party and his well-drilled lieutenants justified their
stance with a simple phrase: ‘Everyone deserves a private past.’ It
was not long before another vice of the adolescent Cameron had
been unearthed – his Oxford membership of the elitist Bullingdon
club. There was the group photograph with boy David to prove it.
He and his fellow peacocks were proudly on parade in their £1,000-
a-head regalia.
Although we might all expect to be forgiven the odd youthful
indiscretion, this was clearly thought by his advisers not to represent
the required man-of-the-people image. And a Conservative well-
wisher dealt with it rapidly by buying the copyright of the photo-
graph so it could not be legally reproduced again. Of course,
Cameron was at university in the 1980s, before the advent of
MySpace, Bebo, Facebook and all the other confessional media that
have mushroomed in the last five years. Imagine how different it
will be for potential politicians of the future who are at school or
university today. Take the New Jersey beauty queen, Amy Palumbo,
who almost lost her crown when mildly suggestive photographs of
her were lifted from her Facebook site. She had posted the images in
the ‘private’ part of her entry, only for access to her accredited
‘friends’. But one of them had a different view of what constitutes
privacy.
The bulk of users employ their MySpace and Facebook
entries for self-advertisement, social networking and the generally
raw process of growing up. They are the first generation who can
tell you precisely how many ‘friends’ they have. They are also the
first generation whose sexual adventures, drug taking, immature
opinions and personal photographs are shared electronically. Can
you truly delete entries from social networking sites with the
confidence they no longer exist on a server somewhere else? You
cannot. And that is only your own entry. Typically the ‘wall’ on each
site has more than a thousand ‘postings’ from other users – random,
careless remarks recorded for posterity.
So we are a mere three or four years into a wholly new
phenomenon: enabled by technology a generation is voluntarily
surrendering its privacy on a hitherto unimaginable scale. I have
carried out a highly unscientific straw poll of just one Facebook
user. In a five-minute conversation I asked her for specific instances
of personal revelation that might come back to haunt her circle of
friends. Here are the results: photographs of marijuana smoking,
naked runs and pole dancing… joining anti-women and anti-
immigration groups and campaigns to save hereditary peerages (all
ironic of course, but who’s to know that in the future?)… extreme
positions on Israel and Palestine plus leading a lobby to prevent the
construction of a local mosque… sexual relationships, sexual
conquests and declarations of sexual preferences… hobbies entered
as ‘drinking, whoring and fighting’… and so it goes on, the amusing
and not-so-amusing social banter of students. Until, that is, it’s dug
up some years later and given the Daily Mail treatment. Already, the
more astute employers are accessing this material to see what their
applicants are really like. A survey last year revealed as many as one
in five British companies are doing this. As are the authorities at
Oxford University who, this summer, fined students whose personal
photographs revealed their drunken antics at the conclusion of the
examinations. The Facebook privacy settings had not guaranteed
the confidentiality that the undergraduates casually expected.
There is some evidence that social networkers are beginning
to be more wary about how much they reveal and there may well be
landmark legal cases soon over ‘friends’ who behave more like
enemies. Ashley Hurst, a media lawyer at Olswang, has observed
that ‘friends’ who make free with Facebook images may be
breaching the laws of both privacy and defamation. Facebook users
may sign up to an agreement not to abuse the service, but the more
dubious possibilities of social networking often prove irresistible.
More serious still is the threat of identity theft. In August 2007, the
IT security specialists, Sophos, demonstrated that 40 per cent of
Facebook users will divulge personal information, such as email
addresses and dates of birth, to complete strangers.
But voluntary, self-advertisement of personal details is only
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part of the story. ‘Cyber bullying’, where humiliating practical jokes
and lewd exposés have been visited on teachers by pupils with
video-enabled mobile phones, was condemned by the last education
secretary. It was treated as an issue of bullying and backed up by a
report from Goldsmiths College for the Anti-Bullying Alliance.1 This
set out seven methods of technological taunting that school children
execute against each other, including text messaging, emailing,
instant messaging and so on. But in reality this is a further privacy
issue. The Italian government took action following a spate of
similarly distressing incidents. Among these was the filmed bullying
of a disabled child and the sexual harassment of a female teacher.
Mobile phones are now banned in Italian schools. The British
reaction has been to appeal to platforms to prevent the posting of
such materials on the likes of YouTube. Either way, as users find ever
more ingenious ways to employ their gadgets, society is several steps
behind in its response.
Two interesting issues arise from this explosion of personal
electronic traffic, either of which could necessitate a re-examination
of the thinking that lies behind our privacy laws. First, is there a
fundamental shift taking place in attitudes to privacy? Whether led
or merely enabled by the technology, is the famous ‘right to be left
alone’ becoming outmoded? If so, there would be profound
implications for public policy. And second, even if this generation
has a new attitude, what if they later change their mind? Could their
consent subsequently be withdrawn, or are the relevant technologies
becoming uncontrollable? The internet, CCTV, DNA, biometrics
and digital camera mobiles now constantly challenge our historic
expectation of privacy.
I became aware of a possible shift of attitude when examining
the furore that originally surrounded the television show, Big
Brother, which my company produces. The second country ever to
stage it, in March 2000, was Germany. Beforehand the press made
much of the 40 cameras and the 24-hour surveillance of the
housemates. Catholic associations said Big Brother displayed a
contempt for humanity. Politicians declared that it violated the
articles of the country’s constitution, protecting human dignity, and
called for a ban. Television regulators took this as their cue and
prepared to shut the production down, on the grounds that it
infringed the right to privacy (for ‘free development of personality’)
enacted in the German constitution in 1954. But in the event they
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allowed the show to go ahead. Despite the association of lack of
privacy with fascism they recognised a crucial difference – these
young people were consenting to the process.
As the television ‘reality’ format spread from country to
country the same cultural conflict arose between the older and
younger generations. Self-exposure by a generation seemingly
relaxed about nudity was shocking enough in itself, but the public
display of general, everyday social intimacies seemed even worse. In
Italy Cardinal Tonini, a senior figure at the Vatican, said that
videoing people, 24 hours a day, was like stealing their souls.2 He
particularly objected to the diary room being referred to as the
confessional, something that should be private between the
individual, the priest and God. In the US President Clinton
attacked Big Brother in an interview with ABC News. When
reminded that certain intimate events in his own Oval Office had
become public he retorted: ‘That’s the problem. Privacy should be
protected. My lack of privacy is a direct result of my position as
President. But privacy shouldn’t be auctioned off to the highest
bidder. These people are prostituting themselves to media
conglomerates. It’s very troubling.’3
It was less troubling to Tim Gardam, the programme director
at Channel 4 who originally commissioned Big Brother for the
United Kingdom: ‘In all its raunchiness it revealed the truth of a
generation. It was the first programme that really laid open what all
the marketing research, all the demographic research, all the
cultural research was saying. You had a generation which was
fundamentally different from generations before. They had no sense
of propriety, no sense of modesty. They were open, honest and
candid with each other.’4 This is a trend also identified by Jonathan
Freedland in the Guardian in 2002:
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If we think hard about privacy, and ask what has really made it as endangered
a species in modern Britain as courtly romance or stiff formality, the answer
does not lie only in the realm of surveillance and monitoring. It’s also about a
cultural change, in which modesty, reserve and discretion – those sentries of
privacy – have come to seem like values which are quaint or even vaguely
repressed… Big Brother is watching us, to be sure. But we are also inviting him
to take a look.5
If there has indeed been a cultural shift in attitudes to privacy
then it is not one that our middle-aged regulators and opinion
formers have thus far picked up on. In fact, with assistance of the
Human Rights Act and the judiciary, the laws on privacy have been
considerably tightened up in Britain over the past decade. Recent
legal victories by the likes of David Beckham and Naomi Campbell
attest to this. And the ethics of privacy are being much more closely
attended to than ever before in such fields as medical records. But if
there were to be a genuine, permanent shift then it would
paradoxically predicate a relaxation of privacy laws – society would
actually place less importance on privacy in the future. This deserves
investigation. It may be, on the other hand, that the events I have
chronicled are mere youthful exuberance given currency by new
sorts of technology and that today’s carefree Big Brother housemates
will become tomorrow’s stern television regulators.
To try to gauge how this generation feels about privacy I
commissioned the market research company YouGov to carry out a
simple survey of attitudes to privacy.6 Table 4.1 shows the questions
they asked and the responses they received from a sample group of
2,274, divided into five age categories.
What can we conclude from this? That the population as a
whole remains very concerned about privacy and easily values it
above qualities such as freedom of speech and open access. You can
also see that, while 18–24-year-olds prize freedom of speech rather
more highly than older generations do, even within their own peer
group privacy plus harm and offence rate well above freedom of
speech and open access. So, despite the carefree enthusiasm with
which some of the younger generation exploit social networking
technology, when confronted with some of the dangers they are
almost as concerned as older age groups.
I interpret this as a group that loves the powerful social
networking that is now possible, but still has a clear sense of privacy.
It relates less to a blanket desire for anonymity. We have seen from
Big Brother that they are often happy to expose their relationships, or
indeed their flesh. But they have chosen to do this. My impression is
that their idea of privacy is that it should be available if they want it.
Some might argue that if you flaunt your private life you surrender
your future right to privacy. I disagree. To be attracted by self-
exposure at a relatively early age does not mean you have no future
right to privacy. You should be able to change your mind. Indeed,
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with the way in which social networking is exploding in popularity
among the younger generation, it is essential you be able to change
your mind. The teenagers chattering away online are media literate,
but they are not media wise.
How then should platform owners and legislators respond to
this new situation? We are only in the second decade of the internet.
The first saw the economic euphoria of the dotcom boom, later
replaced with a somewhat more realistic view of who the financial
winners and losers were. This second decade is witnessing a social
euphoria instead. We are now astonished and excited by the social
networks made possible by the World Wide Web. But it is time for
Drunken students, beauty queens and pole dancing
Table 4.1 Misuse of mobile phones and the internet have been in
the news recently.
(a) Considering the way that digital technologies such as
phone cameras and sites like YouTube or MySpace are
run, which of the following do you think should be the
MOST important consideration?
Total 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+
........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Privacy 33 31 33 29 31 36........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Freedom of speech 11 18 18 10 10 7........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Avoiding harm and offence 43 31 36 45 48 47........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Open access for all 6 13 6 7 4 3........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Don’t know 7 7 7 9 7 7
(b) And which of the following do you think should be the
second MOST important consideration?
Total 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+
........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Privacy 33 27 29 32 36 35........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Freedom of speech 20 23 23 22 15 18........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Avoiding harm and offence 30 27 31 26 30 32........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Open access for all 8 12 9 9 9 7........................................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Don’t know 9 11 7 11 10 8
Source: YouGov
this second wave of enthusiasm also to be tempered with a more
sceptical attitude, one that would tie in with the results of the
YouGov survey. A 2007 report from the Royal Academy of
Engineering argues that the collection, storage and processing of
personal data can be of great benefit, but that users’ privacy needs
to be protected.7
The Royal Academy of Engineers believes that many more
safeguards could and should be designed into new technologies to
ensure the integrity of our personal information. They are mostly
concerned by identity fraud and the ease with which felons can
gather, steal and abuse our personal details. But the development of
the semantic web now provides a different threat. This is the means
by which a trawl for information about an individual, held in many
places, is assembled and presented as one coherent and convenient
collection of data. Facebook announced in September 2007 that a
listing on their site would be verifiable via search engines such as
Google. In what sense have social networkers consented to this
aggregation of data? Can consent for such dissemination be
meaningfully withdrawn or the data deleted? This will become a
major issue for personal privacy going forward. The 1998 Data
Protection Act was guided by eight principles of good data
handling, one of which was that data should not be kept longer
than necessary. This is a precept marked more in the breach than 
the observance.
The Royal Academy recommends harsher penalties for those
who flout the Data Protection Act. But prevention must be better
than cure. So social network hosts need to develop new protocols 
to allow effective withdrawal of consent. The legal rule up to now,
once consent has been granted, is that it is irrevocable. But this is a
principle we will need to question in the future. And although we
regard the internet generation as media literate, this is an area where
it is looking increasingly naïve. So there is a need for greater
education and awareness among the social networkers. Their instinct
for candid revelation needs to be informed by the realisation that
the results might be ineradicable. There is currently a lot of laudable
work being done to prevent online child exploitation. Organisations
such as the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre with
their site www.thinkuknow.co.uk,8 are working to improve the safety
of young people from sexual predators. We now need to extend this
sensibility beyond the specific area of child abuse.
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A vast amount of work is being done outside the sphere of
social networks to guard privacy. The National Health Service is
currently piloting schemes where individuals have to consent to
their medical records being made available for research. The new
Human Tissue Act also covers the illegal gathering of information,
prohibiting the analysis of someone’s DNA without their consent. 
In time these systematic checks and balances may need to be
adapted for the social sphere.
European regulators are now pressing Google, Microsoft and
Yahoo! on their privacy policies. The companies have been keeping
data for up to two years. They are being asked to reduce this
substantially, despite the financial pressure on them to record and
monetise the traffic they attract. Here the Royal Academy of
Engineers’ report has some interesting suggestions:
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Postings to websites might be automatically destroyed after a certain period of
time, unless the end user confirmed they wished to have the material retained.
Postings to certain services could have an automatic delay before the material
was made available to ensure a ‘cooling-off’ period between posting and
publication.9
The report goes on to float an even more intriguing
suggestion:
Research could be pursued into the possibility of using Digital Rights
Management technology to protect personal information… Applying this
technology to information posted on the web could allow information to be
posted for limited amounts of time, or would allow information to be publicly
available on the web but not copied by others – meaning that the author of the
information had control over the amount of time for which it was available,
and could also rule out the possibility of the information being altered. Thus it
could be used to protect the authors of blogs and the users of social networking
sites.10
In summary, when considering electronic privacy we should
now include social networks in our policy making. We need to
monitor the attitudes of users – the ‘self-advertisers’ – in more depth
to see if they are truly more open and less private than previous
generations. The initial evidence is that they still have an innate
sense of privacy. If so, social networking needs to be governed by
the same body of law, custom and practice that is developing to
protect privacy elsewhere. The key elements would be to increase
media literacy, enable the withdrawal of consent and ensure that
obsolete data can be effectively deleted.
Peter Bazalgette was formerly Chief Creative Officer at Endemol and is a
non-executive director of YouGov.
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In the song ‘What’s he building?’,1 Tom Waits’ compulsive drawl
obsesses over the behaviour of his reclusive neighbour. ‘What’s he
building in there?… What’s he building in there?’ he repeats. Waits is
playing the everyman, his suspicions piqued by the solitude and
eccentricities of the guy next door. ‘We have a right to know,’ he
implores, offering a typically biting comment on the fragility of
neighbourhoods, the paranoia of a thousand households sharing
the same postcode. On one level this is just the curtain twitching of
traditional suburbia. But the way that identities and communities
form and hang together makes such pointed curiosity, today, acutely
relevant.
Shutting the door, drawing the curtains, disconnecting the
phone, deleting the files and stashing the diaries – the realm of the
private is at once comforting and essential. But the scent of the illicit
or illegal is never too far away. In the connections between
‘closeness’ and affiliation with each other there sit expectations
about what we want, or are entitled, to know of other people, and
vice versa. The way we talk about privacy can tell us a lot about our
social fabric, yet it is often seen as ‘merely’ a civil liberties problem, a
predictable whine of the chattering classes or paranoid libertarians.
Here, we argue that privacy is far more than a problem for the
individual, and that thinking in terms of ‘Big Brother’ misses
important aspects of the privacy problem in light of how both the
private sector and public services work. But Big Brother still tends
to frame how we think of privacy. This does little to counter our
deeply ambivalent attitudes to privacy. Our newspapers almost
weekly cry Big Brother, traditionally referencing government
surveillance but, in the more recent past, ‘exposing’ the databases
that lie in the hands of the private sector. Seventy per cent of those
surveyed for the Oxford Internet Surveys said going online puts a
person’s privacy at risk.2 But still we shop online in increasing
numbers. Around half of all households in the UK have a Nectar
card. We still travel to the US despite EU–US passenger
information sharing agreements, and border control fingerprinting.
This chapter will focus on why we think privacy is an
important aspect of both private sector efforts to improve customer
convenience, and public sector reform, specifically in the context of
‘personalising’ services. We argue that we need more democratic
rules on personal information use, and to do that, we need a much
better understanding of people’s attitudes to privacy, and of
organisational uses of people’s information. We will then draw on
focus groups designed to explore how and why people value
privacy, and from ongoing research into personal information and
public services.
Barry Schwartz argues in ‘The social psychology of privacy’
that ‘weak social relationships, or relationships in the formative stage,
cannot endure the strain of dissociation’.3 This resonates in a world
in which globalisation has enabled more far-reaching migratory
flows, and in which there have been much talked about changes in
the role of traditional associations such as class, race, nationality and
political party. The new ways we engage with the world around us
have changed how we come to decide who we are, what that means,
and what we should and should not do as a result. The reference
points of everyday life have changed, making our sense of who we
are more fraught and placing more emphasis on the moments at
which we work out who we are in relation to other people.
That makes privacy intimately connected with identity. As a
result of these changes, we live, more than ever, through being
watched. The means for self-determination – through which we
compulsively seek the recognition that stakes out our social status –
are predicated on our being seen. In an increasing number of
contexts, from the associative clamour of Facebook through to the
comprehensive profiling of supermarket loyalty card schemes, our
interactions with people and organisations are predicated on their
knowing about who we are and what we like. This is not a one-way
relationship – the readiness to embrace social networking sites, 
the fascination with celebrity lifestyles, and the (possibly dwindling)
love affair with reality television suggest an obsession with display.
Being watched in this way is something we are, seemingly, often
comfortable with – a function of our need for the recognition it
affords.
But to say that we live through being watched does not mean
that privacy is dead. Privacy still matters because it provides the
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space to withdraw from the gaze of others and to rest from the need
to perform socially. Moreover, it matters politically, and
democratically, because it is intimately connected with how we are
seen, represented and treated by the people, organisations and
institutions that hold influence and power over us. It grows in
significance, but becomes more difficult to control, in an era in
which identities form along unpredictable lines, with unpredictable
consequences, and where the state has less of a claim to influence,
determine or manage them.
Being invisible
The Invisible Man, by HG Wells, weaves a story of the seductive
nightmare of becoming invisible. The blessing of being absented
from the gaze of others quickly gives way to madness, as the
invisible man recalls: ‘I went over the heads of the things that a 
man reckons desirable. No doubt invisibility made it possible to 
get them, but it made it impossible to enjoy them when they are
got.’4
Absolute privacy is to disappear, to mean and be nothing. It is
one, but not the sole, form of invisibility. In Ralph Ellison’s Invisible
Man, the central character is subject to a different kind, resulting
not from the active choice to disappear: ‘I am an invisible man…
because of a peculiar disposition in the eyes of those with whom I
come into contact. A matter of the construction of their inner eyes,
those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon
reality.’5
He is speaking of the experience of a young black man in
1940s America. Whereas Wells writes about purposefully removing
oneself from the gaze of others, Ellison deals with the differences in
power that influence our ability to define who we are and what that
means. His invisible man suffers from the indignity of being seen
through, of being put in a place and judged, a place where his right
to dispute, to engage and to negotiate is non-existent. His privacy
becomes both meaningless and absolute, in the face of persistent
and entrenched discrimination.
Ellison reminds us that privacy is not just about whether
someone sees you – it is about how they see you.
In the context of the contemporary ‘personal information
economy’, this is increasingly significant. We traditionally frame
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threats to privacy as threats to something tangible and fixed that is
being eroded by, for example, new technology used by a malevolent
panoptic conspirator – a ‘Big Brother’.6 But the discriminatory
profiling that so much of modern life is reliant on is not captured in
this traditional outlook. That is because, first, it misses our
contemporary willingness, and need, to be ‘on display’. Second, it
misses the nature of discrimination, not carried out by a single
authoritative force, but as a response to the need to sort and manage
a population with complex and fluid identities. Peculiarly, the
absence of Big Brother, in the traditional understanding, has
contributed to surveillance, largely through digital profiling, being a
centrally important feature of everyday life.
This condition of being watched and needing to be seen has
changed what surveillance means, and it changes how we should
approach privacy. The reliance on databases of information, and on
our need to be recognised, structures our everyday lives.
In addition to guarding against the transgressions of large
information holders – which remains an important task, encompass-
ing governments, international organisations and businesses alike –
we need to also focus on the many different arenas in which we are
sorted and distinguished from each other. That means assessing the
relationships between the watched and the watcher, relationships
often marked by significant differences in power.
This suggests some key questions for the contemporary
privacy debate:
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· How can the practices of public institutions and the private sector
differentiate the people they see as users, citizens or collaborators?
· How can they alter their services accordingly, and what are the
consequences?
· How can these practices be made open and transparent, and why
should we do so?
Who wants to know?
These questions are important ones not only to policy makers, but
to people, something underlined by the focus groups we organised
to support this collection.7 The meaning of privacy might have
changed, but the idea still holds emotional and personal force for
teenagers and the elderly alike.
The things people considered private in our focus groups
could broadly be split into two types. One was deeply personal: 
our relationships, our homes, our bodies and our possessions. 
The other was seemingly less personal: the services we use and 
how we use them – bank details, shopping habits, internet. These
distinctions hold the key to understanding attitudes to privacy.
Some of the confusion mentioned above can be put down to a 
lack of transparency in how information is used, who has access 
to it, and why they want it. But, importantly, any lack of
transparency is compounded by changes in the distinctions 
between what is private and what is public. That complicates the
lines we draw between the most intimate elements of our private
realm, and the more extraneous pieces of information – such as 
our shopping habits, where we like to spend time, what we read 
and watch.
There are three aspects to this. First, it can be difficult to work
out when and where we are being watched. There are new spaces in
which our behaviour and information can be seen, and, therefore,
judged. Being ‘in private’ while we are being watched – for
example, while we drift across the internet – is partly a function of
the rise of new technologies, intensive data collection by private
companies and a government ‘surveillance’ culture. It means we
experience new situations in which people can come to a decision
about who we are. We find ourselves being watched through the
logging of our behaviour online by internet service providers, or
search engines, from the apparent privacy of our homes. Second, it
can be difficult to work out the consequences; the paths our
information follows are often opaque, and the precise role of the
information holders can be difficult to grasp. For example, how can
we be sure about where our passenger information goes when we
enter the US? Who gets to see information about my behaviour on
a website – what I buy, or how long I spend reading what, for
example – and what do they do with it?
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There’s this fixed idea that government needs information for something evil,
and if there’s computers involved they always mess it up.
But if you’ve done nothing wrong you shouldn’t mind giving it to them…
But it’s private.
Participants in focus groups, June 2007
Context and choice are central in people’s attitudes to the
handling of their personal information; knowing when, where and
how information is being used is the first step to making a judge-
ment about how appropriate it is, and what can be done about it.
But these changes to who is responsible for what, and to where we
are seen and, potentially, under surveillance make that context more
difficult to understand. So, when does being watched matter, why,
and who decides?
‘It’s one thing to be watched, but it’s another to be logged,’
one focus group participant told us. The step from surveillance to
categorising and profiling is a short one, if it exists at all, and yet 
the implications are crucial. David Lyon, elaborating on the
significance of being seen, argues that ‘human life would be
unthinkable without social and personal categorization, yet today
surveillance not only rationalizes but also automates the process’.8
The way these profiles are used not only describes the social
terrain but, in turn, helps to sustain it through the structuring of
organisations’ responses to the needs, tendencies and interests of
those profiled. David Lyon continues: ‘Surveillance sorts people
into categories, assigning worth or risk in ways that have real effects
on their life chances. Deep discrimination occurs, thus making
surveillance not merely a matter of personal privacy but of social
justice.’9
But, still: so what? If the price of surrendering more
information is a service better suited to my needs, should I care?
Altering the response to or service for people according to a profile
of ‘who they are’ is not necessarily a bad thing. However, it becomes
problematic, and leads to the ‘deep discrimination’ when we ignore
the social context in which these profiles emerge. Sorting may be
automatic – through the groupings and associations of customer
relationship management software, for example – but the categories
into which people are sorted are constructed, imbued with meaning
and social implications.
We will look now briefly at two spheres where the everyday
surveillance of personal information gathering and use is most
prevalent – the retail industry and the public sector. Each tells us
something about the level of control, choice and power we have
over the profiles built about us. And both relate to how profiling
not only offers choice, but also shapes our behaviour and
experiences.
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Our argument is not that the ‘information’ or surveillance
society is necessarily disempowering. Instead, we argue that
thinking about privacy means finding ways to build democratic
principles into information use, and to assert the power of
individuals in their relationships with other people and institutions.
Customer convenience
The private sector, and perhaps most visibly the retail sector, rests its
work on its ability to categorise people effectively. Through our
willingness to provide them with the information they need, we are
complicit in this process. People are usually inclined to share
information if ‘there’s something in it for me’ or ‘if it makes my life
easier’, allowing supermarkets, department stores and online
companies to develop enormous databases of information –
charting individual and family habits, tastes and behaviours. We are
nothing if not segmented.
The compelling pull of convenience helps to drive the growth
of these databases. The private sector combines a sense of what the
information is for with convenience: in the succinct words of one of
our focus group participants: ‘It gathers your information so it can
offer you a better service.’ It builds trust and business, while
simultaneously categorising its customers and ‘tailoring’ its service
to their needs. But this convenience operates as the product of
surveillance only in particular circumstances – here, when the aims
and context of a transaction or exchange are apparently clear,
control is seemingly not exerted, and prejudicial judgements are
apparently not made. The private sector, as it gathers information
about customers in exchange for rewards, therefore emphasises the
individual’s choice and consent. It passes little comment in return.
But that hides some important problems with profiling in the
private sector. First, there is a potential ‘narrowing’ of our
experiences. For example, newspapers may choose to market to one
group or the other, but not both; at the same, there lies an
increasing potential for people to construct a personal cultural diet
– with implications for how we live together and feelings of mutual
belonging and responsibility. Second, the private sector does not
have to address the value of people’s decisions, or the social context
that shapes them. Further, there is a risk in the longer term that as
private and public roles merge, that information from our everyday
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lives is used to make important decisions we would not have
anticipated – decisions that will deepen inequalities of access,
aspiration and outcomes – involving, for example, increasingly
targeted financial options for those on a lower income.
Personalising public services
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Our great ambition now: a National Health Service that is also a personal
health service.
Gordon Brown, Labour Party conference speech, 200710
Where the private sector has built its work so successfully around
the use of personal information, with the, sometimes tacit, consent
of the public, a variety of factors have held back the public sector –
with technological incompetence, a lack of clear strategies around
joined-up working and technology, and concerns about privacy and
responsibility among them.
Despite public concern both at government capacity to
operate technological systems, and suspicions of government
propensity for surveillance, the government is working to develop
its IT systems to support secure and effective information sharing.
Connecting for Health is perhaps the most visible example – a 
£12.4 billion project to develop nine major systems that will help
doctors and the health system share their records, and make their
service more efficient and ‘personal’.11 Choice and control, key
words in discussions about privacy, echo the past decade of public
services policy development in the UK, sitting comfortably with the
rhetoric of empowering citizens and putting the ‘user’ in control.
They are particularly prominent in the concept of ‘personalisation’ –
an idea at the very heart of New Labour’s philosophy of public
services. Personalisation, broadly, means tailoring how a public
service works to the needs of the individual.
Charles Leadbeater, writing for Demos in 2004, outlined 
five different meanings of personalisation, each becoming more
radical in its implications for services.12 The first two simply 
require an improvement in customer service among public service
providers; the third gives the same users a more direct say over how
their money is spent; the fourth has users as co-producers and 
co-designers of a service – allowing their active participation in
service design and provision. The fifth and final possibility – 
‘self-organisation’ – allows the public good to emerge from 
within society through the way public policy shapes individual
decisions.
But what are the implications of personalised services for
privacy? Like in the private sector, personalising public services is
based on tailoring the offer based on respect for the needs of the
individual. But Leadbeater identifies the bind faced by the state:
‘Committed to protecting, even expanding, the sphere of private
freedom it also is necessarily committed to shaping continuously,
how people use their freedom in the name of public good.’ This
subtle tension between individual responsibility and state advice
and support is increasingly important.13 In order to offer support to
its citizens, government requires a level of information; but however
it chooses to use that information to respond to certain groups it is
making a political decision. The relevance of our choices, behaviour
and relationships grows as they are recorded, cross-checked and
contextualised. In the way that it develops personalisation, it
therefore embodies a particular model of the role of government in
influencing our behaviour or deciding what support we need.
The last three types outlined by Charles Leadbeater call for a
rebalancing of the relationship between the citizen and the state,
and are based on a dialogue between both – involving sharing
certain pieces of personal information (thus relinquishing control),
in exchange for better services. Personalisation, in the more radical
sense, is not about the state categorising people and then providing
what it perceives them to need. Instead, it is based either on inviting
users to be co-producers and co-designers of their services, or on
empowering them more directly with resources and the support to
use them. Both of these approaches see users as experts, bringing
knowledge, skills and experience that even the best-intentioned
providers cannot supply. An exchange of information – based on
ongoing dialogue between user and provider – is transparent, and
aims to build a sense of user-ownership of services.
It is this political decision that can get lost in the justifications
of risk reduction and efficiency, and in the segmentation practices of
the private sector. Each of the models of public service reform offers
differing implications for privacy in the way they embody different
perceptions about the role of government.
Many of the questions surrounding privacy have not changed:
where, and on what basis, am I being judged, and why? Gathering
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information, sharing it, and using it to inform decisions or
behaviours is not a neutral act, nor is it simply a question of
administrative efficiency. The key to answering these questions lies
in acknowledging that the process of segmentation is
discriminatory. Privacy is not just about the politics of curtain
twitching, but plays a central role in understanding how to make for
wider-spread democratic engagement in the systems and institutions
we live through and encounter.
Peter Bradwell and Niamh Gallagher are researchers at Demos. This
chapter is drawn from their Demos pamphlet FYI.
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6 A place of greater
safety? Information
sharing and
confidentiality
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[Soldier guarding the National Convention] ‘… can we offer you an escort,
Citizen Deputy, to a place of greater safety?’
‘The grave,’ Camille [Desmoulins] said. ‘The grave.’1
In Britain and in several other countries in recent years, the pursuit
of greater safety has informed policy in growing numbers of fields.
Improving probabilities of detecting crimes, achieving early
intervention to prevent crime and reduce criminality, providing
greater reassurance to anxious citizens that everything possible is
being done to protect children, preventing people with the most
serious mental health problems becoming a danger to others,
ensuring that future violent and sexual offenders are monitored
carefully, managing anti-social behaviour and the like, are goals of
increasing importance to policy makers. Indeed, systematic risk
assessment is now required in many fields, including those where
people are considered to be a danger to themselves, as well as those
where they present risks to the wider public.
The language of risk is now ubiquitous. In care for frail older
people, for example, ‘risk assessment’, and not just the assessment
of needs, is now routine in order to identify those who are
susceptible to falls. In British public policy, the key to promoting
safety is now the encouragement, through legislation, national
policy guidance and a plethora of model protocols, of the sharing of
personal information between agencies providing frontline services.
At first sight, it might seem surprising that information
sharing should be thought the highway to safety. For sharing
information carries no guarantee of its being acted on, still less of its
being acted on appropriately. Indeed, for all that it has become
commonplace to describe the horrible death of Victoria Climbié as a
failure of information sharing, this is factually incorrect. In her
wretched case, the relevant information was shared about Victoria’s
injuries, but in a form that failed to alert those who should have
been alerted to her plight, or to draw the correct inferences from the
information.
Similarly in the case of Ian Huntley, who killed two school-
girls in the Cambridgeshire village of Soham. Information sharing
may well have had a lesser significance for his employment as that
village’s school caretaker than is commonly thought. Information
was not retained in the intelligence systems of Humberside police
because the allegations against him were insufficiently evidenced to
enable charges to be laid – let alone for the Crown Prosecution
Service to advise that any be taken forward. Most of the cases did
not concern children below the age of consent.
Nevertheless, ministers and many policy advisers remain
firmly of the view that the sharing of more information about those
classified as either at risk or else as presenting a risk will provide the
critical infrastructure for more effective public protection. A central
aspiration in policy has been, therefore, to remove blockages to the
sharing of information. Chief among the barriers to information
sharing, policy makers assume, is the widespread misunderstanding
of the Data Protection Act 1998, which, when correctly understood,
by no means prevents sharing where it would generally be
warranted on public interest grounds.
Ministers’ public statements typically present the issue of
information sharing as one to do with finding a better ‘balance’
between effective inter-agency working and client confidentiality. In
fact decisions about information are rarely matters of ‘balance’ at
all. A decision whether or not to share information is taken precisely
at the point where, by definition, no public service holds all the
information that might be made available. That means decisions
involved in sharing enough information to judge whether pooling it
would be wise commit the service to one course of action. These are
in fact dilemmas requiring a choice and a judgement, not problems
calling for some judicious mix of sharing and confidentiality.
The dilemma is this. Any decision rule that would err on the
side of avoiding the risks associated with not sharing information in
a particular case, will sooner or later err on the side of sharing
information – and perhaps of acting with inappropriately draconian
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intrusiveness – when in fact the person is not at risk. Indeed, it was
only a decade before Victoria Climbié’s case that social workers were
excoriated for taking children into care in Orkney and Cleveland as
a result of sharing information that had been wrongly interpreted to
indicate high risk.2
The call for greater information sharing is not confined to
contexts such as child protection and mental health where it may 
be shared on a case-by-case basis. The Labour government’s
programme also calls for greater ‘bulk’ sharing, or routine access by
public service agencies to at least some of each other’s information
about clients – for example to check entitlements to service, to
complete risk assessments or to cross-match records to detect
possible cases of fraud.
Four public service contexts
It can therefore be said with some confidence that questions about
information sharing between public services constitute some of the
most difficult and urgent privacy challenges of this decade. Yet
safeguarding privacy, understood as a human right, is not the only,
or even the most pressing, reason for which we might care about
confidentiality.
Confidentiality is often a critical means to the pursuit of
service goals. For example in fields such as mental health, substance
abuse and sexually transmitted infections, a strict confidentiality
regime is necessary to persuade clients to present themselves and to
be candid with professionals. In many human services,
confidentiality protection helps to prevent stigma and to preserve
employment and social relationships that may be critical to
achieving service goals. In still other cases, agencies may worry 
that sharing information may lead another agency to take
inappropriate action because they may fail to appreciate its full 
and proper context.
Sharing information often presents the greatest difficulties of
principle when the decision to be made concerns sharing between
services with different types of purpose. Table 6.1 shows some of the
basic types of services between which sharing often raises the most
fundamental operational problems, and sometimes ones of
principle, too.
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Table 6.1 Four pure types of service context
Universal distribution Selective distribution
A Personal direct taxes C Probation
Social insurance payments Youth offending
Driving license registration Policing
Citizen registration MAPPAs and CRB
B Education D Child protection
General health services Services for older people
Social insurance benefits Specialist health services
Drug/alcohol abuse services
The problem is that services with different purposes have 
very different conceptions of their stewardship of client information,
and these conceptions cause them to manage information in very
different ways. We typically expect type A services to gather most
information from clients themselves and to take information from
other services only under specific legal powers. Type B services have
generally been expected to keep information within their own
‘family’ or related health or education services and tend to be
subject to professional protocols that codify duties towards clients.
Type C services have generally been required to show good
grounds before requiring information from other services and to
keep intelligence to themselves, especially where the information is
‘soft’. Type D services may also deal in soft information but will
tend to do so under professional confidentiality codes. In recent
years, however, policy imperatives to share information, and
especially to lower the thresholds for sharing with type C services,
have blurred many of the boundaries between cells in Table 6.1. 
In the process, they have exacerbated the dilemma between risks
associated with information sharing and confidentiality.
In response, the government has looked for general solutions
to this policy problem. In 2000/01, the then Performance and
Innovation Unit, now the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, was
commissioned to produce a report that finally appeared in 2002,
entitled Privacy and Data Sharing: The way forward for public services.3
Its recommendations for new legislation to create a general power
for information sharing found little favour with government
lawyers. When responsibility transferred to the Department for
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Constitutional Affairs (now the Ministry of Justice) the department
issued new legal guidance in November 2003, the burden of which
was that existing powers provided all the cover required for any
sensible sharing. It recommended that locally agreed protocols
would suffice to govern information sharing in specific cases of
inter-agency working. However, continuing scandals, which were
widely attributed to information-sharing failures, led ministers to
call for new initiatives to promote more extensive information
sharing.
In late 2006, a ‘vision statement’ was published, promising
much freer information flows but without providing much detail.
Responsibility for publishing the statement was left to a cabinet
committee, MISC 31. In the meantime, however, government
brought forward new legislation creating information-sharing
powers and duties to combat serious and organised crime, along
with other proposals, including a children’s database, a population
register to underpin the national identity card scheme, a range of
early years and even prenatal interventions to target those believed
most likely, on the basis of long-range predictive modelling, to
present future risks.
There are problems with both these approaches. The search
for a single, general and overarching principle that could be set out
in legislation seems likely to prove misguided, and it would, in any
case, have to leave wide scope for discretion. The thresholds of
probability and the severity of risk that would lead to information
sharing in child protection cases are surely very different from those
that are appropriate in detection of benefit fraud. In fields where
willingness to present and to be candid with professionals is critical,
disclosure rules have to be rather different from those in fields where
financial entitlements are at stake.
In all these fields, decisions about sharing and confidentiality
involve judgements about which staff within which agencies have 
a legitimate ‘need to know’ a specific piece of information, or to
claim routine access to types of information. Such judgements 
also depend on how much, of which types of information, are
proportionate to the risks presented by cases in different fields.
However, these judgements cannot be made using algorithms, ie
rules taking the form, ‘if these circumstances obtain, always share
[or do not share] this information with these other services’. No
such algorithms are available, even for decisions about bulk 
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sharing. Instead, claims about ‘need to know’ and ‘proportionality’
must be justified on the basis of arguable principle.
Dealing with the risks of risk assessments
‘Risk assessment’ for decisions of this kind, undertaken
appropriately, must be symmetrical. That is to say, it should consider
equally the risks arising both from sharing and from not sharing.
Unfortunately, however, too much of the guidance presently given
to practitioners encourages them to consider principally the risks
arising from not sharing, on the assumption that these risks are
generally worse. We argue instead that risk assessment should be
conceived in terms of appraising the risks to the whole range of
service outcomes including those arising from breaches of
confidentiality, on the one hand, and the risks associated with not
sharing, on the other.
Policy makers should also think about the ways public
services could cultivate the skills and institutional capabilities for
making and supporting these kinds of judgements. This is a very
different policy problem from designing rules, and is a long way
from resorting to simplistic calls for thresholds of probability and
severity to be relaxed each time there is some service failure that 
may seem, at first glance, to be something to do with information
sharing, or indeed, raising them, as was the response to the Orkney
and Cleveland scandals.
Some professionals will, quite understandably, demand
explicit rules to follow rather than be required to exercise personal
judgement. This is particularly the case if they have reason to fear
that, should conscientious and competent decisions turn out badly,
politicians will expose frontline workers to personal blame and
obloquy.
To illustrate this point, the cases of Victoria Climbié in
Haringey and Caleb Ness in Edinburgh provide a powerful
contrast. In the Climbié case, it was the frontline social worker, 
Ms Lisa Arthurworrey, who bore the brunt of the blame for the
mistaken judgements made in that case, and she was placed on 
the register of those who should not be permitted to work with
children. Yet there is evidence that she received totally inadequate
training, support and guidance from her managers, and was given a
case load beyond her capacity to cope. By contrast, for the errors
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made by social services in the Caleb Ness case, Les McKeown, the
Director of Social Work in Edinburgh, resigned. The differences in
the degree to which blame was individualised for catastrophic
decisions will have proved very important in signalling to
professionals in England and Scotland the need for defensive
practice in relation to sharing information.
However, what constitutes practice that is defensible against
blame is difficult for many professionals to call. There is no shortage
of guidance for frontline staff on the legal aspects of information
sharing. In almost every field of public services, central government
bodies, professional institutes and local bodies have issued fat
volumes of notes on the meaning of all relevant legal doctrines,
from the principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child in
child protection, through the legal powers of inspection for fraud
detection officers, to the meaning of every relevant clause of the
Data Protection Act, of the central concepts of the common law of
confidentiality, of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act and much else
besides. Locally agreed protocols on information sharing can run to
over a hundred pages. In a large-scale study we conducted recently,
we found to no one’s great surprise that few professionals regularly
consult any of these documents.
If there is a need for any more central policy intervention, it
should surely not be designed to provide yet more guidance on the
law, unless it be by way of handy summary. Rather, the focus should
be on building competence through training, rather than producing
yet more documents to clutter up the web. This training should be
in the skills of symmetrical risk assessment, and the risks should be
more holistically conceived. If there is to be more guidance, it
should be aimed at managers rather than professionals, and should
make the case for a less individualised and blame-oriented culture of
management, and discuss practices that can most constructively be
adopted when cases do go wrong, as inevitably they sometimes will,
whatever decision norms are adopted. Most important, politicians
should consider, before they reach for the easy option of blaming
the frontline staffer or manager, what the consequences of devolving
blame to lower levels may be for future decision making and public
services in the relevant field.
The information sharing issue also raises some more general
lessons about joined-up government. ‘Joined-up’ public services
means, in practice, the joining up of purposes for which our
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personal information is collected, used and disclosed. In many
cases, of course, this can be done sensibly and without contention.
Few would doubt that any medical professional should, and in
many cases commonly now would, alert other services if they saw
evidence of neglect or violence in a child that was unlikely to be
accidental.
It is also important to recognise, however, that we run great
risks of undermining public services – independently of issues to do
with privacy in its narrow sense – if we simply declare that all such
services are obliged to use personal information they collect for their
own purposes to further the goals of all public services, without
exercise of judgement. Not only will the obvious imperatives of
ensuring that clients and patients are willing to present and talk
candidly about personal and social problems be undermined, but
an issue of even more fundamental importance is at stake. Public
trust in public services depends in no small measure on the degree
to which people can understand and recognise the goals of these
services as delimited, and recognise purposes for which they will use
personal information as legitimately related to the core business of
the service. As goals and purposes begin to sprawl and swell, their
transparency, intelligibility and legitimacy is undermined.
At the heart of the issue there is a fundamental question about
the causal relationships between opposing risks. At one meeting in
Westminster not many years ago, we heard one child protection
professional claim that if there were more cases of children being
taken wrongly into care on the basis of sharing information that was
over-interpreted, then that would be a sign that things were moving
in the right direction, because it would indicate that fewer children
who really are at risk are being missed: more cases of ‘false-positive’
judgement errors would be a price worth paying to save more
children from abuse and neglect. This professional’s emotional
engagement with the plight of abused children cannot be faulted,
but the reasoning in that remark is open to strong objection.
It simply does not follow that, because we are sharing even 
to excess and over-interpreting, we must consequently be guilty 
of fewer cases of insufficient sharing and under-interpretation of
information. We could be misdirecting our efforts entirely. But,
further, it is not at all obvious that the long-term cost of false-
positive judgement errors would be a price worth paying for such
an outcome. A system that routinely runs the risk of such errors will
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not indefinitely sustain public trust, as the legacy of the Orkney
cases and the ‘satanic ritual abuse’ panics of 20 years ago showed.
Politicians who call for ‘more information sharing’ and ‘greater
safety’, and think that easy banalities about ‘balance’ and
‘safeguards’ cope sufficiently with the opposite risks, should think
again.
Perri 6 is Professor of Social Policy, Nottingham Trent University; Chris
Bellamy is Professor of Public Administration, Nottingham Trent
University; and Charles Raab is Professor of Government, University of
Edinburgh.
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Up until now, debate in the media about electronic health records
has largely been conducted by doctors, speaking for themselves and
also for their patients. Their concerns, at least as voiced, centre on
risks to patient confidentiality. But they also often betray a lack of
trust in their patients.
It is fair to say that the National Health Service (NHS), for
the most altruistic reasons, has developed a parent–child relation-
ship with patients. Any consideration of privacy and access to
information needs to be seen against that backdrop. The eight-
minute consultation can only work in one of two ways. Either the
patient arrives fully briefed and ready to make the most efficient 
use of the eight minutes. Or the patient is a passive recipient of the
clinician’s wisdom – does as she is told and asks no questions.
Although possibly a satirical example, Essex GP ‘Dr
Copperfield’, writing recently in The Times, illustrates a real school
of thought among some clinicians:
Another pilot project allows patients to see their records and download their test
results via the internet. Brilliant – when the scheme is rolled out across the
country my patients can find out that they have an inoperable brain tumour
from the comfort of their own home. At least it will save me the trouble of
breaking it gently. When they sit down with their tear-stained scan result I can
go straight in with ‘Well, what can’t speak, can’t lie, can it?’1
Contrast that with the findings of research the NHS
Information Authority (NHSIA) commissioned from the Con-
sumers’ Association in 2003. In a survey of 2,000 adults, 63 per cent
felt that being able to see their recent test results was an important
benefit of electronic health records.2 There is sometimes a
presumption that the doctor knows best about not only medical
advice, but also the way it is given and received. It is time that
patients joined this debate rather than letting doctors speak for
them.
I will be arguing here that we need to base our approach 
on the needs of the patient, and on trusting them to make 
informed decisions about their health. The privacy implications 
of NHS reform need to be seen in the context of this change in
emphasis. If most people are ‘privacy pragmatists’, then the
implications of connecting health records need to be based on
understanding why the programme is happening, and what the
benefits are.
The essay looks at how and why linking electronic medical
records is so important to a patient-centred NHS. I suggest that
some of the opposition to electronic health records can be
understood as reticence towards better-informed and empowered
patients – a challenge to the traditional relationship between doctor
and patient.
The need for a strong patient voice
I work for NHS Connecting for Health as its patient lead, though
the views expressed here are my personal ones. It is precisely
because I am a patient that I joined this project to link all parts of
the health service to share patient information, and share it with 
the patient.
For 15 years I ran a support group for British women injured
by the Dalkon Shield, a faulty intrauterine contraceptive device that
injured many thousands of women across the world in the 1970s.
Over that time, I received hundreds of letters and telephone calls
from women telling similar stories. They had the device fitted with
very little information about how it worked or the danger signs.
When they went back to their doctors reporting constant pain and
excessive bleeding, they were told to wait until it settled down, or
even to change their washing powder or take Valium.
Some of the less fortunate women wound up having
emergency surgery for ruptured tubal pregnancies a little while later.
Still more became infertile through chronic pelvic inflammatory
disease. Some were left in chronic pain caused by scar tissue. In the
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worst cases, they became incontinent as well as infertile. Over 3,000
British women were compensated for their injuries by a worldwide
trust fund set up by the US courts.
Three things became apparent to me as I listened to the
women’s stories. We didn’t know enough about the device we were
fitted with. Our doctors didn’t know enough about potential
problems and early warning signs. And there was no effective
system for picking up patterns of problems as they emerged. All of
these things could be significantly improved by better information
sharing via electronic health records.
Though medicine is constantly developing and improving, it
will never be a perfect science. Eminent paediatrician Sir Cyril
Chantler has said that in the past medicine was simple, ineffective
and relatively safe; now it is complex, effective and potentially
dangerous. It must, therefore, make sense to increase the number of
people able to be vigilant. Having badly informed patients is
dangerous, especially when coupled with doctors who are not able
to keep on top of every new development in all the medicines and
medical devices they prescribe.
Privacy versus access to information
There will always be a tension between sharing information for
good patient care and protecting individual privacy. If the NHS 
errs too far on the side of privacy, it comes at a cost to safety and 
the quality of care. But if it bends too far in the other direction, it
risks eroding patient trust and also sometimes causing unintended
harm.
In The Future of Privacy, Perri 6’s research showed that the
majority of us in most contexts are ‘privacy pragmatists’ – prepared
to provide personal information for enhanced services or other
benefits.3 Up until now, that has certainly been true of patients 
in the NHS. In 2002 NHSIA commissioned the Consumers’
Association to do research into patient confidentiality.4 Under a
third of 2,000 adults surveyed would prioritise NHS spending on
systems to protect confidentiality, though that might have changed
in light of recent data losses by other government departments.
However, in 2002 those who had had problems such as lost records,
letters going astray, or being mixed up with another patient were
more likely to prioritise privacy.
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In the NHSIA’s research, one respondent, whom Perri 6
would call a ‘privacy pragmatist’, described an experience many will
recognise:
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If you go in for an emergency appointment… you’ve got to fill out this paper
that’s just been photocopied, and write down what is wrong with you. The
receptionist looks at it and reads it out in front of everybody. And if you don’t
put down what’s wrong with you, you don’t get seen.
A 2003 report of patient surveys in primary care by the 
Picker Institute5 found that 84 per cent of patients reported that
they could be overheard by others while in the reception area of the
surgery.
Another ‘privacy pragmatist’, when asked in the 2002 research
who in his GP surgery had access to his medical records, replied,
with tongue firmly in cheek:
Everyone in the surgery, apart from the cleaner – hopefully.
Weighing up the risks
The cost of not sharing patient information effectively can be seen
in hospitals across the country every day. A prospective study of
19,000 people in 2004 concluded that one in 16 hospital admissions
is the result of a bad reaction to medication – and that nearly three-
quarters are avoidable. And of those admitted to hospital, 5,700
people will die6 – the equivalent of around 19 jumbo jets crashing.
In a 2004 study, the National Audit Office found that apart
from falls, the most common patient safety incidents in hospitals
related to medication errors, record documentation errors, and
communication failure.7 A 2001 Audit Commission report
concluded that most prescribing errors occur when the prescriber
does not have access to accurate information about either the
medicine or the patient.8
There are, of course, risks on the other side as well. Recent
instances of government departments’ laxity with computer discs
containing personal data show all too well the dangers of not taking
confidentiality seriously enough. In a recent report on the unlawful
trade in personal information – of which health information is one
part – the Information Commissioner wrote:
Investigations by the ICO and the police have uncovered evidence of a
widespread and organised undercover market in confidential personal
information… Among the ‘buyers’ are many journalists looking for a story…
Other cases have involved finance companies and local authorities wishing to
trace debtors; estranged couples seeking details of their partner’s whereabouts or
finances; and criminals intent on fraud or witness or juror intimidation.9
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The report gives the example of ‘an abusive husband able to
track down his ex-partner’s whereabouts through her parents’
medical records’.
People have a variety of reasons for not wanting their health
information to fall into the wrong hands. People trying to avoid
violent partners fear being traced through the NHS’s demographics
database. Those with a history of mental health problems say that it
colours the way health professionals view their physical symptoms.
Women who have terminated pregnancies feel certain staff will be
biased against them. People with a history of alcoholism, mental
health problems or drug abuse worry about employers finding out.
People with certain long-term conditions fear that they won’t be able
to get mortgages or insurance. People with past sexually transmitted
diseases worry about partners finding out. And it must not be
forgotten that some of the 1.3 million people who work in the NHS
will have concerns about what their colleagues might be able to see
about them.
In addition to people with sensitive things in their records,
there are those who object in principle to their information being
stored on big government databases or who fear other parts of the
state will misuse it. In some respects they are the most challenging
for the NHS. Though they are a small minority, they are a vocal one,
often better organised and able to speak more loudly than patients
in general.
Better-informed patients
People in a few ‘Early Adopter’ primary care trusts are beginning to
have 24-hour access to a summary version of their electronic health
records, using a protected internet site. A small but growing number
of GP surgeries are also offering their patients access to their full GP
record over the internet. This is a significant change for patients,
who are too often ‘flying blind’ when they make health decisions.
And there is more to come. Before long, people with long-term
conditions will be able to monitor themselves, for example their
peak flows, blood pressure and blood sugar levels, add the results
directly to the record, and get instant feedback. They will also be
able to add their treatment preferences to their record (such as
advance decisions not to be treated) and their access needs
(communication needs, dietary requirements, etc). A little further
down the line, they could well have access to decision aids and an
interactive care plan. They could use their records to give feedback
on the treatment they’ve had. These things will really put meat on
the bones of ‘patient-centred care’.
Patients often tell me that they particularly look forward to
having access to their health records over the internet if they are
taken ill while travelling abroad. They will have the means to make
information from it available online to anyone with internet access
treating them anywhere in the world.
Better-informed staff
Even if people do not choose to access their own records or find it
difficult, having this basic information available to authorised staff
will improve their experience of being a patient.
I met a woman recently whose child has multiple health needs
and many and often-changing medications. She told me that when
her son goes into respite care, the home often does not have recent
changes to his medication and must have proof in writing. So she
spends stressful hours seeking written confirmation at a time when
she wants to concentrate on settling her son in.
A friend emailed me recently after moving from London to
Suffolk. She, her specialist and her GP had spent several years
finding the right balance of medications for her thyroid problem,
with all the mood swings and weight gain that entailed. She arrived
at her new surgery to be told that the chances of her GP record
following her were, in their experience, ‘not high’. She wrote: ‘My
new GP needs to have a historic summary of my blood test results
and medication levels in order to continue care and proper
prescription. Not having access to information about my medical
condition electronically makes no sense to me, and could result in a
deterioration of my condition.’
A shared record of essential patient information would have
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greatly helped staff looking after a colleague nearing the end of 
the treatment for breast cancer. Her veins were ‘shot’ and the hunt
for a useable one was agonising. Her care was shared between two
hospitals. Each required a blood test before treatment but was
unable to see the results of the one taken a few days earlier at the
other hospital. While she is glowing in her praise for both hospitals,
she reports that it was only when she ‘begged and cried’ that they
took the (sometimes considerable) time to chase up the results from
the other hospital by phone to save her having a painful and
unnecessary repeat test.
Picking up trends
If, as Sir Cyril Chantler suggests, treatments are becoming more
dangerous as they become more effective, then we need to improve
our early warning systems of things going wrong. The electronic
record offers a good opportunity. Data about treatments and
outcomes can be anonymised and analysed for trends without the
hit and miss of previous schemes that depended on doctors
recognising and reporting adverse reactions. Had we been able to
do this electronically in the 1970s, who knows how many women
might have been spared the pain and suffering caused by the
Dalkon Shield. It took a whole year for it to stop being used in
Britain after it was banned in the US.
Is privacy a smokescreen?
A small group of doctors, especially general practitioners, have been
vocal in their opposition to a nationally held patient information on
the grounds of patient confidentiality. It is something all clinicians
are naturally concerned about.
What the most vocal objectors hardly ever mention, though,
are the problems today with paper records and existing
computerised records. When recently a GP wrote in The Times that
our GP records spilling out of Lloyd George envelopes were ‘the
envy of the world’,10 I wondered how in touch he was with the
reality for his patients. On both safety and confidentiality grounds,
it is high time we moved on.
We have a precious NHS with many caring and committed
people doing their best under difficult conditions. Money and time
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are wasted when poorly informed patients and poorly informed
clinicians struggle to make treatment decisions. Lives are 
sometimes lost or blighted by the errors that result – thousands 
each year according to the Audit Commission. Why would 
anyone want to continue down that road when we have the means
to do better?
For patients, all aspects of medical care are a balance of 
risks and benefits. Electronic health records are no different. 
The risks have been well aired in the media of late, often
inaccurately. For example, particularly inaccurate are assertions that
the police and various government departments will be part of the
sharing loop. Unlike now, when the police can put pressure on
individual surgeries or trusts to release information, in the future
there will have to be clear policies and procedures for information 
to be taken from electronic health records – and the process will 
be audited. That is not to say that there aren’t risks, and each
individual must weigh them against the benefits in their own
circumstances.
The benefits of linked electronic records range from saving
lives to saving people from additional stress in an already stressful
situation. They also include giving patients the tools to better
manage long-term conditions at home, the means to make known
their treatment preferences, and the power that comes from being
well informed. This context is often absent in stories about health
records; the media know how to write only two stories about them:
another large government IT project is failing or Big Brother is
here. And though they are fundamentally incompatible, sometimes
both are alleged at the same time!
Linked electronic health records, shared with patients, will
make doctors and other clinicians more accountable to their
colleagues and their patients for what they do and write down. It is
likely that this, as much as their concern for patient confidentiality,
may be sparking resistance in some quarters.
The ‘privacy pragmatist’ will have new choices
Much time and thought is being spent to enable the NHS to use its
newfound capabilities wisely, to help it strike an appropriate balance
between sharing information for good care and protecting people’s
privacy.
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A number of safeguards are being introduced once the new
systems are fully operational to provide more protection than exists
now with either paper or existing computer records.
99
· Anyone wanting permission to use the new NHS Care Records
Service will have to be sponsored to register to get a smartcard 
and passcode. Their smartcard registration will assign them a role 
or roles that will determine how much clinical information they 
are allowed to see. That means that someone booking appointments
will no longer have access to a full patient record, for example.
· Staff will only be able to access records of patients the system
recognises them as helping to treat. So gone will be the days when
anyone in a hospital could look at any patient’s records.
· The whole system is monitored and alarmed: anyone looking at a
patient’s record will leave a footprint (called an audit trail) and the
patient can ask to see it.
· Anyone who tries to access a record against the access rules will
trigger an alert to someone in charge of protecting patient privacy.
Heads are more likely to roll when people do things they shouldn’t.
· choose not to have a nationally available summary created, or to
have it created but not visible to anyone but themselves and their
GP practice
· choose to maintain the status quo, with information being shared
between organisations only by traditional means
· hide selected information from view when their records are shared
· put extra blocks on access to demographic information such as
current address and current GP
· in extremis, not to have anything but basic administrative
information held electronically
Taken together, these controls will make it much more
difficult for anyone outside the NHS to find people who actually
have access to a patient’s record who are willing to sell patient
information (provided of course that the systems are up to
standard). Apart from these new safeguards, over the next few years,
various choices will become available to patients who want to put
additional limits on who can access their information.
Those concerned enough to want to put additional limits on
information sharing will be able to:
All training for professionals and NHS staff needs to reflect
the new partnership with patients in relation to their health
information. For example, health professionals will need to be
trained to discuss with patients how information likely to be
sensitive is recorded and shared.
The new world will throw up some significant challenges for
patients and the NHS. People may profoundly disagree with things
they see in their records but clinicians will not want anything
deleted for medico-legal reasons. People who do not want any of
their information held electronically may present real difficulties for
those trying to provide them with care. What happens, for example,
if they need an X-ray? Nearly all hospitals now use only digital
imaging. While the NHS will try hard not to disadvantage people
who make extreme information-sharing choices, it may not always
be physically possible to provide the same standard of care as others
get. And what will happen when, in a clinician’s view, it is not
possible to provide an acceptable standard of care because of
someone’s information-sharing choices?
Some of these challenges have always been there with paper
records but they will be harder to fudge with electronic records.
This is a real opportunity to come up with good answers. It is
important that we proceed cautiously and learn as much as we can
in the early stages. That is why an independent evaluation of early
adopters of the Summary Care Record has been commissioned
from University College London.
Conclusion
This essay started as a look at electronic health records. However, it
has inevitably ranged wider because electronic health records are a
means to an end, not an end in themselves. For patients, they offer
an alternative to the Kafkaesque world where they rarely see
information about them that clinicians share with each other – and
are therefore disempowered. They offer an alternative to patients
and staff ‘flying blind’, making important health decisions without
crucial information. They usher in a world where patients have more
say in the care they receive and how information about that care is
recorded and shared.
There are risks to privacy with linked electronic records. As
patients, we are aware of the potential for hacking into any linked
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computer system, of carelessness leading to lost information, and of
identity theft. Even the considerable additional technological
safeguards built into the new linked electronic health records can’t
guarantee 100 per cent safety. But there are privacy risks to paper
records and existing computer records, not to mention well-
documented risks to patient safety.
It is for each ‘privacy pragmatist’ to weigh up the pros and
cons of fully participating in the new NHS Care Records Service.
The decisions will be different for different people. Those who want
to limit information sharing will have a number of options. Limiting
sharing may have implications for the ability of the NHS to provide
the safest and most efficient care – implications that need to be
understood when decisions are taken.
The important thing for me as a patient is that the choice is
mine. I no longer need well-meaning clinicians to speak for me. It is
time they let me grow up, ask my views and trust in my judgement.
Marlene Winfield is National Patient Lead for NHS Connecting for
Health.
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Research using data derived from medical records is one of the main
methods for improving public health. It has saved and improved
the lives of thousands of people. This form of research identifies
causes of disease in the environment – cigarette smoking is a
notable example. It suggests methods for controlling epidemics; the
findings frequently demonstrate long-term beneficial or harmful
effects of treatment and indicate ways in which effective healthcare
can be delivered or improved. The UK has been one of the world
leaders in this field for over 50 years. With the proposed national
introduction of electronic healthcare records the opportunities for
UK research to improve the health and lives of the population are
now exceptional. No other country will be capable of providing
data for research analysis on the same scale. But just at this moment
of opportunity, changes in the laws concerning privacy, combined
with confused interpretation and regulation of these laws and 
a conflicting and multilayered bureaucracy, have put such 
research at risk.
This form of research is quite different from other types of
medical research that are interventional – such as clinical
investigation or treatment trials where the patient and members of
the investigator’s team meet each other. This is research that uses
information in medical records that was originally collected for
some other purpose – usually the routine care of patients. Of course
the researchers understand that private information is given in
confidence during healthcare and that patients would not expect
that it would be disclosed without consent. But some activities
undertaken in the public interest may be damaged, or even
prevented, unless the reasonable boundaries of such confidentiality
are defined and understood.
Routine medical records have many advantages in public
health research. They represent current practice; they cover all social
classes and ethnic backgrounds; large numbers of records can be
studied to detect rare events; and the findings can be quickly turned
into practical recommendations for health. The researchers are not
interested in outcomes, or details, of individuals, but in the health of
populations. In formulating and presenting the results of the research
no reference is made to individual patients but to general outcomes
in the patient or disease group concerned. In other words, although
the data have to be derived from individuals the subsequent results
are generalised.
A straightforward example is the use of cancer registries. In
many countries it is a legal requirement to register a diagnosis of
cancer. These countries therefore know exactly how many cancers
are occurring and can detect changes in incidence (the number of
new cases in a given time). It is not a legal requirement in the UK
but our registries include the majority of the population. Two
examples serve to show the damage that can be done by not
knowing the number of new cases. It is widely believed that in the
UK the cure rates for cancer are inferior to those in France. Such 
a view, which worries the general public and patients with cancer,
and influences policy, has no basis in fact because most cases of
cancer are not systematically registered in France.1 Although the
death rate from cancer in France is known, in the absence of 
reliable data about incidence the national cure rates cannot be
measured accurately. In Hyogo province in Japan, concerns over
privacy led to the closure of the cancer registry. This decision
tragically led to the failure to detect a rising incidence of mesothe-
lioma (cancer of the lung due to asbestos exposure) and 
the registry was reinstated.
The routine passage of information about a cancer diagnosis
to a public registry, which keeps the information securely and 
which uses it for population statistical purposes, is an example 
of the way in which the illness of an individual can be used to
benefit society as a whole. And yet there are occasionally 
objections in the UK, on the grounds of privacy, to such a 
necessary activity. Indeed, in 2000 the General Medical Council
stated that the transfer of such information to a registry may be
against the law, thereby calling into question the registration of
cancer in the UK. The GMC belatedly recognised, and retracted,
this damaging advice, which was based on a controversial
interpretation of the law.
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It is of course legal to use medical data if the patient has given
consent, or if the records have been completely and irreversibly
anonymised. Unfortunately, consent or irreversible anonymisation
are frequently either not possible, or would invalidate the research.
It is extremely important to understand why this is so, and the
following examples explain the problem.
It may be completely impractical to obtain consent. The
research often involves linking the data from one source to that in
another, unrelated, database. This may involve tens of thousands of
individuals, the data often having been collected, both in time and
place, at a considerable distance from the individuals and the events
of interest and for different purposes:
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Research testing the hypothesis that adverse conditions in pregnancy might
increase the risk of cardiovascular disease years later in adult life used 15,000
birth records collected from 1911 onwards. At the time of the research the
population had dispersed and 3,000 people had died. The study provided
evidence for a link between low birth weight and hypertension and type II
diabetes in adult life.2
There was uncertainty about whether termination of pregnancy increased the
risk of breast cancer – thereby providing an argument against termination. But
a probable bias was that women who had developed breast cancer might be
more willing to disclose information about a previous termination (to help
explain why they had a cancer) than women with no cancer and in doing so
would establish a false association. The absence of risk was demonstrated when a
data linkage study was performed without consent.3
Following the thalidomide tragedy, registers of congenital anomalies were
established to identify teratogenic exposures during pregnancy. The anomalies
may present medically for the first time many years after birth, so data must 
be sought from genetic counselling services, midwives, paediatricians, 
Seeking consent may introduce biases that undermine the
research, the process may cause distress, or the research may
concern people whose illness means that they lack the legal capacity
to consent:
There is a serious risk of double counting if data are
irreversibly anonymised:
general practitioners and others. Unless the names are known, and can be
checked, a single case may be recorded several times distorting the frequency and
the risk.4
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Sometimes additional data may need to be added over many
years in longitudinal studies of outcome. The detection of a rare but
serious side-effect of a drug may only be suspected years after
exposure. New data cannot be added if the records of those
receiving the drug have been irreversibly anonymised.
These examples show that research in the public interest may
sometimes need to use identifiable data without consent. This has
created great difficulty for research as the legal framework, and its
interpretation, concerning such use has changed. This is not just a
problem for the UK, but it is especially important here because of
our long-standing expertise in this form of investigation and the
many important contributions that have been made. Of course,
clinical researchers must recognise that changes in the privacy laws
reflect public concerns about possible misuse of their personal
information. These concerns largely centre on commercial and
political use of data but medical research is caught up in the
resulting legislation, even if it was not the primary target of changes
in the law.
The law has become more complicated following the
enactment of the Data Protection Act 1998, the Human Rights Act
1998 and the Health and Social Care Act 2001. In addition, the 
use of data is subject to the Common Law of Confidentiality. In
spite of the wide areas of public life that this legislative framework 
is intended to cover, schedules and exceptions have been included
to allow the use of data without consent in the public interest. 
The essential point is that the use of data in this way must be
demonstrably proportionate to the risk involved to individuals and
the likely benefit that may result. In more than 50 years there has
not been a case concerning medical research use of records under
the provisions of the common law.
A recent report of a Working Group of the Academy of
Medical Sciences, which I chaired, considered that in spite of the
difficulties with this complex framework, the law as it now stands
was not intended to inhibit medical research in the public interest.5
Our conclusion was that the problems that now beset the researcher
in trying to undertake research are often caused by the confusing
and contradictory assessments made by regulatory bodies that may
be required to pass judgement on the legality of a research proposal.
Research proposals are usually developed by research teams in
academic departments. Studies using population databases or large
numbers of records are often collaborative, involving investigators
in many different locations, sometimes in several countries. To fund
the research, the proposal is usually submitted to a research funding
agency and will have been approved by the ethics review
committees of the institutions involved. Before funding, the science,
feasibility and importance are assessed by a process of peer review.
This is a highly competitive procedure – in aggregate, only about 
30 per cent of proposals in biological sciences are funded in the UK.
If a proposal for research using data passes through these hoops it
will often then have to surmount hurdles which other medical
research does not encounter. These take the form of one or more
assessments by a variety of regulatory bodies. These include the
Patient Information Advisory Group (PIAG), the Office of the
Information Commissioner, the R&D offices of hospital and primary
care trusts. Each of these structures may give different opinions on
what they think is the legal position. In a multicentre study this
process may take months or years. In the Academy study, researchers
gave us numerous instances where it had been difficult or impossible
to respond to the conflicting advice and interpretation.
Understandably, the regulators concerned with research use 
of data place preservation of confidentiality as the predominant
factor in deciding on whether to permit research to take place.
However, following its call for evidence the Academy received
numerous examples of a wholly disproportionate assessment of the
risks to any individual when judged against the potential benefits
that the research might bring. If one or more of the regulators
consider that there may be a legal impediment in the study this may
delay, or prevent, the study from occurring. A frequent outcome is
that so many additional administrative burdens are placed on the
investigators that the financing and time allotted to the study will
not support its continuation.
Although it is true that over the last 50 years there has been
great benefit and no harm, it is clear that this truth will not suffice
nowadays. There are already excellent standards of ethical review of
research proposals and there is independent peer review of the
science. Most research teams have high standards of data security
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and staff training. (It must be stressed that concern for confidentiality
does not supplant the need for data security. The recent gross and
inexcusable loss of data by government departments shows how
important security is.) These standards must be of demonstrably
high quality and for this reason the Academy suggested that
guidelines be developed for these aspects of the research process so
that the public can have confidence in the security of the data and
its handling.
What does the public know of this process and the difficulties
that are impeding research that may benefit them as individuals and
their families? There have been very few reliable studies. Most
enquiries have lumped together all research as one general activity
and posed questions without explaining the specific context. One
large-scale questionnaire enquiring generally into who should have
access to medical records asked whether the respondent would be
content to let their record be seen by ‘a medical researcher’. Many of
us would say ‘no’ to such an ill-defined question but might well
answer ‘yes’ if we had been asked about confidential, secure, non-
commercial use of the outcome of our illness that would allow long-
term problems to be identified and services to be improved with no
risk of personal identification.
Knowledgeable patient support groups are mostly strong
supporters of research of this kind. But several important points
must be considered in discussing public attitudes. Not all illnesses
are equal in terms of sensitivity. Research on blood pressure has
quite different connotations than that on sexually transmitted
diseases, alcoholism, mental illness or child abuse. Furthermore 
the attitudes and responses of patients who have the disease may 
be quite different from when enquiry is made of the general 
public who have no experience of the anxieties that accompany
serious illness and the intense desire for progress that many 
patients feel.
Whose opinion should then prevail? Many of us would
perhaps answer that the attitudes that should carry most weight
should be those of the people who are most affected. Even 
within patient organisations there may be problems of under-
standing that get in the way of informed discussion. Repre-
sentatives of HIV-infected people are often, understandably, 
among those most concerned about records-linked research. But
even in such a potentially sensitive area important issues of health
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cannot be avoided if, and when, they occur. Consider a possible 
scenario.
Let us suppose that a rare side-effect of one, but not all, drugs
to treat HIV is an increased risk, after many years, of an uncommon
cancer of the lymphatic system. (A similar long-term risk was found
by records-based research, beginning in the 1970s, in patients with
renal transplants treated with drugs to suppress graft rejection.) A
way to detect this risk would be by matching the records of tens of
thousands of treated patients with data derived from cancer
registries. But the time elapsed, and the large numbers necessary to
detect, with statistical confidence, a modest increase in risk of an
uncommon disease, might well mean that informed consent could
not reasonably be obtained. If you had HIV and were taking, or 
had taken, the drug in question, would you want this research to
proceed – even if it was quite impossible to ask your personal
permission but you knew there was no risk of disclosure?
So, more detailed research of attitudes is needed. This
research must be focused and precise. Diseases should be
considered separately, the details of the research made clear, and
informed and considered responses should be sought from sections
of the public that are likely to have different perceptions or interests.
These include patients, the families of those affected, the general
public, social and ethnic groups. Poor-quality research, sadly all too
common, will inevitably generate confusion and misinformation.
How can patients and the general public be engaged in the
opportunities, and obligations, to carry out research to improve the
health of us all? The research mission of the NHS has almost no
public face. The opportunities for research based on our own
experience of illness, and the benefit it can bring, are seldom
explained at the point when we use the service. Patients going to a
teaching hospital know, because they are informed of the fact, that
they may be asked to accept the presence of a medical student or
nurse in training. But the same document given to patients seldom
mentions the research mission of the hospital. Why not? Why
cannot hospitals and practices help to spread the understanding of
research for public benefit? If this isn’t done, and public opinion is
not well understood, there is a great risk that a highly vocal minority
who insist on the primacy of the right to privacy, will drown out the
desire of less emphatic citizens who wish to contribute to the public
good. Getting ill is upsetting. If our experience of illness can be
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used to help others most of us would surely want to participate. As
citizens we know we have responsibilities as well as rights.
Robert Souhami is Emeritus Professor of Medicine at the University College
London.
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REGULATING OUR 
PRIVATE LIVES IN AN 
OPEN SOCIETY

9 Sleepwalking into a
surveillance society
Jonathan Bamford
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Back in the early 1970s many were waking up to the potential of
computers to have a powerful influence over ordinary people’s lives
– the power to store hitherto impossibly large quantities of personal
information; the power to cross-reference information about
individuals from different sources; the power to record this in a
format aiding wider distribution than was ever possible before – all
accompanied by the real risk that such power would not be used in
a benign or beneficial way, but in a way that eroded individual
freedoms. This was the real prospect of life imitating art, with the
Orwellian vision of ‘Big Brother’1 becoming a nightmarish reality. 
A prerequisite to being able to build up this intrusive picture of
people’s lives is the capability to distinguish between one individual
and another, to be able to identify them uniquely and attribute
information to this identity.
The response to these privacy concerns included attempts 
to try to identify and codify standards for information
handling that would enable the benefits of the emerging new
technology to be realised while providing protection for individuals
against unwarranted use of their information. These are what have
become known as data protection laws.
If we cast our minds back to the time when these data
protection standards and laws were developed, the information
technology of the day was very different. The power of computing
was based on expensive mainframe computers; the threat came from
personal information being in the hands of a few well-resourced
organisations and governments: a small family of ‘Big Brothers’.
Today our ‘computers’ sit on our desks, in our laps, palms or
pockets with devices as diverse as PCs to mobile phones. We are
‘networked’ unlike anything envisaged by most back in the 1970s.
We take full advantage of our modern wired-up world where goods
and services are available 24/7, where buying a book doesn’t require
a visit to a local bookshop but where it can be purchased with just
the same ease from a retailer in Seattle, Shanghai, Stockholm or
Sydney.
But with our modern world those with whom we do business
want to have confidence in who we are, in order to protect
themselves. Equally, individuals crave certainty in those whom 
they are dealing with to avoid falling prey to identity theft. All 
this involves the provision of identifying information, and we 
leave behind information about ourselves, our electronic footprints,
as we go from transaction to transaction, from website to website:
use of a credit card here, a mobile phone call there, the click of a
mouse on a web url or on ‘send’ with an email. Our transactions 
are tracked, our interactions identified and our preferences 
profiled, all with potential for retaining and disseminating these 
to others, building up an increasingly intrusive picture of we
live our lives. The ‘surveillance society’ is no longer science 
fiction.
Identity: its part in the bigger picture
We have undoubtedly moved into what has become known as the
‘information age’. It is the linking of information to an identified or
identifiable individual that is the precursor to other activities that
may impact on them – identification of the individual either directly
through traditional attributes of identity such as given name, date of
birth and physical characteristics such as gender, eye colour and
height or indirectly through identifiers allocated to them such as
identification numbers, phone numbers, vehicle registration marks
and credit card numbers.
In our parents’ generation ‘appropriate anonymity’ was a fact
of every day life. Many transactions took place face to face with
payment by cash and although the individual may have been
personally known to the service provider there was little in the way
of centralised collections of personal information created. However
in the modern ‘wired-up’ world, a variety of identity attributes are
used to tie individuals to particular transactions involving a large
number of other parties. Although identification attributes can vary
depending on the degree of certainty a service provider needs to
have about who they are dealing with, such as to ensure payment is
honoured, there are still a large number of identifying particulars
created. This not only produces a comprehensive picture of that
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individual’s interactions with the service provider but also provides
the links on which this information can be shared with others,
building up a wider picture of an individual’s activities. The day 
of the data aggregator is with us and organisations offer
lucrative identity verification services, and with this a vicious circle,
as the greater the extent of the personal information and the more
current it is, the greater certainty with which they feel they can
vouch for that individual’s identity. This is often known as the
‘biographic footprint’ and without it individuals can become
disadvantaged as their identity is called into question.
However, identification does not end there; the technology
now exists to tie identity to the very human tissue of an individual
through biometrics. Automatic fingerprint, facial and iris
recognition applications and DNA profiling and matching are
increasingly commonplace and are no longer the preserve of the law
enforcement community. Biometrics are being increasingly
deployed in everyday life from international travel documents such
as passports and visas to schools where fingerprint recognition is
used to issue library books and to pay for school meals.
Identification and surveillance
The alliance between technological advances and the generation of
more and more identifying particulars means that the component
parts of the infrastructure of the surveillance society are now laid
out before us and this is being assembled piece by piece. Each piece
is justified in its own right by its advocates but when viewed as a
whole the edifice could amount to the Orwellian vision, just nearly
quarter of a century later than predicted. Increasingly the political
response to terrorist outrages and fear of crime in the population is
to deploy surveillance technology. In the United Kingdom there are
now an estimated 4.2 million closed circuit television (CCTV)
cameras observing and recording the population as it goes about its
business.2 When first introduced CCTV was essentially a passive
tool, with images being viewed and acted on in response to events.
Increasingly, digitised images are now being processed in a way that
turns CCTV cameras into proactive tools with the capability to
automatically identify and record an individual’s movements.
Automatic facial recognition software is now deployed with cameras
not only with public sector schemes to identify and track known
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criminals but also in the retail sector to identify persons of concern
entering shops.
Increasingly allied to CCTV cameras is vehicle registration
plate recognition software, know as Automatic Number Plate
Recognition (ANPR). This enables vehicle movements to be logged
and by association the activities of the registered person associated
with that vehicle. This technology is now deployed not only to look
for vehicles of interest to the police but also to underpin traffic
enforcement activities such as identifying speeding vehicles and
whether a vehicle’s owner has prepaid for driving in a road-use
charging zone such as with the congestion charge in central
London. The example of use of ANPR technology for catching
speeding vehicles shows how new technology increases the ability to
survey the population as it goes about its lawful business. ANPR
speed cameras calculate average speed over a fixed distance by
capturing the vehicle identification plate of all vehicles passing the
first camera and a second camera some distance along the road.
The difference from traditional speed cameras is that there is a
record of all vehicles passing through the two cameras not just the
speeding ones. A vehicle movements database is built up. The
London Congestion Charging Scheme also captures and retains
details of all vehicles not just the vehicle details of those drivers who
have not paid. Sensible application of data protection safeguards
limits retention of the details of the innocent in this latter case
although the law enforcement community sees such details as
valuable should an incident occur and seeks long retention.
The huge advances in telecommunications with the use of 
the internet, email and mobile telephones as part of our everyday
lives means that these can equally be used by those elements of
society involved in criminal activity. Increasingly the law enforce-
ment community wants telecommunication service providers to
keep detailed records of who owns mobile phones, to whom SIM
cards are sold and the phone numbers allocated to them. They also
want providers to retain ‘traffic’ data showing phone numbers from
which calls are made and received, email transactions and the URLs
for websites visited.
While interception of telephone call and email content
remains subject to strict legal safeguard (although much can still be
judged from the title of a webpage visited or an email address),
governments have moved to require telecommunication service
Sleepwalking into a surveillance society
providers to retain traffic details for longer than they ordinarily
would for business purposes. In the UK the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001 put in place such measures and one of the
immediate responses by the UK government to the terrorist
atrocities in London on 7 July 2005 was to use its position as the
then President of the European Union to fast track work to
establish a regulation requiring common minimum traffic retention
periods in all EU member states. Although the fight against
terrorism is cited as the reason for retention, once retained the
potential is there to use it for less pressing policing activities.
Such legislative responses can erode safeguards contained in
data protection and privacy legislation; other common examples
include laws facilitating public sector data matching such as to
detect fraudulent government benefit claims or other frauds against
the public purse, data matching often being seen as the answer
rather than preventing the fraud in first place by better
administration.
In the UK other developments such as the extension3 of the
police’s powers to take DNA samples and the removal of specific
statutory requirements to delete these and fingerprint details where
the police have no further interest in an individual are further
evidence of a relentless acquisition of more and more identifying
particulars about the population.
The list of public policy developments with a privacy impact
does not stop there. Many current initiatives have dimensions that
engage privacy concerns however well intentioned or desirable the
initiative. Even a brief listing shows the range and extent. The
Identity Cards Act 2006 creates a national identity register tied to
individuals’ biometrics, making possible the creation of a data trail
as individuals use the card as they go about their day-to-day
business. Connecting for Health is a project to create an electronic
healthcare record in England with summary healthcare records
available nationwide. There is an eBorders programme
underpinned by wide-ranging legislative powers for border control
agencies to acquire and share traveller information with each other.
Our road travel is subject to plans to increase the extent of
road-user charging, engaging concerns about how vehicle users will
be tracked and details of their journeys stored. The list goes on with
many other developments in the public sector, be it increased
information sharing to transform government or to catch those who
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commit fraud as with the Serious Crimes Act 2007. The
developments are not just at home; the requirements of the US and
other countries for passenger name record information to be
provided by airlines, including substantial amounts of personal
information in order to safeguard border and aviation security,
impact across frontiers with details of millions of innocent
passengers retained for long periods of time.
Are our privacy laws redundant?
The thirst for more and more information about individuals seems
unquenchable but it would be unduly pessimistic to believe that
data protection and privacy laws are at best anachronistic, and at
worst completely useless. It is fair to say that data protection and
privacy regulation has struggled to keep pace with the techno-
logical, economic and political changes that have driven the
expansion in the breadth and depth of personal details held 
about individuals. Individuals are concerned about what happens
to their information. Research conducted by the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the UK shows that over half of
individuals surveyed believe that they have lost control of how their
information is handled and the need to protect their information is
judged to be a matter that concerns them only second to preventing
crime and issues mentioned above such as the NHS, unemploy-
ment, environmental issues and equal rights.4
Given public desire to be safeguarded against unwarranted
use of their personal details, this begs the question whether the data
protection laws themselves are deficient. In essence most data
protection laws are technology neutral with no detailed references to
particular technological applications within them. They set
principles to be followed, rights for individuals, supervisory regimes
and legal sanctions. The central principles remain as valid today as
30 years ago with safeguards against wider use, poor data quality
standards, security arrangements and the need for transparency,
data minimisation and individual access. The core data protection
standards still appear to pass muster as a comprehensive set of
desirable standards to protect individuals in the handling of their
information, if applied correctly. Research undertaken by the
Information Commissioner in the UK into public attitudes to
CCTV5 and other surveillance technology showed that when asked
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to come up with essential safeguards, the list generated closely
matches the core data protection standards.
Trying to ensure that what appear to many to be complex data
protection and privacy laws are applied in the context of new
developments has become a challenge for the data protection
regulatory authorities. In the UK the Information Commissioner
used his powers to issue a code of practice specifically related to
CCTV surveillance.6 This was inspired by the need to try to apply
the standards that had traditionally been required with
computerised personal information to images relating to
individuals. Although only published in 2000 this code is already
showing its age as technology like ANPR advances, and a revised
version has just finished a round of public consultation ready for
publication in early 2008.
Incorporating safeguards at the outset does not yet always
come naturally to those who develop policy and technology. This is
despite the decades’ long existence of data protection and privacy
legislation. Core data protection safeguards such as data
minimisation and finality of use are often overlooked in the rush to
develop a new application. A solution is the deployment of privacy
enhancing technologies (PETs) into new developments, using
technological solutions to try to ensure appropriate privacy but 
this has yet to strike a chord with many despite the efforts of data
protection authorities to promote them. Perhaps more
fundamentally, many developing new applications do not even
question whether there is a more privacy-friendly way to achieve the
same objective; they are locked into the thinking of the past that
substantial amounts of personal information is a necessity if you are
dealing with people. Privacy impact assessments (PIAs) have a real
role to play, particularly with the public sector developments, but in
Europe these have yet to be embraced in the same way as in North
America and Australasia. The Information Commissioner is
redressing this balance and has commissioned work to produce a
PIA handbook for use in the UK based on the best international
experience available, which was launched in December 2007.7
Identity management is a good example of where old
thinking dominates at the cost of personal privacy. Identity
management is a crucial activity in our modern world as we do
business with others who are not known to us or us to them, where
service providers want to have confidence that they can trust the
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person they are dealing with and, importantly, that the individual
can have confidence in what happens to their details. But the
traditional approach of storing more and more details to
substantiate identity held in a central collection for consultation by
others does not necessarily achieve the objective and poses its own
risks should security be compromised. This centralised approach to
identity management is not the only option; there are other
opportunities that may provide equally viable options such as user-
centric and federated identity management among a number of
privacy-friendly options.
However, each of these responses can address only particular
elements. The effects on privacy go further than the informational
privacy aspects, as is recognised in the PIA process, which goes
beyond dealing with strict data protection compliance and goes on
to consider societal impacts. Initial findings from ICO research
commissioned to gauge public attitudes to surveillance was
published in December 2007 and shows that the public is largely
accepting of some element of surveillance as a product of how the
modern world works but also trusts that there is something or
someone in place to safeguard their interests.8
Whether subsequent widely reported security incidents, such
as the loss of discs containing the personal details of 25 million
people involved in child benefit claims by HM Revenue and
Customs,9 has altered the balance of public trust remains to be seen.
It is clear that legislative safeguards can do only so much to address
surveillance society issues. The two parliamentary inquiries into
surveillance show the range of interests now engaged. The House of
Commons Home Affairs Committee is addressing the issue from its
perspective, which includes the law enforcement angle on
surveillance, while the House of Lords Constitution Committee is
addressing the issue from the constitutional perspective, which
engages the important issue of the relationship between the citizen
and the state.
Whatever aspects or approaches are adopted, addressing the
challenges posed by the developing privacy risks cannot be left to
chance. Acknowledging the need to rise to the challenges and
concerted action to meet them is required. To this end the
Information Commissioner has a dedicated surveillance society
action plan, which has work streams ranging from understanding
public attitudes to developing practical tools such as PIAs and
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codes of practice. It is vital that we move from debating whether we
are living in a surveillance society to putting in place practical steps
that will safeguard us against unwanted consequences. The
Information Commissioner, having raised awareness of the issue at
an international conference in London in 2006,10 held a follow-up
conference in Manchester in December 2007 entitled Surveillance
Society: Turning Debate into Action, which was aimed at moving
the agenda forward in a very practical way, addressing legitimate
privacy concerns and, by doing so, helping to inspire public trust
and confidence in the use of their information.
Privacy: an objective not a threat?
When considering the issue of surveillance and privacy from a data
protection regulatory perspective, it is undoubtedly the case that the
central principles of data protection law are as relevant today as they
ever were, if not even more so. Information being used fairly,
keeping it to a minimum, ensuring it is of the right quality and
guaranteeing its security are crucial protections, which cannot be
left to chance or the virtuosity of those who hold it. Its safeguards
are vital in limiting the ambitions of those whose mantra is ‘only the
guilty have anything to fear’. As the recent security breaches have
shown, more than just the guilty may have something to fear if
personal information is not treated with proper respect and care.
However, the rapid pace of technological progress has sometimes
left behind data protection regulators who too often are trying to
get data protection grafted on to an essentially privacy-intrusive way
of operating.
Protecting privacy is seen by many as an obstacle to
development rather than an objective. It is essential to change the
mindset of those who crave more and more information about
individuals and seek to employ the increasing power of technology
and applications to deliver their objective of the need to consider
privacy first rather than an as afterthought. They can embrace the
use of tools like PIAs and privacy-enhancing technologies as real
evidence of their commitment to protect privacy.
The first European-wide legal instrument on data protection,
the Council of Europe Convention 108, points out that information
power carries social responsibility. If those carrying this responsi-
bility fail to discharge it and do not seize opportunities to treat
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appropriate privacy protection as an objective of new developments,
not an obstacle to them, the consequences will be felt by all, as the
very fabric of our society will have undergone an irreversible
change. The public trust in those who hold and use their personal
details will be lost and replaced with the chilling feeling that privacy
and autonomy have disappeared with each and everyone of us a
fully paid-up life member of the ‘surveillance society’.
Jonathan Bamford is the Assistant Information Commissioner.
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10 Towards global privacy
standards
Peter Fleischer
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How should we update privacy concepts for the Information Age?
The total amount of data in the world is exploding, and data flows
around the globe with the click of mouse. Every time you use a credit
card, or every time you use an online service, your data is zipping
around the planet. Let’s say you live in France and you use a US
company’s online service. The US company may serve you from any
one of its numerous data centres, from the ‘cloud’ as we say in tech-
nology circles, in other words, from infrastructure which could be in
Belgium or Ireland – and which could change based on momentary
traffic flows. The company may store offline disaster recovery tapes
in yet another location (without disclosing the location, for security
purposes). And the company may engage customer service reps in
yet another country, say India. So, your data may move across six or
seven countries, even for very routine transactions.
As a consumer, how do you know that your data is protected,
wherever it is located? As a business, how do you know which
standards of data protection to apply? As governments, how do you
ensure that your consumers and your businesses can participate
fully in the global digital economy, while ensuring their privacy is
protected?
The story illustrates the argument I will make in this essay.
Businesses and governments, but most of all citizens and
consumers, would all benefit if we could devise and implement
global privacy standards. In an age when billions of people are used
to connecting with data around the world at the speed of light, we
need to ensure that there are minimum privacy protections around
the world. But the majority of the world’s countries offer virtually
no privacy standards to their citizens or to their businesses, and the
minority of the world’s countries that do have privacy regimes
follow divergent models. We can do better. Today, citizens lose out
because they are unsure about what rights they have given the
patchwork of competing regimes, and the cost of compliance for
businesses risks cooling economic activity. Governments often
struggle to find any clear internationally recognised standards on
which to build their privacy legislation.
Of course there are good reasons for some country-specific
privacy legislation. The benefits of homogeneity must be balanced
by the rights of legitimate authorities to determine laws within their
jurisdictions. We don’t expect the same tax rules in every country,
say some critics, so why should we expect the same privacy rules?
But in many areas affecting international trade, from
copyright to aviation regulations to world health issues, huge
benefits have been achieved by setting globally respected standards.
In today’s inter-connected world, no one country and no one
national law by itself can address the global issues of copyright or
airplane safety or influenza pandemics. It is time that the most
globalised and transportable commodity in the world today, data,
was given similar treatment.
So I would like to set out why I think international privacy
rules are necessary, and to discuss ideas about how we create
universally respected rules. I don’t claim to have all the answers to
these big questions, but I hope we can contribute to the debate and
the awareness of the need to make progress.
Drivers behind the original privacy standards
First, a bit of history. Modern privacy law is a response to historical
and technological developments of the second half of the twentieth
century. The ability to collect, store and disseminate vast amounts of
information about individuals through the use of computers was
clearly chilling in relation to the collective memories of the dreadful
mass misuse of information about people that Europe had
experienced during the Second World War. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the first data privacy initiatives arose in Europe, primarily
aimed at imposing obligations that would protect individuals from
unjustified intrusions by the state or large corporations, as reflected
in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.1
Early international instruments
Concerns about international data flows were already being
addressed in a multinational context as early as 1980, with the
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awareness that a purely national approach to privacy regulation
simply wasn’t keeping abreast of technological and business
realities. After a decade of uncoordinated legislative activity across
Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) identified a danger: that disparities in
national legislations could hamper the free flow of personal data
across frontiers. In order to avoid unjustified obstacles to
transborder data flows, in 1980 the OECD adopted its Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.2
These OECD Guidelines became particularly influential for the
development of data privacy laws in non-European jurisdictions.
The Guidelines represent the first codification of the so-called ‘fair
information principles’. These eight principles were meant to be
taken into account by OECD member countries when passing
domestic legislation and include:
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· collection limitation
· data quality
· purpose specification
· use limitation
· security safeguards
· openness
· individual participation
· accountability
A parallel development in the same area but with a slightly
different primary aim was the Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of
Personal Data adopted in 1981.3 The Convention’s purpose was to
secure individuals’ right to privacy with regard to the automatic
processing of personal data and was directly inspired by the original
European Convention on Human Rights. The Council of Europe
instrument sets out a number of basic principles for data protection,
which are similar to the ‘fair information principles’ of the OECD
Guidelines. In addition, the Convention establishes special categories
of data, provides additional safeguards for individuals and requires
countries to establish sanctions and remedies.
The different origins and aims of both instruments result in
rather different approaches to data privacy regulation. For example,
while the Convention relies heavily on the establishment of a
supervisory authority with responsibility for enforcement, the
OECD Guidelines rely on court-driven enforcement mechanisms.
These disparities have been reflected in the laws of the countries
within the sphere of influence of each model. So, for example, in
Europe, privacy abuses are regulated by independent, single-
purpose bureaucracies, while in the US, privacy abuses can be
regulated by many different government and private bodies (eg the
Federal Trade Commission at the federal level, attorneys general at
the state levels, and private litigants everywhere).
It is impossible to say which model is more effective, since
each reflects the unique regulatory and legal cultures of their
respective traditions. Globally, we need to focus on advocating
privacy standards to countries around the world. But we should
defer to each country to decide on its own regulatory models, given
its own traditions.
What is happening now?
Today, a quarter century later, some countries are inspired by the
OECD Guidelines, others follow the European approach, and some
newer ones incorporate hybrid approaches by cherry-picking
elements from existing frameworks, while the significant majority 
of countries still have no privacy regimes at all.
After half a decade of negotiations, in 1995, the EU adopted
the data protection Directive 95/46/EC.4 The EU Directive has a
two-fold aim: to protect the right to privacy of individuals, and to
facilitate the free flow of personal data between EU member states.
Despite its harmonisation purpose, according to a recent EU
Commission Communication,5 the Directive has not been properly
implemented in some countries yet. This shows the inherent
difficulty in trying to roll out a detailed and strict set of principles,
obligations and rights across jurisdictions. However, the Commission
has also made it clear that at this stage, it does not envisage
submitting any legislative proposals to amend the Directive.
In comparison with other international approaches, EU 
data privacy laws appear restrictive and cumbersome, particularly 
as a result of the stringent prohibition on transfers of data to 
most countries6 outside the European Union, based around the
Commission’s view of ‘adequacy’ of protection in third countries.7
The EU’s formalistic criteria for determining ‘adequacy’ have been
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widely criticised: why should Argentina be ‘adequate’, but not
Japan? As a European citizen, why can companies transfer your
data (even without your consent) to Argentina and Bulgaria and
other ‘adequate’ countries, but not to the vast majority of the
countries of the world, like the US and Japan? In short, if we want
to achieve global privacy standards, the European Commission will
have to learn to demonstrate more respect for other countries’
approaches to privacy regimes.
But at least in Europe there is some degree of harmonisation.
In contrast, the US has so far avoided the adoption of an all-
encompassing federal privacy regime. Unlike in Europe, the US 
has traditionally made a distinction between the need for privacy-
related legislation in respect of the public and the private sectors.
Specific laws have been passed to ensure that government and
administrative bodies undertake certain obligations in this field.
With regard to the use of personal information by private
undertakings, the preferred practice has been to work on the basis
of sector-specific laws at a federal level while allowing individual
states to develop their own legislative approaches. This has led to a
flurry of state laws dealing with a whole range of privacy issues,
from spam to pretexting. There are now something like 37 different
US state laws requiring security breach notifications to consumers, a
patchwork that is hardly ideal for either US consumer confidence or
US business compliance.
The complex patchwork of privacy laws in the US has led
many people to call for a simplified, uniform and flexible legal
framework, and in particular for comprehensive harmonised federal
privacy legislation. To kickstart a serious debate on this front, in
2006 a number of leading US corporations set up the Consumer
Privacy Legislative Forum,8 of which Google forms part. It aims to
make the case for harmonised legislation. We believe that the same
arguments for global privacy standards should also apply to US
federal privacy standards: improve consumer protections and
confidence by applying a consistent minimum standard, and ease
the burdens on businesses trying to comply with multiple
(sometimes conflicting) standards.
An increasingly influential approach to privacy legislation has
been developing in Canada, particularly since the federal Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
was adopted in 2000.9 The Canadian PIPEDA aims to have the
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flexibility of the OECD Guidelines – on which it is based – while
providing the rigour of the European approach. In Canada, as in
the US, the law establishes different regimes for the public and
private sectors, which allows for a greater focus on each. As has also
been happening in the US in recent years with state laws, provincial
laws have recently taken a leading role in developing the Canadian
model. Despite the fact that PIPEDA creates a privacy framework
that requires the provincial laws to be ‘substantially similar’ to the
federal statute, a Parliamentary Committee carrying out a formal
review of the existing framework earlier in 2007 recommended
reforms for PIPEDA to be modelled on provincial laws. Overall,
Canada should be praised for encouraging the development of
progressive legislation that serves the interests of citizens and
businesses well.
Perhaps the best example of a modern approach to the OECD
privacy principles is to be found in the APEC Privacy Framework,
which has emerged from the work of the 21 countries of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.10 The Framework focuses its
attention on ensuring practical and consistent privacy protection
across a very wide range of economic and political perspectives that
include global powerhouses such as the US and China, plus some
key players in the privacy world (some old, some new), such as
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. In addition
to being a sort of modern version of the old OECD Guidelines, the
Framework suggests that privacy legislation should be aimed
primarily at preventing harm to individuals from the wrongful
collection and misuse of their information. The proposed Framework
points out that under the new ‘preventing harm’ principle, any
remedial measures should be proportionate to the likelihood and
severity of the harm.
Unfortunately, the coexistence of such diverse international
approaches to privacy protection has three very damaging
consequences: uncertainty for international organisations;
unrealistic limits on data flows in conflict with global electronic
communications; and ultimately, loss of effective privacy protection.
New (interconnected) drivers for global privacy standards
Against this background, we are witnessing a series of new
phenomena that evidence the need for global privacy standards
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much more compellingly than in the last few decades. The develop-
ment of communications and technology in the past decade has 
had a marked economic impact and accelerated what is commonly
known as ‘globalisation’. Doing business internationally,
exchanging information across borders and providing global
services has become the norm. Many organisations and those within
them operate across multiple jurisdictions. The internet has made
this phenomenon real for everyone.
A welcome concomitant of the unprecedented technological
power to collect and share all this personal information on a global
basis is the increasing recognition of privacy rights. The concept of
privacy and data protection regimes has moved from one discussed
by experts at learned conferences to an issue that is discussed and
debated by ordinary people who are increasingly used to the trade-
offs between privacy and utility in their daily lives. As citizens’
interest in the issue has grown, so, of course has politicians’ interest.
The adoption of new and more sophisticated data privacy laws
across the world and the radical legal changes affecting more
traditional areas of law show that law makers and the courts
perceive the need to strengthen the right to privacy. Events that
have highlighted the risks attached to the loss or misuse of 
personal information have led to a continuous demand for greater
data security, which often translates into more local laws, such as
those requiring the reporting of security breaches,11 and greater
scrutiny.12
Routes to the development of global privacy standards
The net result is that we have a fragmentation of competing local
regimes, at the same time as the massively increased ability for data
to travel globally. To be effective, privacy laws need to go global.
But for those laws to be observed and effective, a realistic set of
standards must emerge. It is absolutely imperative that these
standards are aligned to today’s commercial realities and political
needs, but they must also reflect technological realities. Such
standards must be strong and credible, but above all they must be
clear and they must be workable.
At the moment, there are a number of initiatives that could
become the guiding force. As the most recent manifestation of the
original OECD privacy principles, one possible route would be to
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follow the lead of the APEC Privacy Framework and extend its ambit
of influence beyond the Asia-Pacific region. One good reason for
adopting this route is that it already balances very carefully
information privacy with business needs and commercial interests.
At the same time, it also accords due recognition to cultural and
other diversities that exist within its member economies.
One distinctive example of an attempt to rally the UN and 
the world’s leaders behind the adoption of legal instruments of 
data protection and privacy according to basic principles is the
Montreux Declaration of 2005.13 This declaration probably
represents the first official written attempt to encourage every
government in the world to think collaboratively, and globally,
about privacy protection. It is an ambition that must be praised,
although little further was heard about the progress of the
Montreux Declaration until the November 2006 International
Privacy Commissioners’ conference took place and the London
initiative was presented.14 The London Initiative acknowledged 
that the global challenges that threaten individuals’ privacy 
rights require a global solution. It focuses on the role of the Com-
missioners’ conference to spearhead the necessary actions at an
international level. The international privacy commissioners behind
the London Initiative argue that concrete suggestions must emerge
in order to accomplish international initiatives, harmonise global
practices and adopt common positions.
One privacy commissioner who has expressed great interest 
in taking an international role aimed developing global standards 
is the UK Information Commissioner. The Data Protection Strategy
of the ICO published at the end of June 2007 stresses the impor-
tance of improving the image, relevance and effectiveness of data
protection worldwide and, crucially, recognises the need for
simplification.15
The way forward
The key priority now should be to build awareness of the need for
global privacy standards. Highlighting and understanding the
drivers behind this need – globalisation, technological development
and emerging threats to privacy rights – will help policy makers
better understand the crucial challenge we face and how best to find
solutions to address them.
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The ultimate goal should be to create minimum standards of
privacy protection that meet the expectations and demands of
consumers, businesses and governments. Such standards should be
relevant today yet flexible enough to meet the needs of an ever-
changing world. Such standards must also respect the value of
privacy as an innate dimension of the individual. To my mind, the
APEC Framework is the most promising foundation on which to
build, especially since competing models are flawed (the US model
is too complex and too much of a patchwork, the EU model is too
bureaucratic and inflexible).
As with all goals, we must devise a plan to achieve it.
Determining the appropriate international forum for such standards
would be an important first step, and this is a choice that belongs in
the hands of many different stakeholders. It may be the OECD or
the Council of Europe. It may be the International Chamber of
Commerce or the World Economic Forum. It may be the
International Commissioners’ Conference or it may be Unesco.
Whatever the right forum is, we should work together to devise a set
of standards that reflects the needs of a truly globalised world. That
gives each citizen certainty about the rules affecting their data, and
the ability to manage their privacy according to their needs. That
gives businesses the ability to work within one framework rather
than dozens. And that gives governments clear direction about inter-
nationally recognised standards, and how they should be applied.
The early initiatives to create global privacy standards have
become more urgent and more necessary than ever. With data
flowing across the internet and across the globe, this is a reality we
have to face together.
Peter Fleischer is Global Privacy Counsel for Google.
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11 The naked machine:
privacy and security in
an age of terror
Jeffrey Rosen
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Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, I’ve become convinced that it is
possible to design laws and technologies that protect privacy and
security at the same time.1 But it not clear that a political consensus
exists, in the US and Britain, to demand that these well-balanced
laws and technologies are, in fact, adopted. My interest in this topic
was provoked by a challenge from my friend Lawrence Lessig of
Stanford University. Not long after 9/11, we were appearing on a
panel about privacy and security, and I denounced the proliferation
of surveillance cameras in Britain – a technology that threatened
privacy without, according to the British government’s own studies,
having any discernible effect in detecting violent crime or terrorism.
Lessig politely but firmly called me a Luddite. Technologies of
security will proliferate whether you like it or not, he suggested, and
he encouraged me to learn enough about them to be able to
describe the architectural and legal choices that could ensure they
are designed in ways that protect privacy rather than threaten it.
After studying the laws and technologies adopted in the US
and Britain since 9/11, I’ve become increasingly convinced that
Lessig was correct and that each of them can be designed in ways
that strike sensible balances between privacy and security. But after
describing what these sensible balances might look like, I’d like to
ask why these well-designed laws and technologies have not been
adopted routinely. Conceptions of privacy vary dramatically among
different cultures, and the very different cultural expectations about
privacy in Europe and the US have vastly complicated the attempt
to achieve comprehensive and balanced regulations.
Let me begin by giving two examples of the kind of
technological design choices I have in mind. The simplest example
is a high-beam X-ray machine originally tested in London and at
Orlando International Airport. Let’s call it the ‘naked machine’, for
that’s more or less what it is. An electronic strip search, the naked
machine reveals not only metal but any plastics or foreign objects
concealed under clothing.2 But it also reveals the human body
completely naked.
The naked machine doesn’t have to be designed in this way.
Researchers at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory identified a simple
programming shift that can project the images of plastics or
explosives onto a nondescript mannequin, and scramble the images
of the naked body into a nondescript blob.3 With this simple
adjustment, the ‘blob machine’, unlike the naked machine,
guarantees just as much security while also protecting privacy. And a
version of the blob machine rather than the naked machine was
recently deployed at Phoenix International Airport.4
Not all the technological choices are so simple, but I’m
convinced that most of the technologies of security proposed since
9/11 can be designed in ways that look more like the blob machine
than the naked machine. Consider the evolution of the Computer
Assisted Passenger Profiling System, or CAPPS II, a controversial
data-mining scheme tested by the Transportation Security Agency.
In its original incarnation, the CAPPS II system proposed to unite
government databases with consumer data held by private data
warehouses such as ChoicePoint and Acxiom. Using the same
neural network technology used by credit card companies to
identify credit card fraud, the initial proposals for CAPPS II
proposed to examine passengers’ living arrangements and travel
and real estate history, along with a great deal of demographic,
financial and other personal information, to determine whether or
not individual passengers resembled the 9/11 terrorists. Based on
their risk index, the CAPPS II program proposed to label travellers
as ‘green’, ‘yellow’ or ‘red’ security risks, and subject them to
correspondingly intrusive scrutiny.5
In its original form, CAPPS II was a naked machine-like
technology that raised two important objections – it was unlikely to
increase security and it posed grave threats to privacy. The security
objection is that terrorism is not the kind of activity that follows
predictable patterns – the next attack is unlikely to resemble the last
one. Unlike people who commit credit-card fraud – a form of
systematic, repetitive and predictable behaviour that fits a consistent
profile identified by millions of transactions – there is no reason to
believe that terrorists in the future will resemble those in the past.
There were only 11 hijackers on 9/11, and those who followed them
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the next year weren’t Saudi Arabians who went to flight school in
Florida; they included Richard Reeves, the English citizen who hid
a bomb in his shoe, and who had a Jamaican father and an English
mother.
By trying to identify people who look like the 9/11 hijackers,
the profiling scheme is looking for a needle in a haystack, but the
colour and the shape of the needle keep changing. ‘Some terrorism
experts are sceptical about terrorist profiling,’ indicates a 1999
report prepared by the Library of Congress for US intelligence
agencies. ‘There seems to be general agreement among
psychologists that there is no particular psychological attribute that
can be used to describe the terrorist or any “personality” that is
distinctive of terrorists.’6 For this reason, the US Secret Service,
which once looked for people who fit profiles of stereotypes of
presidential assassins, has abandoned its personality profiles and
now looks for patterns of motive or behaviour.7
Moreover, because the sample of known terrorists is so small,
attempts to identify suspects with electronic profiles are bound to
produce a high number of ‘false positives’ – that is, passengers
whom the system wrongly identifies as likely terrorists – and the
costs of the system are likely to outweigh its benefits. To illustrate
why data-profiling systems are likely to be ineffective in looking for
needles in haystacks, Christopher Guzelian and Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar of Stanford Law School note that, at one point, doctors
used to recommend monitoring large numbers of people for signs
of latent diseases such as diabetes or ovarian, lung or skin cancer.
But because of the inaccuracy of profiling systems in identifying
symptoms that occur very rarely in the population at large, the
medical establishment has concluded that the benefits of
monitoring are outweighed by the costs, which include not only
false positives – or people wrongly identified as being sick – but
also false negatives – or people wrongly identified as being healthy.8
In the case of terrorism, of course, the prevalence of potential
terrorists in the population as a whole is unknown. But imagine a
profiling system that was set up to identify the 11 hijackers of 9/11.
Searching for 11 individuals in a population of 300 million would
yield exponentially more false positives: even assuming the profiling
system is 99 per cent accurate, because of the low prevalence rate,
3,000,000 (that’s 0.01 × 300 million) of those identified as potential
terrorists by the system would be wrongly accused. Such a system
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would bring the nation’s airports to a halt. In other words, only
0.000363 per cent of the people who tested positive in a nearly
perfect system actually would be positive – a success rate so low 
that the system would have to be stopping a nuclear bomb on the
benefits side and imposing little more than a pat-down on the costs
side to be justified.
But, in fact, of course, no data-mining system has proved to 
be 99 per cent accurate in predicting terrorist behaviour, because
the new attacks so rarely resemble the previous ones. A system with
only 1 per cent accuracy would falsely accuse nearly all innocent
travellers of being terrorists and correctly identify only a fraction of
terrorists while missing nearly all of the real terrorists. No rational
evaluation of costs and benefits would support the adoption of such
a hopeless system as an effective tool for national security. For this
reason, efforts to use dataveillance as a way of predicting terrorist
behaviour in the population at large, rather than investigating
individuals who have been identified as terrorists by other means,
seems empirically dubious.
In its original form, the CAPPS II system also posed grave
threats to privacy. The designers of the system proposed to include
in its database not only the passenger data that airlines currently
maintain as part of the Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling
System, or CAPPS – such as travel history, address and telephone
number – but also publicly available marketing data that is
currently maintained by private companies. This could include
living arrangements, household income, pet ownership, personal
buying habits, and even lists of the books we buy and the music 
we listen to.
In addition, some of the companies contacted by the
government hoped to include personal data whose use is currently
restricted by law, including records of individual credit card
purchases of fertiliser or flight school lessons, for example, or
international telephone calls to Afghanistan. Because CAPPS II, as
originally proposed, included no controls on the use of this data, it
would have been possible for the government to scan a traveller’s
consumer behaviour and telephone calls, share unusual behaviour
with law enforcement agencies, and prosecute him for low-level
offences that had nothing to do with terrorism. This raised a danger
of politically discriminatory prosecutions of the kind that President
Nixon engaged in when he scanned the tax returns of Vietnam
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protesters and threatened them with exposure. It was the effort to
avoid this kind of Nixon effect that led Congress to pass the Privacy
Act of 1974.
Happily, the CAPPS II system was redesigned in ways that
look far more like the blob machine than the naked machine. Two
important design modifications are worth noting.
First, the system is now limited to the goal of ‘authenticating’
that individual airline passengers are who they say they are, rather
than trying to identify them as possible terrorists based on their
consumer profiles. By focusing on authentification rather than
identification, the system avoids the dangers of false positives that
arise from predictive data mining and is likely to be a more effective
technology of security.
Second, as for privacy, the system now includes controls on
the secondary uses of data. In its initial announcement, the
administration proposed to share personal data from the CAPPS II
system with national and international police to allow the
prosecution of any civil or criminal violations. But critics objected
that this could create widespread abuses, allowing the
administration to scour the personal data of millions of people,
uncover relatively minor offences, and threaten its critics with
vindictive prosecutions. In response to these criticisms, the
Transportation Security Agency agreed to restrict officials from
sharing personal data with law enforcement agencies, except in the
cases of individuals who had an outstanding federal warrant for a
violent crime.
This was a welcome and important victory for privacy. It
recognises an insight that some European countries have adopted in
designing technologies of security. The German wiretap law, for
example, allows intelligence authorities to use wiretaps for domestic
surveillance only when there is factual basis to suspect that one of a
list of crimes involving a threat to national security has been or is
about to be committed. The German law says that evidence
obtained through wiretapping can be used only in the investigation
and prosecution of the specified national security crimes or certain
other serious crimes; if the intelligence officers find evidence of low-
level crimes, they may not share it with law enforcement officers or
introduce it in court.9
Because of Germany’s distinctive history with the Nazis and
the Stasi, the German intelligence services have been constrained by
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a special sensitivity to privacy. Unlike Germany, however, the US
has no comprehensive regulation of the sharing of information by
commercial databases in the private sector. As a result, the victory of
CAPPS II may prove to be illusory, and much of the data mining
originally proposed by the government may be contracted out to
private organisations whose use of the data is unconstrained. To
construct an effective blob machine-like regime of data mining, 
the US would need a combination of public and private sector
regulation of the kind that libertarians in Congress are reluctant to
embrace. A bipartisan coalition of civil libertarian liberals and
libertarian conservatives has proved effective in resisting the
executive’s most dramatic proposals for government surveillance
after 9/11. But because of its suspicion of private sector regulation,
the same coalition has been unwilling to consider the kind of
complicated compromises and controls on the use of data by the
public sector that an effective blob machine technology would
require.
Although the blob machine and the CAPPS system represent
important victories for a sensible balance between privacy and
security, there have been many important defeats as well – defeats
such the expansion of National Security Letters in the USA Patriot
Act, which allow the government to seize any data merely by
asserting its relevance to a terrorism investigation. National Security
Letters could have been designed with controls on the sharing of
data between intelligence officers and law enforcement offers, but
they were not – and as a result, the Inspector General of the FBI
found that they were gravely abused.
The expansion of the use of security cameras in the US
represents another defeat for privacy. Right after 9/11, Washington
DC proposed to create a ‘British-style’ surveillance system for the
city, despite the British government’s own survey of the empirical
evidence, which concluded that the proliferation in cameras since
the 1990s had had no effect on violent crime10 or terrorism. (The
cameras may be more useful in identifying the perpetrators after an
attack, although in most cases, it appears that major terrorist
suspects would have been identified without them.) Initially, the
political debate about cameras evolved differently in England and
the US.
Despite the support of community leaders in Washington,
who demanded more cameras as a way of making their constituents
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feel safer, the vigorous coalition of libertarian conservatives and civil
libertarian liberals that had opposed the cameras before 9/11
converged again to oppose the expansion of their use. After several
hearings before the City Council, where the case against the cameras
was forcefully presented, the Metropolitan Police Department
retreated from its original plans. It abandoned an early draft of its
proposed regulations, which had promised to use the cameras to
deter and/or eliminate crime in residential and commercial areas. In
the face of libertarian opposition, the department promised to use
the cameras only in exigent circumstances and not for general 
crime deterrence, unless legislation was enacted to the contrary. 
The regulations also pledged that the cameras would be turned 
on only for limited time periods, at the direction of the Chief of
Police, and that recorded images would ordinarily be erased after
ten days.
The City Council endorsed the regulations, but it also
unwisely funded a so-called pilot programme to allow cameras to 
be put up in Washington neighbourhoods and to study their effect
on general crime prevention, detection, deterrence and investiga-
tion. And in 2006, after a British political activist was murdered in
Georgetown, the council reversed its decision and endorsed an
expansive surveillance system without the previously adopted
restraints on the use of the images. In New York City, the debate
was similar: the City initially resisted proposals by the former head
of the New York Police Department to expand surveillance after
9/11, but in the wake of the London tube bombings, the mayor
embraced an expansive surveillance system, which will soon be
implemented. The surveillance debate in the US and Britain,
ultimately, suggests that people are more concerned about feeling
safe than adopting oversight mechanisms for surveillance cameras
that can protect privacy and security at the same time.
I’m increasingly convinced that political and cultural
constraints may make effective regulation of technologies of security
difficult to obtain. There are no generally shared intuitions about
privacy: different countries respond to different dangers in different
ways. To put the problem in brief: Americans tend to be much more
concerned about government surveillance while Europeans tend to
be more concerned about privacy invasions by the private sector,
but because of the complicated technological interplay of public
and private surveillance, any effective regulatory scheme has to take
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account of both concerns. Contrast American and European
attitudes about financial information.
Europeans are far more sensitive than Americans about
disclosing financial information, steeped as they are in the
aristocratic tradition that respectable people don’t discuss money in
public. And European law reflects this squeamishness. The
traditional rule in France made it a violation of privacy rights to
reveal another person’s salary, and for hundreds of years the French
nobility successfully resisted laws requiring public registration of
their mortgages. In France and Germany today, consumer credit
reports are available only in the case of people in financial
difficulties. In Germany, consumers seeking credit must explicitly
authorise lenders to share information about them, and before any
information can be shared, the privacy interest of the borrower must
be balanced against the commercial interests of the lender.11
Financial reporting is not the only area in which Americans’
cultural ideas about privacy differ dramatically from those in
Europe. If visitors from Europe are scandalised by the casual way
Americans discuss their salaries with strangers, they are also
surprised by Americans’ discomfort with public nudity on beaches
or with female bathroom attendants in men’s restrooms. At the 
same time, Europeans are far more trusting of government, and
willing to allow it to regulate personal choices in ways that
Americans would find intolerable – such as the naming of infants,
for example. And these cultural differences are reflected in dramatic
differences in law. European law protects not only consumer data
and credit reporting but also email privacy in the workplace,
discovery in civil cases, and the distribution of nude pictures on 
the internet, while US law allows dramatic violations of privacy in
all of these areas.
‘Why is it that French people won’t talk about their salaries
but will take off their bikini tops?’ James Whitman of Yale Law
School asks in a path-breaking article entitled ‘The two western
cultures of privacy’. ‘Why is it that Americans comply with court
discovery orders that open essentially all of their documents for
inspection but refuse to carry identity cards?’12 Whitman’s answer is
succinctly expressed in his subtitle: ‘dignity versus liberty’. When
Europeans think about privacy, they are most concerned about
personal dignity and the right to control one’s public image – a
right threatened primarily by the mass media, the internet and
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commercial data warehouses. By contrast, US conceptions of
privacy are focused on personal liberty and the right to be free from
state surveillance, threatened primarily by government intrusions
into the home.
The European conception of privacy as a protection for
dignity rather than liberty, Whitman argues, stems from its
aristocratic tradition of protecting personal honour. For most of
European history, this was a hierarchical tradition: for some people
to have honour, it was necessary for others not to have it, and for
people to be treated with the honour to which they were entitled by
their station, everyone had to know his or her place. But over the
course of the nineteenth century, the defence of personal honour
and interpersonal respect began to migrate from something that
high-status people expected to defend through law. And during the
twentieth century, the legal protections against personal insult were
increasingly ‘levelled up’,13 as Whitman puts it, and extended to all
citizens, not only high-status ones. Repeatedly, however, the legal
protections for personal honour in Europe clashed with two
freedoms that Americans take for granted – property rights and
freedom of the press.
The cultural differences between European and American
conceptions of privacy have important legal implications for their
attempts to balance privacy and security. Europeans tend in general
to be less suspicious of centralised government authority than
Americans. As Kim Lane Scheppele of the University of
Pennsylvania has noted, Europe’s greater deference to government
authority led countries like Germany and France to adopt
surveillance measures after 9/11 that in some ways went farther than
the USA Patriot Act. In 2002, for example, Germany adopted a
sweeping law that increased the power of its security agencies in
important ways. The government was authorised to create a central
database with personal information about foreigners, including
fingerprints and religious background. The law also authorised
German national identification cards to include biometric data, such
as fingerprints. And it explicitly endorsed data mining along the
Total Information Awareness model, requiring government agencies
to turn personal information over to the federal police.14
The great variation between the European and the US
response to 9/11 reflects our different historical conceptions of
privacy and state authority, but it also poses a challenge to policy
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makers: in an age of integrated databases and the internet, it may be
costly to have very different rules about what sort of information
can be shared among and between intelligence agencies, law
enforcement officials, and the private sector in the US and Europe.
It is now conventional wisdom, in fact, that increased information
sharing is the best way of preventing terrorism, but information
sharing between the public and private sectors may be difficult if
the Americans are focused on the dangers of state surveillance and
the Europeans are concerned about protecting the dignity of the
consumer. At the same time, in the age of the internet, attempts to
protect the rights of Europeans to control the distribution of their
images in the name of dignity may be thwarted by the refusal of
cyberspace to respect national boundaries.
Is there any possibility for privacy advocates to expand the
cultural understandings of privacy in Europe and the US, so that
the Europeans come to care more about liberty and the Americans
more about dignity? When it comes to the protection of privacy,
legal values tend to reflect and follow social understandings, rather
than the other way around. Perhaps those who hope to import
European understandings of privacy into the US, and vice versa,
should focus on changing social understandings of privacy rather
than on passing new laws. But can social understandings of privacy
be changed easily to accommodate both honour and liberty? Not
necessarily.
An unsettling possibility for privacy advocates is that as
Europe becomes more and more like the US – that is, more market
driven, less hierarchical, more democratic and more distant from its
aristocratic past – the popular consensus about the importance of
protecting dignity will atrophy and eventually collapse under the
weight of market forces. A society where citizens refuse to respect
their own privacy is not one where privacy will be long respected;
and the US experience suggests that citizens in an individualistic
market democracy may perceive too many market rewards for
exposure to respect their own privacy for long.
As European traditions of dignity are withering in the face of
US-style assaults of the market, US traditions of suspicion of
government may be threatened by the persistent anxieties of an age
of terrorism. It’s not hard to imagine, in the face of future attacks,
the bipartisan libertarian coalition being overwhelmed in the face of
public demands for security above all. Unrestrained by libertarian
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minorities, the public in a public opinion state will sacrifice privacy
to security at every turn.
All this reminds us that privacy – understood as a protection
for dignity or as a bulwark for liberty – is not an especially
democratic virtue. It is a virtue historically demanded and enjoyed
by aristocratic minorities and extended, in Europe and the US, to a
broader population that often was indifferent to its benefits and
demands. Dignity requires a degree of self-restraint on the part of
citizens – good manners, reticence, self-respect and a willingness to
respect the dignity of others; while liberty requires a degree of civic
engagement – only informed and educated citizens can check the
excesses of the state. Neither dignity nor liberty can easily be
achieved in a nation of anxious exhibitionists, more concerned
about attracting attention than deflecting it. To defend privacy, in
other words, citizens in democracy have to care about privacy, and
it’s increasingly clear that many of us do not.
Jeffrey Rosen is a law professor at George Washington University and the
legal affairs editor of the New Republic. 
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Mass surveillance, together with the consequent erosion of 
personal privacy, has become an enduring theme throughout the
spheres of media and politics. Privacy protection, in the guise of
data protection, has permeated technological and legislative
development across the world. Formerly arcane issues such as
encryption, transborder data flows and predictive profiling have
captured the public imagination and sparked headlines in every
newspaper. Throughout the past quarter century, no other
fundamental right in the arena of public policy has generated such
turbulence and controversy.
Since 2003 the number of parliamentary inquiries, legal
challenges, media stories and academic papers on the subject of
privacy has risen to an unprecedented extent. Indeed, privacy
protection in its many forms can now be seen as an industry in its
own right, employing many thousands as regulatory staff, 
advocates and writers.
Despite these dynamics privacy is fatally disadvantaged for
two primary reasons. First, the concepts of embedded surveillance
and perfect identity in our information systems have gained
acceptance faster than the concepts of embedded privacy and
anonymity. Second, governments in charge of large information
systems have the luxury of writing the rules. Exemptions in favour
of surveillance are written into law on the basis of a stated ‘public
interest’, while requirements for the protection of privacy rarely 
have such a weighty pedigree.
Public interest exemptions from data protection laws have
resulted in wholesale violations of privacy. The imposition by
financial services regulators and insurance companies of statutory
and non-statutory reporting and audit requirements creates a
further imbalance. While acknowledging the importance of privacy
as a fundamental right, data controllers argue that surveillance is
necessary to maintain law and order and to create economic
efficiency, and that privacy rights in general must remain subject 
to constraints of fiscal and public interest. Thus despite the
burgeoning activity in privacy regulation, surveillance continues to
expand while privacy laws continue to degrade.
It is possible that the current interest in privacy stems from 
the broader concern over loss of human autonomy. The number 
of people each year who are restrained or disciplined by legal,
administrative and judicial mechanisms is a thousand per cent
greater than 20 years ago. Legislation regulating conduct in public
has increased 15-fold in the same period. The requirement for
‘permission’ to initiate group activities has soared. It can now be
argued successfully that individual freedom is no longer
conditioned by what is expressly prohibited in law, but instead is
circumscribed by what the law expressly permits. In this context
privacy takes on a libertarian aspect and thus becomes the standard
bearer for the general issue of freedoms.
That we are entering an age of the ‘surveillance society’ is
without dispute. In 1999 Privacy International estimated that almost
a million people in the UK alone conduct at least a degree of
surveillance as part of their employment. In the same year, the
organisation also undertook a study to find out how much
information was being held on each of us. The findings were quite
remarkable, concluding that details of each economically active
adult in the developed world were located in an average of around
500 major databases, creating enough processed data to compile a
lengthy reference book on each person. When Privacy International
conducted the survey again in 2002 at the request of the Guardian
newspaper, the organisation found that the number of computer
systems processing information on the average citizen had shot to
more than 700.1
It is equally true that the government has largely abandoned
any responsibility for protection of privacy – or, at least, abandoned
any responsibility to keep surveillance in check. While it is true that
many government departments are obsessed with data protection
compliance, they are less interested in controlling surveillance. The
Health and Social Care Act removes the traditional right of patients
to control their own health information, transferring the ownership
of this data to the Secretary of State. The Identity Cards Act 2006
will place all key personal information under the control of the
Home Secretary. Legislation since 1995 has permitted a range of
public authorities the right to share information on every UK
resident. Each of these laws progressively undermines the provisions
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of the Data Protection Act, a law designed (albeit to a minimum
standard of protection) to preserve citizen rights over personal
information.
This trend is symptomatic of a broader arrogance within
government – one that has lubricated the wheels of control. Former
Cabinet Secretary Lord Butler knew this when he launched into a
remarkable attack on the Blair style of government, accusing it of
control-freakery and intellectual paucity. He bemoaned the decline
of Parliament, the obscene power of the whips and the puppeteer
role adopted by the Executive.
Butler was among good company. A brief review of the
investigations conducted by parliamentary oversight committees
provides ample evidence that the government has permitted a
wholesale and systematic abrogation of its responsibility not just 
to privacy but also to the democratic process. Increasing anxiety
expressed by the Human Rights Committee has been all but
entirely ignored. The Public Administration Select Committee has
expressed continuing disappointment about a range of concerns
from the conduct of government inquiries to the way ministers
answer questions. The Constitution Committee has given up on
hoping to effect any change on government thinking.
Once independent oversight is removed the ethos of
surveillance can flourish. It also occurs through a more systemic
process. A huge shift has taken place since the 1980s in the way
governments view the ordinary citizen. In the past, surveillance 
was based on the targeting of specific individuals or groups. Now,
systematic surveillance proactively profiles millions of people at a
time. In their often-futile quest to second-guess the bad guys,
authorities have chosen to treat everyone as a potential suspect.
Instead of working to build a profile on particular suspects,
authorities now use template criminal profiles that are matched
against the entire population. This is the way, for example, that
airline passengers are screened.
This trend has been evident for decades. In 1988 privacy guru
David Flaherty was writing and teaching about the growth of
surveillance societies and postulating that part of the cause lay with
the inability of regulators to face up to the challenges of a turbulent
policy domain. For almost 20 years the idea of a surveillance society
has been well known to academics, even though the expression in
the twenty-first century is exciting and fashionable.
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The effect of the surveillance society, whether intended or not,
is a push to normalise human behaviour with the motivation of
promoting ‘good’ and socially responsible conduct. Deviants, when
identified, are penalised in myriad ways never before imagined.
With escalating regulation, deviation is increasingly probable, and
with increasing surveillance deviation is easier to detect. A shrinking
‘zone of normality’ has been constructed. Individuals may step
outside this domain, but they will be more vulnerable, exposed and
observed than ever before. Little wonder that the libertarian instinct
gravitates to privacy.
Some people argue that this trend is justified. They say
privacy cannot be sustained in an age of organised crime and terror,
and that public interest exemptions to privacy law are legitimate
and necessary. This view assumes a benign approach by law makers
and data controllers in which wise people gather in sensitive
dialogue over such questions. The reality should give rise to a far
more cynical view. To be blunt, privacy is widely perceived as a
nuisance. In theory at least it limits data flows, prevents the sale of
valuable data to third parties and stops entities from establishing
surveillance simply for the sake of surveillance. And were it not for
the institutional vandalism of this right the law might very well have
offered those protections.
For advocates, the value of privacy as a boundary between the
intrusion of state and society and as a right of an individual to say
‘go away’ is self-evident. To many millions of people who express
anxiety at privacy invasion in its many forms such a view is equally
self-evident. The interesting question that emerges is why the
surveillance society has been permitted to grow at such a pace.
It is superficially tempting to imagine that the cause of mass
surveillance and loss of privacy is due to the increasing power and
capacity of modern IT systems. However, there are four additional
factors. First, individuals – while consistently expressing anxiety
about privacy invasion – are overwhelmed by the processes required
to enforce protection of their privacy. Resistance to the use of
conventional encryption techniques is one example. Second, privacy
and data protection regulators are frequently fatalistic, timid or
under-resourced, resulting in management that is based on reaction
rather than advocacy. Third, many protections – whether legal or
technological – are frequently undermined by options to discard
privacy through inducement, exemption or coercion.
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The fourth and final reason is perhaps the most disquieting.
The ancient idea of privacy as a public interest in its own right
(similar to the right of free expression) has been all but
extinguished. Instead of being viewed by authorities as a right and
proper means of determining the autonomy of the individual set
against the values of society, privacy is now interpreted as a ‘selfish’
right or at best a ‘group’ right relating to specific populations (such
as those using the roads in the case of road-user charging or those
wishing to shop on the high street in the case of public CCTV). 
The result has been to exorcise from the public imagination any
instinctive notion that privacy is a fundamental right.
The means of achieving this important change are subtle but
obvious. The imagery, context and language surrounding both
privacy and surveillance have been substantially altered.
The idea of ‘the good, law-abiding and honest’ citizen has
been eliminated. Successive governments have engineered an
environment in which all citizens must be watched at all times. The
ancient burden of proof – the presumption of innocence – has been
reversed. This phenomenon has come about partly because it is not
acceptable to ‘single out’ particular groups or classes, even if they
may be known historically to be the cause of particular problems.
However, it is primarily due to a flourishing philosophy that only
those with something to hide would have something to fear from
surveillance. The maxim ‘no one is above the law’ has become ‘no
one is above suspicion’.
Indeed the UK, like Australia and the Netherlands, has
mastered this new governance. The Children Act 2004, for example,
provides for the profiling and analysis of all children to detect which
infants may be potential criminals. The Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 makes provision for the universal archiving of all
communications records (phone, email and internet visits) for
possible later use by authorities. A raft of new laws on border
security, travel and immigration controls assume that all travellers,
UK nationals and others, are potential criminals and should be
subjected to constant tracking and profiling. Financial regulations
increasingly assume that innocence on the part of bank customers is
dependent on a constantly narrowing zone of normal account
behaviour determined by constant analysis.
The Dutch syndrome, like that in the UK, is symptomatic of a
trend across the world. Once a confident and freedom-loving society
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with a deep liberal pathology and libertarian inspiration, the Dutch
nation has been largely transformed into a control culture. In the
space of 30 years it has moved from a place where a mass movement
paralysed the national census, to a place where government could,
without controversy, institute the most extensive wiretapping
infrastructure in the Western world. From its comfortable position
as a global melting pot of cultures it has become a reactive and
sometimes xenophobic surveillance society. In doing so it has set a
lead for many countries in Europe.
A similar trend has emerged half a world away in Australia.
Less than 20 years ago a fiery individualist spirit sparked a vast
campaign of popular opposition to the government’s proposed
national identity card. Fuelled by recollections of the nineteenth-
century ‘Eureka Stockade’, tens of thousands marched in the streets
to oppose an initiative that government had figured was an entirely
reasonable proposal. The card fell, and so – very nearly – did the
government.
Half a generation later, the Australian people have capitulated
to controls once undreamed of. Smoking has been banned in all
public places (including beaches), restaurants are prohibited from
giving their customers ‘doggy bags’ (their leftovers from dinner)
and all bank accounts, geographic movements and personal details
are routinely scrutinised by government. Again, hardly a syllable of
dissent is expressed.
France, Germany, Russia and countries throughout the Asian
region are taking the same route. Only in the US is there a slight
deviation. There, constitutional protections limit such activities by
the federal government, but the states and the private sector are out
of control.
These dramatic cultural shifts have occurred throughout the
world. It can be postulated that they have transpired because of the
combined influence of an oppressive mass of legal requirements,
routine surveillance and an equally oppressive mass of judicial
sanctions. It is also likely that cultures have changed because of
clever marketing of control initiatives.
Simon Davies is Director of Privacy International.
The culture of control
Notes
155
1 S Andrews, Privacy and Human Rights 2002 (Washington, DC:
Electronic Privacy Information Center, and London, UK: Privacy
International, 2002), see www.privacyinternational.org/survey/
phr2002/ (accessed 5 Mar 2008).

13 The architecture of
privacy: space, power
and human rights
Markus Miessen and International Festival
157
It is just over ten years ago since Hotmail was first released. A
decade later, it is handling approximately 100 million emails a day,
covering 230 million users. Text messaging on mobile phones
appeared around the same time; ten years on the worldwide volume
of SMS is estimated to be in the hundreds of billion messages.
Amazon and eBay were created in 1995. Google was unleashed in
September 1999 from a garage in Palo Alto, and in the spring of
2007 it claimed to handle 300 million queries per day; more than
100 billion per year.1
Considering the same ten years in relation to concepts of
privacy, it is quite easy to argue that adjustments are small in
perspective as we adapt incrementally to a proliferation of
communication tools and the opportunities they bring. Most are
more than happy to adjust: social networking sites were unheard of
a short time ago; now, we do not blink before putting photographs
and details of our lives online. But, given these tools’ ubiquity, these
adaptations have profound implications. As recent newspaper
headlines about the potentially pernicious side-effects of our online
openness suggest, the public is getting increasingly jittery about
what exactly we have given up when we invite the world to ponder
our identity as well as gaze at last eve’s party pics.
There are some fundamental principles underlying privacy.
Privacy is about relationships between people: it relates to the ways
that boundaries are drawn between us, them, me and you. The way
we value our privacy helps to produce our sense of who we are and
what others mean to us. But as we shall see in the next section, it is
those very relationships that have changed; our affiliation and
‘closeness’ to the people around us has become more contested –
disrupting our sense of where we stand socially.
If privacy is a function of new ways of behaving, communica-
ting and organising, but the principles behind it remain the same,
then the question remains: what has happened to privacy? This
essay attempts to answer this by approaching privacy as a socio-
spatial concept. As is the case through the boundaries between
home and street for example, the space around us comes to reflect
the priorities of privacy: who we choose to let ‘in’ to spaces and 
who we choose to keep out. Through stipulations about minimum
overlooking distance and the often mandatory half metre between
pavement and front door, such considerations are in fact at the 
heart of the UK planning system. This is no trivial matter; the 
way spaces are organised is not only a result of, but helps to shape,
relationships between people and groups, and influences how
people understand their identity, position vis-à-vis others and
culture of everyday life.
Privacy as process
Discourses around privacy tend to idealise a privacy that is an
immutable right. But it is important that we avoid addressing
privacy through a question of what, and to think in terms of the
‘particular’: of when, how, for whom, to which end and through
which mechanisms privacy is valuable. We need to respect a priori
how context-specific privacy is. That means thinking not of a ‘thing’
to be defended – a space we can retreat to, a set of information we
should never have to give away – and instead looking at privacy as a
process of negotiation. We don’t just enjoy privacy, we perform and
reproduce it every day. From this it follows that, in relating it to the
protection and empowerment of the individual, we need to
understand privacy not as a right to a thing, but rather as a right to
be part of that performance and negotiation. Rather than
something set in stone, the human ‘right’ to privacy is bound up in
the right to self-determination.
This negotiation of privacy happens every day. Every morning
on the way to work, thousands of us ‘produce’ privacy by opening a
book, reading a newspaper, working on a laptop, or listening to
MP3 players. The space that is created is often not physical, but has
physical effects. Privacy, on the crowded train or bus, for example, is
about creating anonymity, and on occasion a sense of security. It
means being able to influence where we set out boundaries between
others and ourselves.
This is an inherently political endeavour. There are moments
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where established understandings of the boundaries of privacy have
been disrupted and exposed as such. The act of disrupting or giving
up privacy can be understood as political if we consider that the
privacy we are granted or demand is the result of social or economic
interests. For example, the feminist emphasis on the personal as
political took aim at a sphere that was considered private: the home.
In highlighting domestic behaviour, the home became the point
where privacy reinforces a particular relationship of power.2 The
ability to challenge the established principles of privacy is as
important as the ability to set them up.
Privacy as process can be a tool to demand that the society
around us remains open to renegotiation – that the relationships
that constitute that society are fluid and contestable. But at the 
same time, it can be a tool through which influence and power can
be wielded – where it is deployed as a reactive tool, reinforcing
prejudice and legitimising crimes against humanity. At its most
extreme, this is evident in the examples of Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay. In this essay, we will use these examples to 
show that this architectural expression of a society’s approach to
underlying principles of privacy can have severe, violent conse-
quences. Such excesses have to be seen against the background of a
moment of ‘crisis’ in which globalisation and technological change
have destabilised established norms, values and expectations
regarding privacy. This could be a moment of opportunity in which
societies can formulate, demand and express an approach to privacy
that is productive and always under negotiation. We argue that
planners, architects and spatial practitioners need to be involved in
the debate over privacy because their work embodies choices made
about the relationships that privacy speaks of.
Crisis? What crisis?
What exactly has changed in the recent past that throws our idea of
privacy into this state of crisis? The technological advancements we
spoke of above are products of an age in which people have the
ability to communicate and organise like never before. The
progressive triumph of globalising market capitalism has seen an
emphasis on flows of people, finance and ideas. Integral to this has
been a progressive commercialisation of resources that were
formerly publicly guaranteed. This has opened up new market
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spaces, for example in telecommunications – driving technological
innovation but also dramatic change in the relationship between
person and public domain, state and market. Coincident with that
has been a roll-back of the direct power of the state, or institutions
that mediate between individuals and representative collective
interests. While these trends have often sought to emphasise the
empowerment of individuals, there has been a loosening of the ties
between people and these types of institutions.
It is no surprise that the concept of precariousness has often
accompanied these stories of global change. Let us follow the
example of Isabell Lorey’s argument on precariousness.3 In the
1960s, the archetypical ‘precarious’ person was a somebody who
stepped out of (or was ejected from) a strongly homogenous society
and thereby produced ‘alternative’ communities. These stood in a
marginal relationship to the rest of society. As she and others such as
Chantal Mouffe argue, the 1980s saw precariousness becoming a
more generalised condition, a feature of everyday life. Suddenly,
hitherto relatively stable notions of work, family and cultural
networks became precarious. People’s relationships to their jobs
changed, and certainty with regard to their sense of who they are
became harder to find. At the same time, ‘mainstream’ culture and
society has become increasingly fragmented – the rising significance
of the ‘Long Tail’,4 for example, and the declining consumption of
mass media suggest a society turning towards the niche.
Precariousness is becoming mainstream.
Since precariousness is now a shared societal condition, it
conditions the ways in which citizens negotiate moments of privacy
in daily life. The task we must set is to recognise opportunities for a
radically different form of privacy that intervenes and works with the
social context – the way that we understand each other – rather
than simply reacting to ‘threats’ alone. Our job should be to work
out how the relationships that we connect to privacy are (and can
be) produced and reproduced to benefit genuinely from this
opportunity moment.
In this moment of flux, there are potentially different
incentives for government, private sector and the general public that
could drive how privacy is approached and produced. The current
condition of precariousness makes this a key moment in which to
consider privacy, because the crisis moment can either prompt an
empowering renegotiation of relations, or instead a profoundly
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threatening trend. This latter, reactive aspect is a powerful force. 
As we shall see, it can prompt a reaction against those deemed
‘outside’ or threatening to the remaining ideals of togetherness 
and commonality – those who invade our privacy and disrupt 
our fraught and increasingly unattainable sense of security and
stability.
This also implies that the institutions that profess to provide
such protection are relevant, something especially evident in the
light of increasingly prominent security concerns. Just as we
question their accountability to democratic control, we ought to
continuously interrogate what spatial syntax they produce and its
implications for those who are co-producing spatial outcomes. In
sum, this is a moment in which we can, or should, re-establish a
collective ability to engage in the process of negotiating the
relationships on which privacy depends, and through which it is
inscribed in space.
The privacy we want, and the privacy we get
But what are the influences and interests that pull and shape how
privacy is produced? We focus here on two areas: corporate or
private sector interests, and the interests of the state. Their actions
are a necessary product of their need to manage populations, albeit
for different ends. Through the operating of both, space and the
places around us come to reflect how privacy is valued. Far from
being something imposed on us by overt force, this happens partly
through gradual seduction.
From a corporate perspective, the present state of flux is
positive. Corporate economies support fragmentation, movement
and breaks, as a means to continuously re-contextualise demands.
Insight in our private sphere is evidently favourable, because it
allows for a tailoring of products and offers to individuals’ perceived
aspiration, want or need. But it is too hasty to consider that
corporate economies are interested in full transparency or the
wholesale abolishment of the private sphere. Instead their interest
lies in a highly dynamic and heterogeneous private sphere, as long
as it remains open to measurement with sophisticated marketing
tools.
On the one hand, businesses need access to our private realm;
they need to learn about what we do and who we are. But at the
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same time, people’s compulsion to consume is based in and
dependent on the very private sphere, on the idea that marketised
goods reflect our inner self – that they help us craft, define and
communicate ‘who I am’. Hence the privacy enunciated by
corporate economies is simultaneously expanding and contracting;
without (at least the illusion of) private and individual selves, the
‘dividual’5 of companies’ samples, data and targeted products
become meaningless.
This is not just true for products; the same process has been 
at work in urban space at large. Fuelled by the increasing aesthetic
reflexivity of urban populations, resulting in the more conscious
crafting of lifestyles, such identities – aggregated from individual 
to recognisable and marketable groups – get inscribed into space.
What is striking about present-day urban space is not the extent 
to which we have accepted intrusions in our privacy with CCTV
cameras, but the extent to which public space is segmented
according to lifestyle groups and communities of interest. This
process has eclipsed the general public, annihilating that classic
element of urban sociology, the ‘anonymous crowd’. The flaneur is
no longer the ultimate individual but an urban ‘dividual’, member
of one of many ‘commodity publics’, catered for by themed urban
spaces, the physical equivalent of the highly self-selecting social
dynamic that forms the core of Facebook’s success.6
These influences work in a moment in which the relationships
that privacy embodies are seemingly up for grabs. The moment of
crisis constitutes a dissolved or dissolving ‘grammar’ that opens the
possibility of a productive change in how we understand how the
world fits together. That is an opportunity for society to become
more open, as ideas and groups can become actively involved in
negotiating the terms and conditions that are henceforth to apply –
until the next renegotiation.
Although the boundaries between private and public sector
are blurring, the state plays a distinct and significant role in shaping
and influencing how privacy is valued. For this essay’s purposes, we
are interested in how the state, in its role as the mediator between
individual and collective interests, influences the public’s
perceptions and attitudes to the distinctions between public and
private. In particular, its role in protecting public security has come
to the fore.
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Privacy and punishment reinvented
We cannot be blind to the risks that are simultaneously immanent 
in this moment of flux. Major disasters set the stage for capitalist
forces to assert their hegemony in previously unconceivable ways 
by sweeping aside previously existing constraints of ‘traditional’
society, often side-stepping democratic concerns in the process, the
crisis moment has also produced markedly undemocratic, reactive
practices and spaces.
A serious analysis of the relationship between space and
power raises many questions about how far spatial conditions have
influenced and continue to affect conscious violations of human
rights. Post 9/11 in particular, one can trace an increasing habit of
politicians to convert the tools of spatial planning in order to create
microclimates which do not obey any legal framework, subverting
existing notions of both individual privacy and public scrutiny.
There is evidence that spatial planning has been used as a
mechanism to convert spaces into strategic weapons of punishment
that reflect prejudices and the interests of dominant ideologies and
institutions. At this point, people’s ability to influence the
public–private realm disappears; the decisions about us and them
are instead presented to us as fait accompli.
In 2005, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben re-
interpreted the US ‘war against all evil’ as a symbolic gesture that
envisions an alteration of the political landscape.7 Two months 
after the September attacks in 2001, the Bush administration – in
the midst of what it perceived as a state of emergency – authorised
the indefinite imprisonment of non-citizens suspected of terrorist
activities. This policy, according to Agamben, should be understood
as the ‘state of exception’, a powerful strategy that enables the trans-
formation of a contemporary democracy into a civil dictatorship.
Agamben argues that the state of exception, instead of a provisional
measure, has become part of the everyday fabric of society. This has
moulded the current precariousness and crisis moment into a
reactive situation in which barriers and boundaries are reinforced in
an attempt by the state to reassert a particular notion of stability and
security.
In the post 9/11 world, we are told that in ‘times of war’ rules
and rights are no longer applicable and have to be ‘temporarily’
suspended. In some instances military judges replace civil courts
and, in the name of national security, the president – as the civil
leader of the military – embodies unrestricted powers. The
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underlying principle of justification is whether or not a particular
action is taking place in the name of national interest – with this
very interest defined by the power that pursues it. In this context,
the term ‘terror’ is being pollinated with ‘war’. Consequently, ‘war’
allows for all civil rights to be suspended.
In this context, it is not surprising that those imprisoned in
Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), the
detention centre at Bagram airport (Afghanistan), Abu Ghraib
prison (Iraq) and numerous third-country penitentiaries have 
been deferred into territories that lack human rights monitoring,
influenced by the infamous White House directive that ‘terrorist’
suspects do not deserve the rights given to prisoners of war under
the Geneva Conventions.
This method of creating extra-legal territory also includes the
technique known as ‘extraordinary rendition’. In April 2005,
Human Rights Watch released a summary of evidence of US abuse
of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba and other programmes of
secret CIA detention.8 The US government openly admits that they
seek diplomatic assurances from states where torture is a common
phenomenon, an absurd pragmatism of one state requesting that
another make an exception to its general policy of using torture
with respect to just one individual. This has deeply disturbing
implications. Proactively proposing the creation of such territorial
and legal islands of protection illustrates the imperative function of
space, and comes close to accepting the ocean of abuse that
surrounds it.
When Giorgio Agamben, both prior to and post 9/11, dis-
cussed the principles of Western society, he rendered a threatening
image that is gaining momentum but is consistent from legal
documents all the way back to the Roman Empire. Influenced by
Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism and the institutional form
of rights,9 Agamben traced a historic process towards his primary
thesis: there is an unforeseen solidarity between democracy and
totalitarianism. According to the Roman legal system, the one who
threatened the existing order of the Republic was treated as a public
enemy, the ultimate outsider, as ‘Homo Sacer’ – the one without
rights – who was stripped of his human attributes, reduced to
nothing but a living being who could be executed with no further
ado. Logically, the individual’s right to privacy is obliterated: his
‘bare existence’ is that of an animal whose privacy is irrelevant.
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The videos and photographic footage that came out of Iraq’s
Abu Ghraib prison illustrate graphically the urgent relevance of
Agamben’s theory: the stripping of rights, and bodily violations, 
the naked bodies piled on top of each other and its sadistic
choreography blend into a scene that resonates with the fatal
imagery of the twentieth century. Within this, there seems to be a
strong link to what Michel Foucault described as the premodern
‘ceremonial of punishment’: ‘some prisoners may be condemned to
be hanged… others, for more serious crimes, to be broken alive and
to die on the wheel, after having their limbs broken; others to be
broken until they die a natural death.’10 Starting from such medieval
practices, Foucault illustrates how far in present-day societies
physical punishment has become the most hidden part of the penal
process. In the twentieth century, he argues, the spectacle of
punishment has shifted to the trial. But if there is no trial, such as
seems to be the case now that the ‘the rules of the games have
changed’, there is no scene. We are witnessing the disappearance of
public sentencing, and with that we lose accountability, and justice.
We are left with the occasional leaks of a sinisterly private spectacle
of abuse.
Another spatial expression of the state of exception, the naval
base Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, is essentially a territory in which
prisoners can be held indefinitely beyond scrutiny of US courts –
some of them since 2001. It is the ‘legal equivalent of outer space’;11
since it is not considered US territory, those imprisoned there have
none of the rights of someone brought to US soil. Amnesty
International has compared the territory with Soviet concentration
camps known as Gulags, where resistance was legal proof of the
need for ‘treatment’.
The spatial construction of Camp Delta consists of a maze of
fences, razor wire and guard towers. Walls are made from chain link
and cells are protected from the elements by corrugated metal
sheets. Prisoners spend most of their time in their cells, sitting on
the floor or lying on foam sleeping mats. At night the entire territory
is lit up so the guards can see the prisoners’ every move. This
extreme of security is the extreme absence of privacy. The
construction of additional detention units was completed by mid
April 2002, and done by Brown & Root Services (BRS) – a
subsidiary company of oil venture Halliburton – approximately five
miles from Camp X-ray. Each detention unit is 8 feet long, 6 feet 
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8 inches wide and 8 feet tall and constructed with metal mesh on a
solid steel frame.12 Each detainee is provided with a foam sleeping
mattress, a blanket, and a half-inch-thick prayer mat.
It is precisely these conditions that have been meticulously
designed in order to alter the behaviour of inmates and cause
symptoms such as chronic depression, suicide, interpersonal
rejection, psychiatric disorder and trauma. Spatial components are
being used as a tool to both punish and coerce. As soon as the aim
is achieved – ie the detainee confesses – the spatial conditions are
altered. Detainees who are willing to comply and confess have the
opportunity to become a ‘level one’ detainee and live in Camp Four,
where prisoners are housed in communal settings. Spatial design in
the service of mental breakdown and humiliation has become part
of the everyday fabric.
Through Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault explains the subtle
form of psychological control of inmates in the private–public
microclimate of a prison. It seems this has turned into a scenario in
which there is neither political control on the micro-scale he
described, nor a fully operative legal framework able to deal with
this parasitic relationship between politics and space.
From permanent exception to everyday opportunity
Although the ‘camp’ should by no means be understood as a
possible answer to some of the political questions that are
continuously being raised by the ‘architects of power’, at least the
camp offers a spatially defined framework, which can be judged and
debated as a tangible space. The state of exception has led to the
spaces of exception, where the performance of privacy takes place
under lawless conditions not seen on such a scale since the Second
World War. Tomorrow’s politics should reach out for an architecture
of human rights. That architecture would be one that did not shy
away from the complicity of space in affecting the individual’s
public–private interface, but was open about the relations created,
and democratic in their continuous renegotiation.
The crimes regarding the organisation of the built
environment through the deliberate misuse of spatial components,
isolating human targets by withdrawing them from any evident
physical environment while dehumanising the individual, are in
desperate need of further analysis. This calls for the involvement not
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just of politicians or human rights groups, but also of architects and
planners trying to dismantle and understand the physical
relationship between space and power. Guantanamo and Abu
Ghraib are showcases for the extreme extents to which physical
planning is capable of ethical failure.
We experience this every day in cities where conditions aren’t
nearly as stark. But we should be equally attentive to the socio-
spatial strategies of intrusion, segregation and exclusion from the
right to self-determination about the boundaries between the self
and the world around us. The private sector offers continual
reaffirmation of the self; the state promises an elusive sense of
security. In an age of precariousness, the actions of market and state
offer the public a reassurance of identity and security, in return for
the relinquishing of privacy. We have to insist on playing our part in
this ongoing re-negotiation, lest we be reduced from performers in a
play, to mere spectators of an increasingly sinister spectacle.
Markus Miessen is a German, London-based architect, researcher, educator
and writer.
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At Liberty we try and avoid the use of phrases such as ‘Orwellian’
and ‘Big Brother’ when describing privacy, surveillance and data
sharing in the UK. We’re concerned it can lead to allegations of
wild-eyed paranoia. It seems that we might have been overcautious.
In 2007 even senior police officers such as the deputy chief
constable of Hampshire, Ian Readhead, seem worried that we are
edging towards the world of 1984. On the BBC show Daily Politics
he said that the spread of CCTV cameras is leading the country into
‘an Orwellian situation’.1
He is not alone. In October 2006 the Information Com-
missioner Richard Thomas described the UK as a ‘surveillance
society’. He said it as a statement of fact.2 Since then select
committees in both Houses of Parliament have launched enquiries
into surveillance while the main opposition parties rarely miss an
opportunity to lambaste the government with allegations of
contempt for individual privacy and an unhealthy obsession with
snooping.
It was not always like this. In the aftermath of 9/11, expressing
a concern about surveillance was seen as being soft on terrorism and
crime. Vox pops on the BBC website agreed that ID cards were an
essential weapon in the war on terror. Only those with something to
hide had something to fear. Privacy was a right easily trumped by
national security. While these arguments might still be rolled out on
occasion today, the range and quantity of those keen to voice their
disagreement is on the increase.
But is it too late? Some are now warning that privacy as we
understand it is a concept that will seem alien a generation from
now, that we are either regressing into the Stasi-esque world of The
Lives of Others or heading towards the cyber-futurism of Minority
Report. Whether melodramatic or not, in 2007 we are subject to
levels of state and private sector intrusion and surveillance
unimaginable ten years ago.
This is not necessarily always a bad thing. Surveillance
techniques need to adapt to deal with modern criminality while data
sharing can make life more convenient and improve access to public
services. What has been missing in government policy in recent
years is a sense of proportionality limiting privacy intrusion so that
it is targeted and appropriate. This overarching principle can be
applied across the range of privacy-relevant subjects. It is helpful to
look at some of these in more detail before looking at possible ways
of redressing the balance.
Privacy intrusion by the state is generally summarised as
‘surveillance’. This word means many things to many people. There
are several broad categorisations that can help definition. ‘Mass
informational surveillance’ covers the retention and dissemination
of database information. This would cover databases such as the
National Identity Register (NIR), created by the Identity Card Act
2006 (IDCA) and the children’s index set up by the Children Act
2004. ‘Mass visual surveillance’ relates to the use of CCTV cameras.
‘Targeted surveillance’ refers to the use of intrusive powers such as
communication interception by means of the framework created
under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).
The central distinction between these types of surveillance is that
targeted surveillance is commonly used as part of intelligence-led
investigation into illegal or unlawful activity. Mass visual and
informational surveillance does not take place in anticipation of a
specific investigation into impropriety but will often be claimed to
have some crime detection or (in the case of CCTV) crime
prevention purpose. Information is retained and disseminated in
anticipation of being of use for investigation. Mass informational
surveillance will also take place for purposes unrelated to
investigation such as assisting access to public services.
Mass and targeted surveillance techniques have usually 
been distinct. However, in the last few years this distinction has
been blurred by the increasing use of ‘data-matching’ and ‘data-
mining’ processes. These techniques are based on the use of
automated processes that analyse or match seemingly innocuous
data in order to throw up anomalies or inconsistencies. When 
used in relation to information about people this is more 
commonly known as ‘profiling’. The blurring of distinction arises
from the fact that there is no human- or intelligence-led initiation of
suspicion. Human investigation will follow after initial matching or
mining.
Although not strictly surveillance the retention of DNA on the
National DNA Database (NDNAD) should also be mentioned. The
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UK has five times as many people on its database as any other
country. DNA retention is not informational surveillance in that the
‘data’ (at present) serve a specific single purpose, which cannot be
applied elsewhere. DNA retention is, however, of concern to an
increasing number of people.
In privacy terms possibly the most profound societal shift in
the last ten years has been the proliferation and use of mass
informational databases. We have become so used to instant
informational access, particularly from online sources such as
Google, that it is easy to forget how recently things have changed. It
is also easy to see how concerns about mass informational systems
used by the state can be seen as Luddite. Looking at the legislative
frameworks behind mass database programmes can be telling,
however. What the Identity Card Act 2006, the Children Act 2004
and the recently enacted UK Borders Act 2007 (which will require
anyone from outside the European Union to have a ‘biometric
information document’) share is enormous scope for both the
information contained and the bodies with access to be increased.
The ability to increase powers is generally left to the ‘positive
resolution’ process whereby extensions are given limited debate 
and parliamentarians can only vote for or against the order as a
whole.
When systems are in place it makes logistical, practical and
financial sense to use and expand these powers as much as possible.
Liberty has always maintained that the uses put forward justifying
the ID card scheme, from crime to unlawful immigration and
terrorism to identity fraud, fail to stand up to scrutiny. However,
whatever use is made of them events will inevitably occur which will
result in an extension of powers. If, for example, the NIR had been
in operation at the time of Ian Huntley’s conviction for the Soham
murders, the mood of public outrage was such that there would
have been political pressure to place details of convictions or ‘soft’
non-conviction police intelligence onto NIR entries.3 The
experience of the previous Second World War identity cards
suggests that extra purposes would soon be found as that scheme
saw an increase in uses from three to 39 in 11 years.
Pressure to increase the scope of use of the NIR could arise
from a need to make it of genuine use in combating serious crime or
terrorism. After the July 2005 attacks, the former Home Secretary,
Charles Clarke, publicly accepted that ID cards and the NIR would
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not have prevented the attacks. This makes sense as it is safe to
assume that British intelligence and policing agencies have gathered
information on anyone that they believe could constitute a risk to
national security.
The reality is that anyone who does give reason for concern
would become subject to a level of targeted surveillance that would
collate information going way beyond what would be contained on
the NIR. It is not feasible that the NIR entry would add
information to that possessed by the security services. This leads to a
worrying possibility; in order to be of any use whatsoever in
combating terrorism, the NIR must contain more information. This
would need to be of a type that would separate those who present
no, or minimal, risk to national security from those who might pose
a serious risk. In other words, to be of any use in combating
terrorism, data contained on the NIR must be increased in order to
allow some degree of profiling and categorisation.
Profiling of information through data matching or data
mining is increasingly being seen as a legitimate policing technique.
The Serious Crime Act 2007 places data matching for fraud
purposes on a statutory footing. So far profiling of persons has
remained too contentious and divisive a proposal for the
government. However, following the 7 July 2005 bombings and the
plot to blow up a series of transatlantic flights in August 2006 there
were calls from a number of commentators to introduce profiling
for public transport users and airline passengers, respectively.
Profiling may be the future of surveillance.
Of course many informational databases can serve useful
purposes. In theory the children’s index set up under the Children
Act 2004 could be a useful resource for identifying children at risk
from neglect and abuse. Unfortunately, making the index apply to
every child in the UK and allowing broad scope to enter detail on
the index increases the potential for both familial privacy intrusion
and counterproductivity. In particular, so much information might
be entered onto the index, especially by social workers who are
worried by the consequences of failing to register information, that
soon the woods cannot be seen for the trees and children genuinely
at risk are overlooked.
As DCC Readhead’s words attest, CCTV is a frequent target
for allegations of state ‘Big Brotherdom’.4 However, there are few
who argue it has no uses. Since the poignant images of Robert
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Thompson and Jon Venables in a Merseyside shopping centre
leading Jamie Bulger to his death seized the nation in 1993 it has
been common currency that CCTV helps fight crime. Of course
CCTV has crime detection uses. It also, as in the case of the 7 July
bombers, has proved to be of use in piecing together a retrospective
picture of events leading to a major crime. Its use as a crime
prevention tool is debatable. Street lighting is a more effective way
of reducing crime. At best CCTV can be one part of a local crime
strategy.
To an extent debates over effectiveness, while interesting, are
not the principal issue with CCTV. It is here to stay. Of greater
significance is its unregulated nature. The relevance of the Data
Protection Act 1998 (DPA) is limited for two reasons. First, a
decision by the House of Lords in the case of Durant means that
footage from many systems not specifically targeted on an
identifiable subject (ie most public systems) are not covered by the
DPA. Second, the DPA contains a series of principles about
processing data but is of little assistance in providing any detail for
more practical matters such as locating and signposting cameras
and the handling, disseminating and disposal of footage. Bodies
such as the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) and the Local
Government Information Unit (LGIU) have published detailed
codes of practice on CCTV use. However, these are for guidance
and carry no sanction for breach. In terms of enforceability CCTV
remains very much the Wild West.
NDNAD used to be relatively uncontentious. When set up in
1995 it was used for the storage and use of DNA samples of those
convicted of certain offences, mainly involving sexual assault or
violence. Since 1999 successive acts of Parliament have rolled back
the grounds for the taking and permanent retention of DNA so that
anyone can have their DNA retained on the NDNAD for the rest of
their lives after being arrested for a recordable offence (generally
those for which a person could be sent to prison). A recent Home
Office consultation has suggested that this could be again extended
to cover non-recordable offences allowing for permanent DNA
retention for the most minor traffic offence.
Coupled with ever-expanding grounds of retention is the
difficulty in removing samples on the database. There is a 
general discretion to remove but no statutory basis for making
determinations. Thus, decisions tend to be operational ones 
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made by individual forces and discretion seems very sparingly 
used. People arrested and then not proceeded against routinely 
find that the sample is retained. This practice makes DNA 
retention increasingly rub up against the concerns of ‘Middle
England’ as middle-class parents whose children have minor
brushes with the law find out that youthful indiscretion can lead 
to permanent retention. Suddenly the NDNAD becomes much
more than a necessary tool for capturing violent criminals and 
sex offenders.
Of course violent and serious crime detection is most assisted
by the more intrusive forms of targeted surveillance such as
communication interception. The framework for intrusive
surveillance is set out in the highly complex Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). Even those who are familiar
with its workings can struggle with RIPA, which was referred to by
David Blunkett when Home Secretary as ‘this horribly complicated
legislation’. RIPA creates five different tiers of surveillance ranging
from interception of communications as most intrusive down to
access to communications data, which is the record (but not
content) of phone calls, mobile calls, emails and website visits. Use
of RIPA is staggering with 439,000 warrants for communications
access alone being granted between 1 January 2005 and 31 March
2006. The authorisation process ranges from self-approval for
communications data by the myriad of public bodies able to apply
for it to warrant signed by a government minister for interception of
communications.
Executive authorisation is a long way from independent
judicial oversight, which is totally absent. Anyone believing the
UK’s system is likely to compare favourably with that of the US
might be surprised to know that no interception of communications
can take place within the US without court authorisation.
Suspicions that this might in fact be occurring resulted in the
deputy press secretary at the White House, Dana Perino, going on
record in November 2006 to say: ‘There is no domestic surveillance
[in the US] without court approval.’5
The oversight structure is also lacking. Three separate
Commissioners between them review the use of RIPA power but
their functions are mainly restricted to reporting after the event. The
Investigatory Powers Tribunal does provide recourse to those who
believe they have been improperly subjected to surveillance.
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However, the success rates of the 150 or so applicants who have
cases heard annually is not staggering. In December 2006 the
tribunal’s one and only finding of unlawful surveillance determined
that Police Chief Superintendent Ali Dizaei had his telephone
unlawfully tapped.
This somewhat whistle-stop run through a broad range of
privacy and surveillance issues might be seen as painting a
somewhat negative and pessimistic picture. To an extent this is true.
Part of the problem is that the legislative framework in place to
protect privacy is lacking. The human rights principles embodied in
the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) make specific provision for
privacy protection through Article 8. In common with most of the
rights guaranteed in the HRA it also provides a comprehensive
framework allowing for appropriate limiting of privacy rights when
in accordance with the law, for a legitimate purpose, and
proportionate. The problem with the HRA is that it is mainly
tailored to protect individual ‘victims’. It is not best suited for
providing protection against the societal-wide impact of mass data
sharing and surveillance.
The DPA is far more suited to the protection of data privacy.
However it is nearly ten years old and originated from a directive
dating back to 1995. Its ability to provide proper limitation to data-
processing, data-matching and data-mining techniques in 2007 can
be questioned.
For example the DPA contains eight principles, which all data
processing must comply with. One of these allows processing only
for one or more specified purposes. However, there is no limit on
those purposes so long as they are registered with the ICO. This
means multiple registrations could allow potentially unlimited uses.
The ICO is limited in its ability to act against excessive processing.
Its powers in relation to processing are essentially administrative
rather than regulatory. What enforcement powers the ICO does
have tend to be used after the event and rely on cooperation of the
data controller.
There are many problems with the nature of privacy
protection. There are, however, a number of steps that can be taken
which might at least partially redress the balance. At the top of the
list is new data protection legislation. This could help provide
effective regulation of CCTV and update the data protection regime
to provide proper enforcement powers to the ICO.
175
Effective powers for the ICO is only part of the story. It also
needs to be properly resourced to proactively ensure that data
protection is taken seriously. Good practice and inter-agency
cooperation are more important in ensuring this than new
enforcement powers. This is of particular relevance to the operation
of mass informational database systems when privacy protection is
frequently about the appreciation of public bodies as to what is
proportionate.
Formalisation of a rigorous weeding regime to remove from
the NDNAD DNA samples from those who are not convicted of
offences of sex or violence would immediately make the retention of
DNA more equitable and less contentious. The introduction of a
degree of judicial oversight in RIPA authorisation along with a more
rigorous scrutiny from commissioners would greatly enhance the
accountability of intrusive surveillance.
This is just a quick summary of some of the steps that could
be taken. None are radical or revolutionary. For a government of
whichever persuasion willing to listen to the growing expressions of
public concern about privacy intrusion they could represent an
opportunity to make political capital while helping to make privacy
once again a meaningful concept.
Gareth Crossman is Director of Policy at Liberty.
Notes
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1 See www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/
21/npolice121.xml (accessed 19 Mar 2008).
2 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6108496.stm (accessed 5 Mar
2008).
3 As it was, the Bichard Inquiry into the killings made the
commendable suggestion that a positive vetting process be
introduced.
4 See www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_
article_id=456487&in_page_id=1770&in_page_id=1770&expand=t
rue (accessed 26 Mar 2008).
5 See L Cauley, ‘NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone
calls’, USA Today, 5 Nov 2006, see www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm (accessed 19 Mar 2008).
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The work (as defined below) is provided under the terms of this licence ('licence'). The work
is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as
authorized under this licence is prohibited. By exercising any rights to the work provided
here, you accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this licence. Demos grants you the
rights contained here in consideration of your acceptance of such terms and conditions.
1 Definitions
A 'Collective Work' means a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology or encyclopedia, in
which the Work in its entirety in unmodified form, along with a number of other
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled
into a collective whole. A work that constitutes a Collective Work will not be considered a
Derivative Work (as defined below) for the purposes of this Licence.
B 'Derivative Work' means a work based upon the Work or upon the Work and other pre-
existing works, such as a musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which the Work may be recast, transformed, or adapted, except that a work that constitutes
a Collective Work or a translation from English into another language will not be considered
a Derivative Work for the purpose of this Licence.
C 'Licensor' means the individual or entity that offers the Work under the terms of this Licence.
D 'Original Author' means the individual or entity who created the Work.
E 'Work' means the copyrightable work of authorship offered under the terms of this Licence.
F 'You' means an individual or entity exercising rights under this Licence who has not
previously violated the terms of this Licence with respect to the Work,or who has received
express permission from Demos to exercise rights under this Licence despite a previous
violation.
2 Fair Use Rights
Nothing in this licence is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use,
first sale or other limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under copyright
law or other applicable laws.
3 Licence Grant
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Licence, Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide,
royalty-free, non-exclusive,perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) licence to
exercise the rights in the Work as stated below: 
A to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, and to
reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works;
B to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly,perform publicly, and perform
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as incorporated in
Collective Works; The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now
known or hereafter devised.The above rights include the right to make such modifications as
are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. All rights not
expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved.
4 Restrictions
The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited by the
following restrictions:
A You may distribute,publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work
only under the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the Uniform
Resource Identifier for, this Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You
distribute, publicly display,publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform.You may not offer or
impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms of this Licence or the
recipients’ exercise of the rights granted hereunder.You may not sublicence the Work.You
must keep intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of warranties.You
may not distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work
with any technological measures that control access or use of the Work in a manner
inconsistent with the terms of this Licence Agreement.The above applies to the Work as
incorporated in a Collective Work, but this does not require the Collective Work apart from
the Work itself to be made subject to the terms of this Licence. If You create a Collective
Work, upon notice from any Licencor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the
Collective Work any reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested.
B You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that
is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary
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compensation.The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital
filesharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed toward
commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of
any monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of copyrighted works.
C If you distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work or
any Collective Works,You must keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and give the
Original Author credit reasonable to the medium or means You are utilizing by conveying the
name (or pseudonym if applicable) of the Original Author if supplied; the title of the Work if
supplied. Such credit may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however,
that in the case of a Collective Work, at a minimum such credit will appear where any other
comparable authorship credit appears and in a manner at least as prominent as such other
comparable authorship credit.
5 Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer
A By offering the Work for public release under this Licence, Licensor represents and warrants
that, to the best of Licensor’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry:
i Licensor has secured all rights in the Work necessary to grant the licence rights hereunder
and to permit the lawful exercise of the rights granted hereunder without You having any
obligation to pay any royalties, compulsory licence fees, residuals or any other payments;
ii The Work does not infringe the copyright, trademark, publicity rights, common law rights
or any other right of any third party or constitute defamation, invasion of privacy or other
tortious injury to any third party.
B except as expressly stated in this licence or otherwise agreed in writing or required by
applicable law,the work is licenced on an 'as is'basis,without warranties of any kind, either
express or implied including,without limitation,any warranties regarding the contents or
accuracy of the work.
6 Limitation on Liability
Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability
to a third party resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will licensor
be liable to you on any legal theory for any special, incidental,consequential, punitive or
exemplary damages arising out of this licence or the use of the work, even if licensor has
been advised of the possibility of such damages.
7 Termination
A This Licence and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach
by You of the terms of this Licence. Individuals or entities who have received Collective
Works from You under this Licence,however, will not have their licences terminated provided
such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with those licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7,
and 8 will survive any termination of this Licence.
B Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the
duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor
reserves the right to release the Work under different licence terms or to stop distributing
the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw
this Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the terms
of this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as
stated above.
8 Miscellaneous
A Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos
offers to the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence
granted to You under this Licence.
B If any provision of this Licence is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not
affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this Licence, and without
further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.
C No term or provision of this Licence shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to
unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with
such waiver or consent.
D This Licence constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work
licensed here.There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to
the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that
may appear in any communication from You.This Licence may not be modified without the
mutual written agreement of Demos and You.
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The transformation of our social lives and the 
increases in surveillance and technological
innovations have led us to believe that privacy is
in the midst of a very public death. But privacy is
not dying, nor can we let it do so. Privacy protects
a set of deeply significant values that no society can
do without; it is about the lines, boundaries and
relationships we draw between and among ourselves,
communities and institutions. Privacy appears
threatened because our perception of what it means
has radically changed.
This collection argues that we get the privacy 
culture we deserve. Our appetite for a connected 
society means we have yet to determine why we 
still care about privacy. These essays explore the 
underlying challenges and realities of privacy in an 
open society, and argue for a new settlement between 
the individual and society; the public and the state; 
the consumer and business. To achieve this, we need 
collective participation in negotiating the terms and 
conditions of twenty-first century privacy.
Charlie Edwards is Head of the Security Programme 
at Demos. Catherine Fieschi is Director of Demos.
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“An open society
depends on individuals
rediscovering the social
value of privacy...”
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